Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

1[SUP]st[/SUP] and 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalions of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Para Brigade after landing at Arnhem

As discussed earlier, when 1st Battalion followed the Reconnaissance Squadron a little later (see from post #1400), they found the route blocked by Krafft and his men from the training battalion.





They desperately tried to outflank Krafft to the north, but were unable to.




They finally gave up and headed south east towards Oosterbeek.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Kevin,

Fantastic photos of some excellent figures!:salute::

 

[panda1gen]

The Airlanding Brigade

Two-thirds of the 1st Airborne Division was landed behind the German lines, essentially with no losses and achieving complete surprise. They had not been immediately engaged by the Germans.

Only one brigade of infantry, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Parachute Brigade, was free to move due to the refusal of the air planners to fly two lifts on day one.

The Airlanding Brigade were instead to secure the landing area by taking the villages of Wolfheze and Heelsum, to the east and south respectively.

D Company of the 1st Border took Heelsum. During the operation they surprised a German truck, killing two soldiers and captured the rest, without loss.






Two platoons of the South Staffords took Wolfheze, but there were more Germans in Wolfheze and two South Staffords were killed clearing the village.





Glider pilots of E Squadron were also present and sent into the grounds of the asylum with the South Staffords .

 

[panda1gen]

ref - https://funnyshit.com.au/the_plan.html

The Plan

In the beginning was the Plan.

And then came the Assumptions.

And the Assumptions were without form.

And darkness was upon the face of the Workers.

And they spoke among themselves, saying, "It is a crock of ****, and it stinketh."

And the workers went unto their Supervisors and said, "It is a pail of dung, and none may abide the odour thereof."

And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying, "It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong, such that none may abide by it."

And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying, "It is a vessel of fertiliser, and none may abide its strength."

And the Directors spoke amongst themselves, saying one to another, "It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."

And the Directors then went onto the Vice Presidents, saying unto them, "It promotes growth and is very powerful."

And the Vice Presidents went unto the President, saying unto him, "This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigour of the company; with powerful effects."

And the President looked upon the Plan, and saw that it was good.

And the Plan became Policy.

This is How **** Happens.

The Arnhem operation?

Garden Party

Uninvited Gate Crasher

Funny bl@@dy Market

 

[Sentaapua]

{sm4}{sm4}{sm4}{sm4}{sm4}
I’ve seen that happening too many times in my professional life...
But I have a feeling that particularly in Arnhem, different from corporate tradition, the "plan" came from Montgomery down, disregarding all the intel...

 

[panda1gen]

Elements of the armies deployed were having different, isolated but deeply inter-connected battles and skirmishes ............

1st Airborne paras are caught in the open, take what cover they can and hope to win the firefight

82nd Airborne fight to clear Nijmegen and hold their landing grounds around Groesbeek

XXX Corps pile on up Club Route but are frequently required to stop the Germans cutting the road

An SS officer organises his part of the Nijmegen defence

Cat and mouse in the Arnhem outskirts

 

[panda1gen]

A warm welcome in Nijmegen for XXX Corps


1st Battalion try to reach Frost at the bridge

ready to cover the advance

I know where I am, where are the Gerries?

Peek a boo

covering the road

 

[Louis Badolato]

Kevin,

I'm loving the new buildings, they look great!:salute::

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin,

I'm loving the new buildings, they look great!:salute::

Glad you like them, I have a lot more photos! Thanks to Wayne 'LeicesterFox' for making the latest of them for me.

 

[panda1gen]

South of Antwerp was General von Zangen’s 15th Army, which had been cut off and held in a salient at the coast by the rapidly advancing Allied armies in August and September 1944.




He was ordered to evacuate his army north, across the River Scheldt, to the Netherlands and successfully moved nine battered infantry divisions by 21 September 1944.




Two of these divisions were then ordered to hold part of the line to the right of Student’s 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Parachute Army, which itself was gradually strengthening.




XXX Corps now had to break through defensive positions that a fortnight earlier would have been unopposed gaps. Unfortunately, the Allies did not possess the supplies or units to advance at that time.




In the event, both of these formations helped delay XXX Corps’ advance and so contributed to the late arrival at Nijmegen and the Arnhem approaches.

 

[panda1gen]

At #1533 I discussed the forces that reached Arnhem Road Bridge. At #1541 to 1543 I started to discuss the other elements in elements apart from 2 Para and how two platoons of the South Staffords took Wolfheze. To continue .............

Some airborne men congregated at Wolfheze railway station from the landing area. A flak train was found wrecked in the earlier RAF bombing and Royal Engineers of No. 1 Platoon, 9th Field Company 'spiked' twenty-one 105mm AA guns, still in their factory grease.

181 Airlanding Field Ambulance RAMC established a Dressing Station.



They started treating injured and wounded men in houses on the Duitsekampweg,




.... near where Brigadier Hicks set up his Airlanding Brigade HQ, in a house on the same lane. Also quickly functioning was the Divisional Intelligence Section. Six prisoners of war were interrogated within an hour of the landing.

 

[panda1gen]

Battalion Krafft

In the woods, alongside the road running south-east out of Wolfheze, stood The Hotel Wolfheze. No. 1 Platoon, 9th Field Company was ordered to block this road 'to catch any birds flushed out of Wolfheze', by the South Staffords.




However, this platoon had already lost a third of its strength in a fatal glider crash in England. As a result, the job was given to Lieutenant Roy Timmins’ section of No. 2 Platoon.




On approaching the hotel, Germans from No. 2 Company, SS Panzer Grenadier Depot and Reserve Battalion 16, (usually known as Battalion Krafft after its commander Sturmbannführer (SS Major) Josef Krafft) killed Timmins and two of his men, who died the following day from their wounds.




Krafft's men were not all fully trained and it was not a full-strength battalion. The Germans tended to send partially trained recruits to the occupied countries to complete their training, whilst serving as local defence units.



Krafft's war diary is one of the most detailed German documents of the Arnhem battle, but it was written to impress his superiors, so contains some exaggerations and frank falsehoods, (whether genuinely believed at the time or not).

His dispositions would severely hamper the paras though.

 

[panda1gen]

Question for the Forum

From the research I have tried to do and the photos I have seen I am not sure - were all of 1st Airborne Division given paratrooper uniforms (Denison smock etc) or were some in normal battledress, if so who?

 

[panda1gen]

Krafft’s strength on the morning of 17 September was 306 men, consisting of his battalion HQ, two recruit companies and various other elements, plus a newly forming third company. They had been sent to Arnhem from the coast in early September.

The officers and NCOs were all veterans. Most of their men were young, keen SS recruits. Obersturmführer Rauli, the unit's political officer, provided excellent training in 'world philosophy' (Nazism), according to Krafft's war diary. The unit was based partly in Arnhem and partly in Oosterbeek.

Training is suddenly real .....

Political officer, plus dog :smile2:


The battalion's No. 2 Company was on a training exercise in the woods between Oosterbeek and Wolfheze when the landings were made. From there it deployed to the Hotel Wolfheze, from where they ambushed Lieutenant Timmins section.

Prepare to ambush ...


Krafft was in Arnhem, where, after the preliminary air raids, he brought the remainder of his unit to readiness. Most German units had trained for and had instructions to carry out as soon as an airborne landing occurred.

Krafft realized that his was the nearest unit as soon as the landings were reported. It was reported that the landing force was between 3,000 and 4,000 strong, so he correctly calculated that something as important as the Rhine bridges in Arnhem were the objective.

Krafft


Of the four possible routes, Krafft decided to block the two central ones, the railway line and the Utrecht road, as these were the most direct route. He did not have sufficient strength to block all four. A British motorcyclist seemed to confirm his decision when captured in the mid-afternoon in possession of a marked map.

Turns out not a good day for a ride ...

 

[Arnhemjim]

Question for the Forum

From the research I have tried to do and the photos I have seen I am not sure - were all of 1st Airborne Division given paratrooper uniforms (Denison smock etc) or were some in normal battledress, if so who?

Hello panda1gen,
Have refrained from responding to your question regarding the extent Denison smocks were issued/worn compared to normal battledress during Operation Market-Garden, waiting for more learned expert replies. Having waited for several days without any comments, thought I would offer the following assessment. Right up front may I say emphatically that I do not know percentages let alone actual numbers. However, like yourself, having studied the battle for at least five decades, would like to advance these observations.

These are based on photographs from a thorough review of the definitive two volume set of the After the Battle Operation Market-Garden Then and Now, Karel Margry, Editor, Battle of Britain, International Ltd., London, 2002, ISBN 1 870067 39 8, as well as my own developed annotated order of battle; https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2017/07/a-detailed-and-annotated-order-of.html


MGen R.E. Urquhart in all known photographs is wearing battledress without a Denison smock.


Conversely I would think all personnel in both the parachute and airlanding battalions, other than support element troops would initially be wearing Denisons, i.e. 1[SUP]st[/SUP] and 4[SUP]th[/SUP] Parachute Brigades and 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airlanding Brigade.

I think the vast majority of all ranks of personnel of the Glider Pilot Regiment, specifically due to their dual trained role as pilots and combat infantry would initially be wearing Denisons.

Although most photographs show personnel of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Light Regiment, Royal Artillery in Denisons, even during the course of the battle, there is a higher probability that in their initial disposition, as well as within in the subsequent Oosterbeek perimeter, they may have been in battledress, if not shirt sleeve order (from photos).

Tractor drivers for the 17 pdr Anti-tank guns are shown in film to be in shirt sleeve order.

There is a higher probability that divisional headquarters at the Hotel Hartenstein would have been in battledress.

There is a high probability that all personnel of the three Field Ambulances, surgeons as well as medical orderlies and other staff, would have been in battledress, and again shirt sleeve order.

This obviously could change during the course of the battle, with personnel being wounded and Denisons being taken off in order to facilitate medical personnel providing treatment.

[FONT=&quot]In summary this is at best only a reasonable projection.[/FONT]

 

[panda1gen]

Krafft also ordered his 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Company, at the Hotel Wolfheze, to attack the landing area at once. 'We knew from experience,' the war diary says, 'that the only way to draw the teeth of an airborne landing with an inferior force is to drive right into it'.




But the war diary then reports that his No. 2 Company sent its heavy machine-gun section into action on the glider landing zone north of Wolfheze: 'This created great confusion and wreaked great havoc. The troops from about four gliders were completely wiped out and the gliders shot to pieces'. This did not happen. However, Krafft did order his Nos 2 and 4 Companies to form a north-south blocking line just east of Wolfheze, which covered the railway line and the Utrecht road, see map at #1552, which was effective.

He also established Battalion HQ at the Hotel Wolfheze, in the centre of the line and the early battles.




A more sinister report concerned some Dutch 'terrorists', who were considered to interfere with part of these moves and were 'suitably dealt with'. Krafft had his men in position in the blocking line by 3.30 p.m., just an hour and a half after the end of the landings. By gathering every possible extra man, the German battalion now numbered 435.




Crucially, this was just before units of 1st Parachute Brigade set out towards Arnhem, around 2,000 men. Rarely could the effective disposition of a small force like Sturmbannführer Krafft's have such an effect upon a battle the size of Market-Garden.

 

[villagehorse]

Once again it shows a small dug in defensive force can significantly disrupt a much larger attacking force. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Once again it shows a small dug in defensive force can significantly disrupt a much larger attacking force. Robin.

You are absolutely right Robin.


To continue,

The most experienced parachute units in the British Army were in Brigadier Gerald Lathbury's 1st Parachute Brigade and their job was to seize the road bridge over the river Rhine in Arnhem.



Starting at #1531 I explained the 'brigade group', i.e. the force sent to Arnhem, which contained several units besides Lathbury's Brigade Headquarters and the three parachute battalions. These included the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Parachute Squadron and part of the 9th Field Company of the Royal Engineers, most of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, 16 Parachute Field Ambulance, No. 3 Platoon of 250 RASC Company and at least two forward artillery observation officers with each battalion and at Brigade HQ. together with some glider pilots and various other personnel.







Lathbury had to make an initial planning decision whether to concentrate and attempt to smash through to Arnhem by one route, or to form up in more than one column and use the major routes and the many wooded tracks to advance on a broad front.

The question was, did he face light .....



....... or heavy opposition?

 

[panda1gen]

Lathbury had been told that it would be light, so four columns would be formed, the three battalions and Brigade HQ. He sent three battalion columns by separate routes, designed to achieve maximum speed. He was also concerned that using the whole brigade on one route might become unwieldy, as it would form a long column.

In contrast, if the single battalion columns did encounter serious opposition, they might not be strong enough to break through. He was acutely aware of the need to maintain the momentum of advance before the Germans could react.



The broad front approach would give him a better idea of where the German defences might be and offered a better chance that some part of his brigade might reach the road bridge.



If his intelligence was correct, they should be able to hold it until the rest of the division reached them, although he was concerned that there was no substantial reserve to react to any serious threat, although one battalion would delay advancing until the other two had started.

 

[panda1gen]

Preceding this would be a coup-de-main attempt on the bridge by most of the Reconnaissance Squadron. They intended to use minor tracks through to the road bridge and having overpowered any bridge guards, hold it until battalions arrived.








Referenced from M Middlebrook, the plan was that:The Reconnaissance Squadron (less one troop retained as divisional reserve) and No. 3 Platoon, 9th Field Company, would drive to the Arnhem road bridge by the northern route (codenamed 'Leopard'). They were to remove any demolition charges and hold until relieved.

The battalions would have to walk nearly seven miles on foot, carrying full kit. Even if there was only ‘light opposition’, they would probably have to fight some Germans on the way.





At #1533 I listed the force that actually reached the bridge.