American Civil War what if? (1 Viewer)

[UKReb]

Probably more wishful thinking on his part than anything else. From what I've seen of Mr. Robertson, bit of a Lost Causer.

Brad

Robertson was indeed a Lost Causer but diligent research proves there was hardly anything in Jackson's way-so who would have stopped him?-Local Militia halting the Stonewall Brigade???????

 

[jazzeum]

Brad

Robertson was indeed a Lost Causer but diligent research proves there was hardly anything in Jackson's way-so who would have stopped him?-Local Militia halting the Stonewall Brigade???????

Since he wasn't alive at the time, it's a rather hypothetical question, not really needing an answer.

 

[UKReb]

Aw! shucks Brad

And there was me thinking this was a What If thread? ^&grin^&grin^&grin

 

[jazzeum]

"What if" as to the actual possibility of certain things happening since the personalities mentioned were alive at the time whereas Jackson was just gathering dust by then. I'm happy to help you in anyway I can :wink2:

 

[Warrior]

I love the what if game;

What if Reynolds had not been killed shortly after entering the fray; he was a very good corps commander, one of The Army of the Potomacs best, his death shattered Union morale at that point to some extent, what effect did his death have on Union forces during the first days fighting.

What if Sickles had not moved 3rd Corps forward, thus leaving the round tops unoccupied and leaving his entire flank flapping in the breeze?

What if the Union Army had not engaged into the battle piecemeal like it did on the first day; union cavalry (and not the "controversial" kind, but the real McCoys) followed by 1st Corps, followed by 11th Corps but instead the 1st and 11th in position, ready and waiting for Johnny Reb?

One of the most interesting theories I've seen floated recently is Lee's actual target for Picketts Charge was not the famous Copse of trees, but rather Zieglers Grove slightly north of the Brien Farm; also, he had wanted Ewell to attack Culps Hill at the same time Picketts Charge was launched, thus striking the Union lines at two points at the same time.

To me, this makes more sense than a suicidal advance across all of that open ground as in the end, the Confederates who managed to cross the Emmitsburg Road were hit on three sides, a perfect killing field so to speak; the fact that any of them got up and over the stone wall is incredible.........................

 

[Scott]

Anyone ever read McKinley Cantor's counterfactual novel, "If the South Had Won the War"? I've got it on my long-term reading list. I enjoy what-if fiction.

Prost!
Brad

Yep I got a kick out of the "Battle Flag" on the moon illustratration.

 

[tdubel]

Yep I got a kick out of the "Battle Flag" on the moon illustratration.

That is pretty darn funny.

TD

 

[tdubel]

"What if" as to the actual possibility of certain things happening since the personalities mentioned were alive at the time whereas Jackson was just gathering dust by then. I'm happy to help you in anyway I can :wink2:

Jeez Brad, you are tough, can't ya at least give us Causers Jackson??????^&grin^&grin^&grin

TD

 

[Rob]

Guys, I wonder if I may push my questions to you a little further now we've had some very interesting views on LRT. My question is in three parts a) did Lee ever have three such bad days in a row during the ACW b) what were the main reasons for his defeat at Gettysburg do you think and c) how big a factor was Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day 1 in the defeat at Gettysburg?

As always and as a mere novice to this War I really appreciate your comments.

Rob

 

[Warrior]

My question is in three parts;

a) did Lee ever have three such bad days in a row during the ACW............Not sure he actually had three bad days in a row. Day one was a huge success, First Corps, the cream of the Union Army, specifically The Iron Brigade, took a pounding. The Iron Brigade was never the same after Gettysburg, they left it all on the field, specifically their stand at the Seminary, which allowed the rest of the Union army to reform and regroup. Eleventh Corps was pushed back and through the town as well. So in short, the Union Army was driven from the field, I'd call that a success.

Day two was a near run thing; on the Union left flank Devils Den was taken, Little Round Top was nearly taken, the wheatfield was taken, the peach orchard was taken, shattering the Union 3rd Corps in the process, the Confederates drove all the way to the Trostle Farm where a stand by the 9th Massachusetts held them off, and Wrights Georgians got all the way to the crest of Cemetery Ridge, driven off by the 20th MA and 13th VT. Wilcox's Alabamians almost got there too, but were driven off by the famous charge of the 1st MN.

On the Union right flank, parts of Culps Hill were taken and the Confederates got all the way to the crest of Cemetery Hill but were driven off in vicious hand to hand combat in almost complete darkness. So overall, day two was not a total disaster, although the Union line did hold at the end of the day.

Day three; again, it's been discussed lately that Lee's actual target was further to the north and if it has hit there and was coordinated with Ewell's attack on Culps Hill, it might have worked.


b) what were the main reasons for his defeat at Gettysburg do you think.................The main reason for his defeat was he had grown to believe his troops could do anything he asked them to do, Picketts Charge proved that not to be the case.

c) how big a factor was Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day 1 in the defeat at Gettysburg?................It's really not his refusal to do so, he was not ordered directly to attack and did not, it was more his belief that his men were spent after fighting for most of the day. Was it more Lee's fault for not directly ordering him to attack, that is the real question........

Hope this helps.

 

[Scott]

"....did Lee ever have three such bad days in a row during the ACW .."

Sure, right before Appomattox.

 

[Rob]

My question is in three parts;

a) did Lee ever have three such bad days in a row during the ACW............Not sure he actually had three bad days in a row. Day one was a huge success, First Corps, the cream of the Union Army, specifically The Iron Brigade, took a pounding. The Iron Brigade was never the same after Gettysburg, they left it all on the field, specifically their stand at the Seminary, which allowed the rest of the Union army to reform and regroup. Eleventh Corps was pushed back and through the town as well. So in short, the Union Army was driven from the field, I'd call that a success.

Day two was a near run thing; on the Union left flank Devils Den was taken, Little Round Top was nearly taken, the wheatfield was taken, the peach orchard was taken, shattering the Union 3rd Corps in the process, the Confederates drove all the way to the Trostle Farm where a stand by the 9th Massachusetts held them off, and Wrights Georgians got all the way to the crest of Cemetery Ridge, driven off by the 20th MA and 13th VT. Wilcox's Alabamians almost got there too, but were driven off by the famous charge of the 1st MN.

On the Union right flank, parts of Culps Hill were taken and the Confederates got all the way to the crest of Cemetery Hill but were driven off in vicious hand to hand combat in almost complete darkness. So overall, day two was not a total disaster, although the Union line did hold at the end of the day.

Day three; again, it's been discussed lately that Lee's actual target was further to the north and if it has hit there and was coordinated with Ewell's attack on Culps Hill, it might have worked.


b) what were the main reasons for his defeat at Gettysburg do you think.................The main reason for his defeat was he had grown to believe his troops could do anything he asked them to do, Picketts Charge proved that not to be the case.

c) how big a factor was Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day 1 in the defeat at Gettysburg?................It's really not his refusal to do so, he was not ordered directly to attack and did not, it was more his belief that his men were spent after fighting for most of the day. Was it more Lee's fault for not directly ordering him to attack, that is the real question........

Hope this helps.

Thanks George, good to get your view. I think I posed my question wrong in that I meant did he have three days where the ending was so bad, as you say there were some Rebel advances over the three days and some near run things too. The ebb and flow of this battle is one of the things that really hooks you in and places like Devils Den, Peach Orchard and LRT are smaller battles within a bigger one....if that makes sense!

And to be fair to him Ewells order from Lee was not crystal clear was it?!

Cheers again George

Rob

 

[Warrior]

Thanks George, good to get your view. I think I posed my question wrong in that I meant did he have three days where the ending was so bad, as you say there were some Rebel advances over the three days and some near run things too. The ebb and flow of this battle is one of the things that really hooks you in and places like Devils Den, Peach Orchard and LRT are smaller battles within a bigger one....if that makes sense!

And to be fair to him Ewells order from Lee was not crystal clear was it?!

Cheers again George

Rob

The battlefield itself is huge and like you said, it was many battles within the battle, three days of fighting. The fighting on the first day was in itself a large, spread out battle involving thousands of soldiers, as was the fight on the Union right flank on days two and three around Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill....

 

[jazzeum]

Rob,

In response to your second question, it was hubris, plus some bad luck I suppose. Probably the same sort of over confidence that Hitler had back in 1941. It was only through Meade's inability or negligence that the rebel forces were not completely destroyed. Lincoln wrote Meade a blistering letter when he found out that Lee had escaped but never sent it, fearing he would have destroyed Meade's effectiveness forever.

 

[Warrior]

Rob,

In response to your second question, it was hubris, plus some bad luck I suppose. Probably the same sort of over confidence that Hitler had back in 1941. It was only through Meade's inability or negligence that the rebel forces were not completely destroyed. Lincoln wrote Meade a blistering letter when he found out that Lee had escaped but never sent it, fearing he would have destroyed Meade's effectiveness forever.

Meade was an interesting general; at Fredericksburg, his forces broke through the Confederate lines down on their right flank where Jacksons men were, but the breakthrough could not be exploited, he had the most success of any Union general in that miserable disaster of a battle. His one and only battle in command of the Union Army was in fact Gettysburg, he was replaced by Grant in 1864, but his contribution to preserving the Union will never be forgotten.............

 

[Louis Badolato]

Rob,

In response to your second question, it was hubris, plus some bad luck I suppose. Probably the same sort of over confidence that Hitler had back in 1941. It was only through Meade's inability or negligence that the rebel forces were not completely destroyed. Lincoln wrote Meade a blistering letter when he found out that Lee had escaped but never sent it, fearing he would have destroyed Meade's effectiveness forever.

According to the guide who took me through the battlefield, Meade did everything exactly right, and suffered for his concern for his men. Meade had tens of thousands of casualties to deal with (many of which were confederates too injured to retreat with Lee's forces), yet still pursued Lee within 24 hours. He caught Lee's army at the flooded Potomac River in a very well defended dug in position, and unlike Grant, who would have thrown thousands of his troops lives away for no gain, as he did at Cold Harbor, he spent 13 days probing Lee's lines until he found a weakness. Unfortunately for his legacy, when he finally ordered a well planned attack, the river had receeded the night before, and Lee's army had slipped across the river before dawn. Had the river stayed flooded one more night, accoring to the guide, the war in the East would have been over, with Meade as the hero, and Grant a footnote in history. How's that for a what if?

 

[jazzeum]

I don't think that's correct or the full story. Meade had the troops but he was not a gambler. He had just won a great victory and didn't want to take the risk of throwing it away. At a conference on July 12 his infantry commanders took that stance and Lee escaped. Lincoln was furious and said this was reminiscent of McClellan.

Another thing that had annoyed him is that Meade or someone in his command said after the battle that they had thrown them out of their soil. This distressed him as he said than the whole country was their soil. This brings up a point which many of his commanders, other than Grant, Sherman and Thomas principally did not grasp: the goal was not to take or retake land but to destroy the enemy.

 

[UKReb]

Rob

The Confederates lost Gettysburg simply because on those three days Meade's subordinate officers were better than Lee's.

Two inexperienced Corps commanders with one of them seriously ill the whole three days. Both Hill & Ewell we now know were promoted well above their pay grade.

A petulant Longstreet who did not want to fight at Gettysburg and continually told Lee that it was wrong to do so.

The complete absence of Stuart and his cavalry.

Putting some meat on the first of those statements:- When Jackson was killed Lee was faced with finding a replacement for his Second Corps command. Ewell was the obvious choice and had served Jackson well as a Division commander as too had Ambrose Hill. Both had been determined fighters-note- had been. Who does he choose? He was unsure but his final decision was to split the Second Corps in two and form a Third Corps under Hill. He had toyed with the idea of promoting Sam Hood as Second Corps commander but realised that would be a problem with Ewell's seniority and Longstreet did not want to lose his best fighting Texas Brigade commander. Now that's another what if? Hood was a wild fighting Kentuckian who like Jackson would not have stopped to ask Jubal Early and Rodes what they thought about taking Culps Hill. Once he had received Lee's "take that hill if practicable" order, based on all of Hood's previous battle actions up to that time, its a fair bet that he would have rode up there in front of his troops regardless of his divisional commanders reluctance to do so.

You correctly note that Lee's orders were vague-in fact they were always vague but Jackson had an ability to understand them perfectly and had the acumen to change them to suit as a battle progressed. Ewell and Hill most definitely did not have that ability or battle acumen. That was Lee's mistake but he learned at Gettysburg as you will note when he came up against Grant ten months later in Virginia. Lee took overall command of his army at both Corps and Divisional levels at the Wilderness/Spotsylvania/North Anna and Cold Harbor.........but by then it was far too late.

Bob

 

[Rob]

Guys, can't tell you how much I'm enjoying this thread, I'm reading this while reading Mark Adkin's Gettysburg companion. Its like the official companion to this thread^&grin

Ok, if you all haven't got fed up with my questions I have another for you. Bob mentions Stuart and his missing cavalry, would the presence of his cavalry over the three days have made a big difference do you think, or would it have mainly been in a recon role? Can you give examples of where his mounted soldiers could have swung the balance even if only on a 'local ' action.

Rob

 

[tdubel]

Rob

The Confederates lost Gettysburg simply because on those three days Meade's subordinate officers were better than Lee's.

Two inexperienced Corps commanders with one of them seriously ill the whole three days. Both Hill & Ewell we now know were promoted well above their pay grade.

A petulant Longstreet who did not want to fight at Gettysburg and continually told Lee that it was wrong to do so.

The complete absence of Stuart and his cavalry.

Putting some meat on the first of those statements:- When Jackson was killed Lee was faced with finding a replacement for his Second Corps command. Ewell was the obvious choice and had served Jackson well as a Division commander as too had Ambrose Hill. Both had been determined fighters-note- had been. Who does he choose? He was unsure but his final decision was to split the Second Corps in two and form a Third Corps under Hill. He had toyed with the idea of promoting Sam Hood as Second Corps commander but realised that would be a problem with Ewell's seniority and Longstreet did not want to lose his best fighting Texas Brigade commander. Now that's another what if? Hood was a wild fighting Kentuckian who like Jackson would not have stopped to ask Jubal Early and Rodes what they thought about taking Culps Hill. Once he had received Lee's "take that hill if practicable" order, based on all of Hood's previous battle actions up to that time, its a fair bet that he would have rode up there in front of his troops regardless of his divisional commanders reluctance to do so.

You correctly note that Lee's orders were vague-in fact they were always vague but Jackson had an ability to understand them perfectly and had the acumen to change them to suit as a battle progressed. Ewell and Hill most definitely did not have that ability or battle acumen. That was Lee's mistake but he learned at Gettysburg as you will note when he came up against Grant ten months later in Virginia. Lee took overall command of his army at both Corps and Divisional levels at the Wilderness/Spotsylvania/North Anna and Cold Harbor.........but by then it was far too late.

Bob

Bob,
Post of the thread with describing what happened (IMO). I think you are dead on accurate with the difference between Jackson and the rest. Even on Jackson's bad days he was better than Ewell and Hill. Although Hill has to be given credit during Battle of Antietam for his actions, unfortunately, he didn't have the same success later.

TD