UKReb
Command Sergeant Major
- Joined
- Aug 31, 2007
- Messages
- 2,436
Over the last few months a fellow US Frogger member-who is studying the ACW as part of his history degree-has asked me by e-mail my opinion on a number of aspects of the war. Just recently he asked me my thoughts on Gettysburg as a turning point of the war my reply was something like the following:-
Was Gettysburg a definitive turning point of the war? Militarily, probably not. The engagement was not particularly unique, nor did it appreciably alter the pervasive stalemate in the East. Historians have micro-analyzed the battle like no other during those four years of conflict in an attempt to fully understand it, so much so, that we have ended up with an enigma wrapped in nostalgia, subjectivity and myth. The battle was indeed a pivotal event in the course of American history, but not for the reasons popularly held. It's hallowed ground is a grand mausoleum of patriotic dead-a euphemism if you like for noble sacrifice which gave birth to the Lost Cause & High Tide of the Confederacy.
Like Howard's post-John Buford actions during the first day has always impressed me but until Shaara's novel The Killer Angels and the film Gettysburg hardly anyone- apart from us ACW nerds- had never really heard of him. However, when aligning the myth of Gettysburg against Buford's actual delaying actions an entirely different picture can arise.
It certainly cannot be denied that the experience of Buford and his men forced the Confederates to deploy and advance slowly towards their goal. Yet it should be noted that at first Heth did not press the issue-he kept most of his infantry in column formation while eight companies of Archer's brigade formed as skirmishers and easily pushed Gamble's pickets back about 1/12 miles from Marsh Creek to Herr Ridge. Even then with support from Davis' brigade and Pegram's rifled cannons the Rebs carried the ridge without difficulty and forced Gamble's men to retire to the woods along Willoughby Run. The light intensity of fighting to this point is confirmed by the fact that the Union cavalry involved suffered no real serious casualties before 0930.
Col Fry's 13th Alabama which was the Confederate skirmish line from 0730 to 0930 lost only 7 men slightly wounded during this whole time. After the war Fry explained to historian John B Bachelder "As to the the resistance made by the Union cavalry I clearly remember that it was inconsiderable and did not delay as very much. Only small parties appeared to our front and inflicted no real damage to us"
Buford's greatest service was his decision to stand and fight on McPherson's Ridge. Harry Heth on the other hand showed that he expected the Yankee cavalry to continue to withdraw. Once he saw that Buford was not going to give way is when he decided to form a line and bring up Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades from the rear of his column. By all accounts it took him an hour to accomplish this. As he started to advance is when Reynolds and his 1st Corps arrived.
If Heth had formed his line anytime before this (and he was told at 0730 that morning that he was facing Yankee cavalry and not local militia) he would have swept Buford's troopers off of the ridges at least an hour before the arrival of the Iron Brigade
Now that is a big Gettysburg what if that had happened?
Bob
Was Gettysburg a definitive turning point of the war? Militarily, probably not. The engagement was not particularly unique, nor did it appreciably alter the pervasive stalemate in the East. Historians have micro-analyzed the battle like no other during those four years of conflict in an attempt to fully understand it, so much so, that we have ended up with an enigma wrapped in nostalgia, subjectivity and myth. The battle was indeed a pivotal event in the course of American history, but not for the reasons popularly held. It's hallowed ground is a grand mausoleum of patriotic dead-a euphemism if you like for noble sacrifice which gave birth to the Lost Cause & High Tide of the Confederacy.
Like Howard's post-John Buford actions during the first day has always impressed me but until Shaara's novel The Killer Angels and the film Gettysburg hardly anyone- apart from us ACW nerds- had never really heard of him. However, when aligning the myth of Gettysburg against Buford's actual delaying actions an entirely different picture can arise.
It certainly cannot be denied that the experience of Buford and his men forced the Confederates to deploy and advance slowly towards their goal. Yet it should be noted that at first Heth did not press the issue-he kept most of his infantry in column formation while eight companies of Archer's brigade formed as skirmishers and easily pushed Gamble's pickets back about 1/12 miles from Marsh Creek to Herr Ridge. Even then with support from Davis' brigade and Pegram's rifled cannons the Rebs carried the ridge without difficulty and forced Gamble's men to retire to the woods along Willoughby Run. The light intensity of fighting to this point is confirmed by the fact that the Union cavalry involved suffered no real serious casualties before 0930.
Col Fry's 13th Alabama which was the Confederate skirmish line from 0730 to 0930 lost only 7 men slightly wounded during this whole time. After the war Fry explained to historian John B Bachelder "As to the the resistance made by the Union cavalry I clearly remember that it was inconsiderable and did not delay as very much. Only small parties appeared to our front and inflicted no real damage to us"
Buford's greatest service was his decision to stand and fight on McPherson's Ridge. Harry Heth on the other hand showed that he expected the Yankee cavalry to continue to withdraw. Once he saw that Buford was not going to give way is when he decided to form a line and bring up Pettigrew's and Brockenbrough's brigades from the rear of his column. By all accounts it took him an hour to accomplish this. As he started to advance is when Reynolds and his 1st Corps arrived.
If Heth had formed his line anytime before this (and he was told at 0730 that morning that he was facing Yankee cavalry and not local militia) he would have swept Buford's troopers off of the ridges at least an hour before the arrival of the Iron Brigade
Now that is a big Gettysburg what if that had happened?
Bob