American Civil War what if? (2 Viewers)

Over the last few months a fellow US Frogger member-who is studying the ACW as part of his history degree-has asked me by e-mail my opinion on a number of aspects of the war. Just recently he asked me my thoughts on Gettysburg as a turning point of the war my reply was something like the following:-

Was Gettysburg a definitive turning point of the war? Militarily, probably not. The engagement was not particularly unique, nor did it appreciably alter the pervasive stalemate in the East. Historians have micro-analyzed the battle like no other during those four years of conflict in an attempt to fully understand it, so much so, that we have ended up with an enigma wrapped in nostalgia, subjectivity and myth. The battle was indeed a pivotal event in the course of American history, but not for the reasons popularly held. It's hallowed ground is a grand mausoleum of patriotic dead-a euphemism if you like for noble sacrifice which gave birth to the Lost Cause & High Tide of the Confederacy.

Like Howard's post-John Buford actions during the first day has always impressed me but until Shaara's novel The Killer Angels and the film Gettysburg hardly anyone- apart from us ACW nerds- had never really heard of him. However, when aligning the myth of Gettysburg against Buford's actual delaying actions an entirely different picture can arise.

It certainly cannot be denied that the experience of Buford and his men forced the Confederates to deploy and advance slowly towards their goal. Yet it should be noted that at first Heth did not press the issue-he kept most of his infantry in column formation while eight companies of Archer's brigade formed as skirmishers and easily pushed Gamble's pickets back about 1/12 miles from Marsh Creek to Herr Ridge. Even then with support from Davis' brigade and Pegram's rifled cannons the Rebs carried the ridge without difficulty and forced Gamble's men to retire to the woods along Willoughby Run. The light intensity of fighting to this point is confirmed by the fact that the Union cavalry involved suffered no real serious casualties before 0930.

Col Fry's 13th Alabama which was the Confederate skirmish line from 0730 to 0930 lost only 7 men slightly wounded during this whole time. After the war Fry explained to historian John B Bachelder "As to the the resistance made by the Union cavalry I clearly remember that it was inconsiderable and did not delay as very much. Only small parties appeared to our front and inflicted no real damage to us"

Buford's greatest service was his decision to stand and fight on McPherson's Ridge. Harry Heth on the other hand showed that he expected the Yankee cavalry to continue to withdraw. Once he saw that Buford was not going to give way is when he decided to form a line and bring up Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades from the rear of his column. By all accounts it took him an hour to accomplish this. As he started to advance is when Reynolds and his 1st Corps arrived.

If Heth had formed his line anytime before this (and he was told at 0730 that morning that he was facing Yankee cavalry and not local militia) he would have swept Buford's troopers off of the ridges at least an hour before the arrival of the Iron Brigade

Now that is a big Gettysburg what if that had happened?

Bob
 
Rob

Re the 20th Maine's now famous bayonet charge I concur with George's comments and can also highlight a little known fact of that action.

Chamberlain had exalted his regiment's charge in his post-war memoirs which was then immortalised in Shaara's novel. However, years later Col William Oates contended that his 15th Alabama were completely exhausted with no water after marching 20 miles before their multiple failed charges up LRT. He also stated that he was already assembling his men for an orderly retreat when Chamberlain's attack hit them. Chamberlain called this "sour grapes".

This difference of opinion carried on again sometime later when in an attempt to commemorate the 15th Alabama, Oates returned to LRT to erect a monument at the point of his regiment's farthest advance. Chamberlain immediately protested, stating that the 15th Alabama never reached as far as Oates claimed (although it likely had). After heated changes between the two (who were now both governors of their respective states) the Gettysburg Park officials sided with Chamberlain and the monument was never built.

The victor always writes the history somehow comes to mind in this case.

Bob
 
Bob, as always good to hear your thoughts and I appreciate you posting. I've read in several places that the Rebs were out of water when they started the attack, on a warm day and fighting uphill must have been hard work. So if as you say the Rebs were knackered and as George says the 20th Maine were further down the slope is it fair to suggest then that the 20th Maine's action have been hyped up by some considerable amount perhaps at the expense of other units on the day including 44th New York and 16th Michigan, although they did fight on what was still a vital part of the Union line. I've also read that Col Strong Vincent has been largely overlooked compared to chamberlain despite the fact that he quickly realised how dangerous the situation was at that point in the line and was quick to convey this to Chamberlain. I don't mean to take anything away from the 20th Maine as they obviously fought with great heart and determination, but there is no doubt other units and other commanding officers are overlooked.

So Bob, IF the Rebs were watered and rested and IF they'd taken the top, what would you say would have been the likely effect of this on the battle, the full on ' roll up' or something much less but nonetheless important?

Rob
 
What Confederate units were behind the troops that attacked Little Round Top? Was there anything behind that punch that had full canteens?
 
What Confederate units were behind the troops that attacked Little Round Top? Was there anything behind that punch that had full canteens?
If I remember correctly, the Confederates were all in. Longstreet had gone into the attack without Pickett's division, and so was undermanned. I do not recall there being a single uncommitted unit that could have been used to exploit or assist the assault on LRT. This also speaks to the question about the Confederates simply extending their line to outflank LRT. Oates could not do it. He was the far end of the Confederate line and extending his regiment would have exceeded his orders, weakened the assault and he would have risked losing contact with the troops on his left, not to mention moving into uncharted territory, without knowledge of the ground or possible Union troop positions. -- Al
 
Oates could not do it. He was the far end of the Confederate line and extending his regiment would have exceeded his orders, weakened the assault and he would have risked losing contact with the troops on his left, not to mention moving into uncharted territory, without knowledge of the ground or possible Union troop positions. -- Al

Not to mention to the left of Chamberlains 20th Maine there were Berdan Sharpshooters behind a stone wall that would have laid into Oates if he did try to outflank the position.

In as much has been made of Oates' men attacking uphill with very little water, the troops who really had a tough task were the 4th and 4th Texas as well as the 4th Alabama as they attacked through Devils Den, across the Slaughter Pen, the Valley of Death and up the face of Little Round Top, all the while wide open and exposed to rifle and artillery fire; they made it just about to the crest of Little Round Top, a much more difficult charge.........

v
 
So Bob, IF the Rebs were watered and rested and IF they'd taken the top, what would you say would have been the likely effect of this on the battle, the full on ' roll up' or something much less but nonetheless important?

Rob

I'm most probably well in the minority with this view but I have never considered LRT as being strategically important- it has merely become part of the Gettysburg myth I mentioned in a previous post. Let me state the facts that I base that on. If those rocky heights were so critical, would Meade have left them vacant?-as George says climb to the top and you can see for miles- so he knew they were there. As did Lee and if he thought it important he would have weighted his far right with substantially larger numbers than he did- just consider how they petered out when they did attack.

Both Lee and Meade were professional soldiers but neither seemed overly concerned about LRT. The hill had some value as an anchoring position and if the Rebs had captured it they could have threatened the southern flank of Meade's army. But the actual terrain of the summit was useless as an artillery platform or even as an infantry staging point.

The crucial point of the whole battle of the second day can be found with Lee's new plan that he formed once he realised that Sickle's III Corps had moved forward into the Peach Orchard etc. He told Longstreet "We have an opportunity here". He ordered an en echelon attack. That is one that begins at one point in the enemy line-usually a flank-with the object of drawing the enemy's reinforcements to that point. Then a second attacking force comes forward to attack the next point-drawing in more men from further down the enemy lines. Then a third force and so on until the enemy's reserves are exhausted. This type of attack can be very effective but it requires careful timing and exact co-ordination between the participating units.

Lee's plan darn nigh worked just look at the activity of Hancock pulling in troops from all down the Federal line to combat the Reb attacks-as we know now the Reb co-ordination failed at the critical moment but Lee's second plan came close to pulling it off on day two.

Bob
 
...He ordered an en echelon attack. That is one that begins at one point in the enemy line-usually a flank-with the object of drawing the enemy's reinforcements to that point. Then a second attacking force comes forward to attack the next point-drawing in more men from further down the enemy lines. Then a third force and so on until the enemy's reserves are exhausted. This type of attack can be very effective but it requires careful timing and exact co-ordination between the participating units.

Have to hop in here with a tip of the hat to Frederick the Great, that's the Oblique Order, which he read in the classics and adopted and developed to a high degree. Most successful for him at Leuthen, later the Austrians knew to watch for it.

Prost dem Alten Fritz!
Brad
 
Fascinating thread and many what ifs. As a student of the Confederacy, I live and dream on the what ifs militarily:

1. Stonewall Jackson being alive for Gburg
2. Stuart removing his large plumed head from his posterior long enough to be effective in the early days of July 1863.
3. Braxton Bragg/Jeff Davis making a complete and utter mockery of the "War in the West". Bragg is probably lucky Forrest's guerillas didnt assasinate him. (wishful thinking)
4. Heth inability to take the hill
5. Lee's up the middle desperation

Ok, enuff said. ifs and buts.......

Anyhow, the strongest point still out there was Lincoln's desire to preserve the Union. No matter what military victory the South could accomplish, Lincoln's desire outweighed it. AND< Lincoln had something that the South could never combat-----overwhelming population of troops at his command. Sheer numbers, attrition and a competent Grant/Sherman were the "nails in the coffin".

All my opinion, and in the end, not too sure how different things would be had the South won. Other historical events would have still occurred and America would have reunited in lots of ways and we may very well be where we are today. Heck, one could argue today we are more divided than ever over central power vs State's rights!

TD
 
Anyone ever read McKinley Cantor's counterfactual novel, "If the South Had Won the War"? I've got it on my long-term reading list. I enjoy what-if fiction.

Prost!
Brad
 
Tom

The best descriptive I have ever read ref:- What if Stonewall Jackson had been alive for the battle of Gettysburg was by Jackson's biographer James I Robertson Jr.

He said that if Jackson had been alive on July 1st 1863, there would have been no battle at Gettysburg as Jackson and his battle hardened troops would have reached Vermont by that date.
 
Tom

The best descriptive I have ever read ref:- What if Stonewall Jackson had been alive for the battle of Gettysburg was by Jackson's biographer James I Robertson Jr.

He said that if Jackson had been alive on July 1st 1863, there would have been no battle at Gettysburg as Jackson and his battle hardened troops would have reached Vermont by that date.
So true.^&grin^&grin^&grin -- Al
 
Tom

The best descriptive I have ever read ref:- What if Stonewall Jackson had been alive for the battle of Gettysburg was by Jackson's biographer James I Robertson Jr.

He said that if Jackson had been alive on July 1st 1863, there would have been no battle at Gettysburg as Jackson and his battle hardened troops would have reached Vermont by that date.

Awesome! Jackson militarily was the creme de la creme in any era. What a fascinating figure and truly intelligent. When he was on his game, there was no equal. It could also be argued that his A game brought everyone else along too like AP Hill and Richard Ewell. They seemed lost at times after his passing.

TD
 
Tom

The best descriptive I have ever read ref:- What if Stonewall Jackson had been alive for the battle of Gettysburg was by Jackson's biographer James I Robertson Jr.

He said that if Jackson had been alive on July 1st 1863, there would have been no battle at Gettysburg as Jackson and his battle hardened troops would have reached Vermont by that date.

Probably more wishful thinking on his part than anything else. From what I've seen of Mr. Robertson, bit of a Lost Causer.
 
Awesome! Jackson militarily was the creme de la creme in any era. What a fascinating figure and truly intelligent. When he was on his game, there was no equal. It could also be argued that his A game brought everyone else along too like AP Hill and Richard Ewell. They seemed lost at times after his passing.

TD

When Jackson was on his game...yes. But he had very baffling lapses as well (Seven Days being a glaring example). Truly a fascinating man!
 
Anyhow, the strongest point still out there was Lincoln's desire to preserve the Union. No matter what military victory the South could accomplish, Lincoln's desire outweighed it. AND< Lincoln had something that the South could never combat-----overwhelming population of troops at his command. Sheer numbers, attrition and a competent Grant/Sherman were the "nails in the coffin".

True but had Sherman not taken Atlanta Lincoln might have been defeated, an occurrence which he fully expected, and he had made plans for this eventuality.

The conventional wisdom was that the North had unlimited pool of population to draw on but that was not quite true. One of the reasons for the Emancipation Proclamation was to draw on the pool of African Americans that could fight for the Union. Without them the War couldn't have been won, belying the fact that he had tremendous sources of white troops to draw on. This is actually a fundamental tenet of the Lost Causers, that they were done in or overpowered by the unlimited reserve of Northern troops.

Perhaps one of the North's biggest weapons was Lincoln himself, especially when compared to his opposite number down South. Lincoln had the advantage of crystallizing what was being fought for unlike Jefferson Davis who wasn't as effective in these areas.
 
Anyone ever read McKinley Cantor's counterfactual novel, "If the South Had Won the War"? I've got it on my long-term reading list. I enjoy what-if fiction.

Prost!
Brad

When I was a kid. Great book.
 
When Jackson was on his game...yes. But he had very baffling lapses as well (Seven Days being a glaring example). Truly a fascinating man!

Believe it or not a theory I have read on this is his..........lack of sleep! Apparently it has been theorized he was not at his best without his hrs in the sack!

TD
 
True but had Sherman not taken Atlanta Lincoln might have been defeated, an occurrence which he fully expected, and he had made plans for this eventuality.

The conventional wisdom was that the North had unlimited pool of population to draw on but that was not quite true. One of the reasons for the Emancipation Proclamation was to draw on the pool of African Americans that could fight for the Union. Without them the War couldn't have been won, belying the fact that he had tremendous sources of white troops to draw on. This is actually a fundamental tenet of the Lost Causers, that they were done in or overpowered by the unlimited reserve of Northern troops.

Perhaps one of the North's biggest weapons was Lincoln himself, especially when compared to his opposite number down South. Lincoln had the advantage of crystallizing what was being fought for unlike Jefferson Davis who wasn't as effective in these areas.

Brad,
Not unlimited, but look at the sheer volume of troops engaged on any given day after 1862-63. The Union had many more field troops, I will go so far to say if it wasn't for Southern Command in the first 3 years, it would have been over early!

I do agree Davis was an idiot, see my note about Braxton Bragg.

I am and never will be a Lincoln man, but I don't think he didn't have perseverance and intelligence and in general, stubborn will. All great traits needed at the time. He also had Grant who ended up being a very good General.

I am happy to be a Lost Causer, but I have no illusions as I previously stated that the nation would have stayed separated (even with an improbable Southern Victory in 1863) for the dawn of time. We are what we are today, a nation of individualistic States and Regions who are together as Americans on an international level. Domestically, well, I guess we are still separated on a lot of issues, but that is what it is.

TD
 

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