Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

The 3rd Parachute Battalion

Lieutenant-Colonel John Fitch commanded the 3rd Battalion.




It now moved along the main road from Heelsum, on the way to the centre of Arnhem. This road was the Utrechtsestraatweg in 1944 but is now called the Utrechtseweg, which will be used here.

The whole of the 3rd Battalion set off, with three 6-pounder anti-tank guns of C Troop of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, half of an RE troop, an RAMC section, some artillery observation officers and a few Dutch commandos. Unlike the 1st and 2nd Battalions, the 3rd had no subsidiary tasks. It was planned that it would become the main force at the northern end of the Arnhem road bridge.




Major Peter Waddy's B Company led the battalion. Lieutenant Jimmy Cleminson's No. 5 was the leading platoon, which had two men ahead, acting as scouts,




on each side of the road.




They were spaced out, with a fifty-yard interval between the platoons. They in turn had each section marching in file on alternate sides of the road. Following the leading company were the rest of the battalion and its attached units, consisting of hundreds of marching soldiers, interspersed with around twenty jeeps, the anti-tank guns and two Bren carriers.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Kevin,

More great photos, especially the shots with the buildings!. Brings back memories of the town we assembled in my backyard for the photo shoot all those years ago!

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin,

More great photos, especially the shots with the buildings!. Brings back memories of the town we assembled in my backyard for the photo shoot all those years ago!

Glad you like them, yes it does bring back memories. I shall continue to share some of the photos we arranged.

Meanwhile .......

The 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion column was more than a mile long and it made steady progress for nearly two hours. Unlike in England, they could follow the pre-war road signs, which were still in place. This surprised the airborne men.




For most of the time, the main road passed through woodland. Here, the troops could keep to the side, ready to drop into cover if fired upon.




When more houses were encountered however, their wire fences, erected along the roadside and between each house, slightly limited their deployment off the road, as they were all about four feet high. This would prove to be a problem for the rest of the way to Arnhem.




Dutch civilians came out and greeted the soldiers. The leading company had to focus on their task to keep going through this welcome and to keep moving. And so it was the rear of the column that received most of the civilian attention. There was almost no opposition.

Corporal Bob Allen, in A Company at the rear of the column, described one of the occasional German efforts to delay the column,

‘I was walking through trees near the edge of a road; Lance-Corporal Bamsey was a few feet away to my right. We sense enemy ahead and both paused - me behind one tree, Bamsey at the side of another. A shot rang out from the right. Bamsey collapsed like a puppet whose strings had been cut. I located the source of the shot, then dashed across and pulled Bamsey behind a tree. He had been shot through the throat, and the bullet had broken his neck.

Lance-Corporal W. E. Bamsey, was a Welshman from Port Talbot and was almost certainly the 3rd Battalion's first fatal casualty.

Then, suddenly, from a side road to the left, a German Army Citroen entered the main road just behind the leading platoon’s scouts. They were just past the junction at the time. The car tried to turn towards Arnhem.

Lieutenant Cleminson said,

‘It appeared without warning, and the front men of each of my leading sections, who were just behind the junction, opened fire with Stens and rifles and riddled its exposed flank. It was all over in a flash. I saw a body leaning out of the door but pressed on, leaving it to someone else to sort out. I didn't know it was a general until after the war. Of course, it put all my platoon on a high’.

the paras opened fire with Stens and rifles


General Friedrich Kussin, the town commandant of Arnhem, was the senior officer killed.

seen here visiting his troops


He had earlier visited Battalion Krafft’s headquarters, now set up at the Hotel Wolfheze, which lay only 800 yards up that side road. He had briefed Krafft on the various German responses to the landing and gave a pep talk to Krafft's headquarters staff. Kussin ignored the advice of Krafft's men that the main road might now be dangerous and set off on his return journey. Kussin, his driver and his batman/interpreter paid the price.

Hundreds of British soldiers would remember the sight of the bullet-riddled car and the dead, including the general who had fallen out of the door. The photographs of the car would become famous.

 

[panda1gen]

Lieutenant Cleminson's platoon moved on. After a few hundred yards there was another, more serious, type of action. As the leading troops approached a crossroad a German armoured vehicle, described variously as an armoured car ......




...... or as a self-propelled gun,




suddenly appeared from a side road ahead. It was probably either a self propelled anti-aircraft or anti-tank gun, both of which Battalion Krafft used.

German infantry supported it on either side of the road.




The British platoon had its PIAT anti-tank team in the left-hand leading section,




but this was spotted by the Germans. The PIAT was knocked out by machine-gun fire before it could be used. The platoon had no other weapon capable of harming the vehicle. They promptly scattered, taking cover in houses and gardens by the road.

 

[panda1gen]

Unfortunately, this scattering of the paratroopers exposed a jeep towing a 6 pounder anti-tank gun further down the column. The gun was in the towing position, facing away from the enemy. Before its crew could turn the gun to face the SPG, they were fired upon and two men were hit.

Gunner George Robson was stitched across the chest by machine-gun bullets and killed. The other wounded man was later taken prisoner and driven away on the German vehicle. (‘Gunner Robson's date of death is shown in the Commonwealth War Graves Commission's records as 26 September 1944, one of many incorrect dates caused by the confused nature of the Arnhem fighting. He has no known grave’).

The jeep tow was knocked out, but the 6pdr gun was recovered by another jeep.

a jeep is found to recover the 6 pdr

Lieutenant Cleminson describes what happened next:

‘I realized that nobody had got their Gammon bombs prepared to chuck at armoured vehicles, as the sticks of plastic explosive were still firmly wedged in our back pockets. I got up into a house and found myself behind the German vehicle. I was joined by Peter Waddy. I shot a German soldier in the garden below me with my Sten and wondered what I could do to get rid of our armoured visitor. Peter suggested firing his Very light - which had singularly little effect - but, fortunately, as a result of the small-arms fire and after they had collected about half a dozen prisoners, the vehicle pulled back down the road with our prisoners and their own wounded and supporting infantry’.

Lt Cleminson claims a victim from the upper floor


the vehicle withdraws after a successful foray


The platoon did not seem to be too shaken by the experience but had quickly learned that advancing straight down a main road against armour with no anti-tank weapons was no way to get to the bridge.

carefully does it

 

[panda1gen]

Either the same or similar vehicle, later came out of another side road, turning alongside the Battalion Rear HQ. This was further down the column, only a few yards from Major Alan Bush, the battalion second in command:




‘I was behind a tree, and he put the burst of fire meant for me into the base of the tree; he was in danger of cutting the tree down. A man from our Intelligence Section was near me. I told him to throw a grenade, but he froze, stationary as a startled rabbit. I have to admit that I couldn't throw my grenade; I had forgotten to prime it. I ran back, zigzagging, for fifty yards and hid in the undergrowth. The intelligence man was taken prisoner’.






The Germans disengaged. Corporal Ben Cope was killed. He was nineteen years old and only recently married. Several more were wounded or prisoners. The action had lasted about ten minutes, but Lt Cleminson said,

'It seemed like ages.'

By about 5.15 p.m., the head of the column had nearly reached the halfway point to the bridge. Three miles had gone, there were three and a half to go. B Company resumed its advance.




The encounter had been with No. 9 Company, Battalion Krafft's mobile reserve. It was obvious that the Germans understood 3rd Battalion's presence and intentions and that further opposition along the Utrechtseweg could be anticipated.

 

[panda1gen]

Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch, urged on by Brigadier Lathbury ........




who had now joined the column, detached C Company, and send it along a side turning to the left, the Bredelaan. This was an attempt to outflank any opposition ahead and find a clearer path to Arnhem.




Major 'Pongo' Lewis, so named by naval friends when he had been stationed at Gibraltar before the war, was the C Company commander. Fitch gave him his orders and he returned to brief his three platoon commanders in turn. Lieutenant Len Wright's No. 9 Platoon was to lead, so he attempted to brief his men:

‘I had my O-Group standing by; that was routine. But, before I could start to brief them, I heard the high-pitched voice of the brigade commander saying, 'Where's the leading platoon commander?' I jumped to my feet, saluted - believe it or not - and said, 'Here, sir.' He asked me what I was doing, and I replied, 'Briefing my O-Group, sir.' He snorted, very sharply, 'They don't need briefing; just tell them that's the bloody way. Get moving!' So I did’.




It was now early evening when C Company disappeared off up the side road.




At about this time, the troops at the rear of the column were surprised to see their divisional commander appear in his solitary jeep. Urquhart moved up the column until he met up with Lathbury and the two of them conferred near to the shot-up German staff car.

 

[panda1gen]

At about this time, approximately 6.30 p.m., there was further serious action. Major Mervyn Dennison's A Company was the battalion's rearguard. Up to this point, they had experienced only occasional pot shots and interminable stops as the column concertinaed its way forward.





As the company came level with a hotel off to the left (called the Bilderberg) however, it was struck by prolonged machine-gun fire, followed by accurate mortaring coming from the wooded area around it. ‘A’ Company went to ground and started to return fire, although this was blind as they could see little to fire at.




Lieutenant Tony Baxter, commander of No. 3 Platoon, explained what happened next:

“I had two or three men hit by the first fire. Lathbury and Urquhart were both in the platoon position, taking cover behind a tree. Lathbury knew me and said, Baxter, collect up your platoon and clear that wood”.

Baxter recalled,

“I called out to section commanders, telling one to take the right, one the left, and the third to come with me. We just spread out and rushed into the trees.




I was taking a shot at a German I could see, with a rifle I had taken from a man who had been hit. I was looking through the sight, with my left thumb around the barrel, aiming at the German who was about forty yards away, just his helmet showing round a tree. But he shot first; the bullet hit my thumb on the rifle barrel. It cut the bone, and my thumb was hanging loose.




We probably shot three or four Germans and we pushed the others back, but we didn't clear them out completely. Mervyn Dennison told us to withdraw, and we had an O-Group at the edge of the wood. But the Germans we had pushed back returned and started firing their mortars again, and one of the bombs fell among our O-Group. Two or three of the sergeants were killed. I was wounded again - shrapnel in the head and splinters everywhere - and was knocked out cold”.

In the skirmish that followed, most of Major Dennison’s company spent approximately the next two hours fighting in amongst those trees.




Both sides suffered casualties. ‘A’ Company suffered eighteen including three of its five officers wounded, two sergeants killed and a corporal blinded. They did however, bring twelve prisoners back to the battalion when the company rejoined later that evening.

ref: M Middlebrook

 

[OzDigger]

Kevin,

I'm enjoying your ongoing battle commentary with action scenes that includes a lot of early K & C German vehicles and Waffen SS figures I have in my collection. This one of my favourite battles and I can't remember how many times I've watched A Bridge too Far.

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin,

I'm enjoying your ongoing battle commentary with action scenes that includes a lot of early K & C German vehicles and Waffen SS figures I have in my collection. This one of my favourite battles and I can't remember how many times I've watched A Bridge too Far.

Thank you, I appreciate the feedback.


Meanwhile, XXX Corps had started their advance to Valkenswaard but at this time they were still meeting some determined resistance – they were only just crossing their first water obstacle in front of Valkenswaard - see the more detailed XXX Corps story of the breakout from around page 130

 

[panda1gen]

To pick up from #1588

This was Battalion Krafft’s last attempt to halt the British advance. At about the same time as A Company rejoined the main body of the battalion, Krafft withdrew his Battalion to the north-east, starting this move around 9.30 p.m. He had decided that his much smaller force was now in danger of becoming surrounded. In his war diary, Krafft claimed to have inflicted casualties on the British 'ten to fifteen times as heavy' as his own. The diary does not specify the German casualties.

Krafft's men had caused important delay


Krafft also claimed that his unit had kept the 'mass of the enemy' from capturing Arnhem and that this had given his superiors time to bring up their forces, 'thereby initiating the first steps to annihilating the British 1st Airborne Division, England's finest troops'. This analysis is, however, at least partially valid.

The order is for the men to pull back


After C Company’s departure of up the side road, the rest of the battalion, amounting to little more than one company (but with a major-general and brigadier amongst them) halted.

Battalion halted

It was getting dark when Lieutenant Cleminson's platoon, still leading, reached the area marked on the maps as 'Hartenstein', which was they discovered, an elegant old hotel in its own grounds. Cleminson’s soldiers gingerly entered the building through some cellar windows. Once in they found the laid out main course of a standard German cold lunch. The Hartenstein had been used as the staff mess of no less an organization than Germany's Army Group B. To put this into context, it was approximately the equivalent of Montgomery's 21[SUP]st[/SUP] Army Group.

Field Marshal Model had been living nearby, but he and his staff had evacuated the area shortly after the airborne landing. Cleminson and some of his men did not stand on ceremony and tucked into the food, despite some firing going on outside, although Major Waddy soon appeared and chased Cleminson and his men out.

‘B’ Company had encountered some Germans in the parkland at the rear of the Hartenstein. It was now dark and the opposition strength was not known. No further advance took place.

Germans in the parkland

B Company attempts to flush them out

 

[Louis Badolato]

More terrific photos Kevin!. On an unrelated matter I sent you an e-mail. Did you get it?

 

[panda1gen]

The main road directly ahead went through the built-up part of Oosterbeek. There was a reluctance to press on, although there was no evidence of any strong German presence.

the main road looks clear


They could not rule it out either. Lathbury and Fitch decided to stay put for the next few hours, although Major Bush and his batman were sent to investigate the side road which C Company had earlier taken. Bush later reported that he found nothing but some dead Germans.

Major Bush and batman


The decision to halt has been criticized. The critics argued that they should not have been fatigued and that airborne troops in the first twenty-four hours of action should still have been quite fresh. The battalion had some wounded and prisoners to care for and not all of A Company had returned yet from its skirmish at the rear of the column. Lathbury’s Brigade Headquarters was already at the bridge and he was in contact with it.

The southern route, only about half a mile to the south was clear, as Major Hibbert had informed Lathbury a short time earlier.

scouting the southern route


Hibbert had suggested that the 3rd Battalion should use that route, but, he said that,

'Brigadier Lathbury did not agree.'

There was apparently dismay at the decision to halt amongst the troops. Private Fred Morton said,

'We were being held up by twopenny-ha'penny opposition.'

some of the tuppence halfpenny opposition


Bush was convinced that the main reason for the decision to halt was the presence of the divisional commander. Major Bush said,

'That was the start of the great cockup.'

‘I felt very sorry for Colonel Fitch. Urquhart needed to get back to Division, and Lathbury wanted to get forward to the bridge. If we had not had those two with us, Fitch would probably have followed C Company around that route to the north, but he could hardly move without the approval of both the divisional and brigade commanders - a hopeless situation’.

As it was, the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion HQ, still with the two senior officers present, moved into number 269 on the north side of the Utrechtseweg, one of the stylish residences on that route.

number 269 Utrechtseweg is checked out before its occupation


Meanwhile, rather than press on to the bridge as was its objective, to secure an all-round perimeter at the Hartenstein, the men of the battalion dug slit trenches there instead.

 

[GICOP]

This is a great thread Kevin :salute::

Stay safe

Martyn

 

[panda1gen]

This is a great thread Kevin :salute::

Stay safe

Martyn

Thank you Martyn, I appreciate the feedback.

I really enjoy seeing your glossy threads, as I like them after taking photos of Louis' collection for the K&C glossy book, but have practically none myself.

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

The 1st Parachute Battalion

The planners thought that 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] and 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalions were sufficient forces to capture and hold the Arnhem road bridge. Consequentially, Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie's 1st Battalion was given a different objective from the rest of the brigade. Some relatively rare Dutch high ground, due north of Arnhem, was allocated to them as the main road north to Apeldoorn also ran through it. German reinforcements might be expected to use it and,




if XXX Corps progressed, they would need it to continue their advance northwards.




The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Battalion was to capture this high ground and hold it for twenty-four hours, until they were relieved by the 4th Parachute Brigade, which would arrive in the second lift. To reach it, Dobie had chose a route which first ran from Wolfheze Station, then along the same track used earlier by the Reconnaissance Squadron. From there, he would strike north, first along a track past Johannahoeve Farm, then to hit a main road. This was the Ede-Arnhem road, the Amsterdamseweg, which had been code-named 'Leopard'. When he reached the outskirts of Arnhem, he would branch off to the left to reach the high ground.




David Dobie was not a fan of the task his battalion had been allocated.




Lieutenant 'Tsapy' Britneff, his Intelligence Officer, said,

‘He was full of frustration because we had to take the northern route from which enemy reaction would be the first to materialize. Then we had to hang around for over an hour for Brigade's permission to move off. We left the RV and took to the railway line, ambling along like a crocodile. Then, to Dobie's consternation, Major Gough pitched up; his Reconnaissance Squadron should have been at the bridge by now. He told us that enemy troops with tanks were deployed ahead of us. This was the first inkling that things were bad’.

 

[villagehorse]

Interesting, was not aware of this part of the plan. Intriguing. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Although the Reconnaissance Squadron had been stopped by light infantry weapons,




not by armour, the 1st Battalion diary also mentions tanks. The tank report may have come from the South Staffords, they held the nearby landing zone and may have heard engine noises.




Dobie had discretion to alter his route, as long as he continued towards his ultimate objective. He decided not to use the track by the railway line and turn due north at Wolfheze instead, along a road that ran directly to the Amsterdamseweg.




Some have criticized Dobie's decision to leave his original route, but the diversion was only of half a mile, using good straight roads. He hoped that he could avoid the suspected opposition and keep his battalion intact for when he did reach his destination. It should be remembered that his objective was to seize and hold this ground, possibly for a long period. Any loss sustained in reaching that objective prejudiced that task, so criticism of Dobie over his change of direction, given the information he had, does not seem especially valid.




The Reconnaissance Squadron jeeps were now unemployed, so in theory could have been asked to scout out his proposed new route, however, their command problems have already been explained.

 

[panda1gen]

I shall return to the story of the Airlanding Brigade soon, but in the meantime, German efficiency and flexibility came into play .......

In German - 'I say chaps, good job we did the anti-paratrooper training, off you go to Arnhem, pronto!'


The Guards leading XXX Corps tried to find secondary routes to relieve congestion on 'Club Route', the main road.


It was not always straight forward. 'Bu@@er! The 'Stable Boys' were right, the bridge won't take tanks!'



.... High Command prioritizes supplies, men and equipment to this front with orders to stop or delay each of the three airborne divisions in their missions to hold the key bridges.

Field Marshal Model organizes where to find and send reserves of artillery, armour and troops trained in urban warfare to Arnhem and other key points along the route.


In German, 'Cop this lot Tommy'.


In each day of the Arnhem battle, the German military strength increased whilst the British 1st Airborne supplies diminished. (By 21 September, the fifth day of the battle, German forces outnumbered the British by 3:1 and continued to increase).

 

[panda1gen]

To continue the story from #1598 .........

So, the battalion set off, turned and then went up the Wolfhezerweg, as it ran across the open ground of the glider landing zone. After about half a mile, the road entered a wooded area, in which there were Germans.




The leading element was ‘R’ Company, commanded by Major 'Tim' Timothy. He was a veteran, who had already won an MC and Bar. He would subsequently receive a second Bar for his part in this action.




R Company was able to advance through the wood on the left of the road and eventually reached the junction with the Amsterdamseweg.

They then became entangled in the difficult fighting in wooded country that was to become a feature of much of the Arnhem battle.




The Germans had deployed armoured vehicles on the road, so the company could make no further headway, although fighting continued until darkness fell.