Battle for Arnhem.... (2 Viewers)

In his book about the fight for Arnhem, M. Middlebrook quotes some veterans who fought in that confused period.

Private John Hall was a Bren gunner in Lieutenant Michael Kilmartin's No. 1 Platoon,

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‘Our platoon commander led us through the wooded area until we came to a road. We were about to cross when suddenly machine-gun fire opened up; one man fell to the road, his body moving with the impact of the bullets.

We returned the fire and after a short while silenced the Germans and continued on our way.

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Small skirmishes occurred every so often. During one of these encounters a German soldier emerged from the trees, and one of our NCOs went to bring him in; as he did so, other Germans under cover shot him. From then on we said, 'No prisoners' (we had nowhere to put them anyway).

Our platoon commander seemed to keep us to the wooded areas as much as possible, and we made good progress. It only seemed as if a few minutes had gone by when the sound of rumbling could be heard, and we were told to dig in. Out came our entrenching tools, and we dug into the sandy soil to get our bodies below ground level but still have a good firing position.

The sound of those tanks was now quite near, and all of a sudden hell seemed to break out - shells bursting, bullets flying and trees cracking with the impact. In the flashes of gunfire we saw the silhouettes of armoured vehicles.

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We returned the fire. This was the one time I said a prayer – and I do believe it carried me through what was to follow’.


Lieutenant George Guyon commanded the Mortar Platoon, which now sought to support the attack,

‘The wood came to an end about a hundred yards short of the enemy, and the open space beyond was obviously lethal. I had the mortar set up in a clearing, but our wireless, which had worked well up to now, packed up, and I had to string men from the OP [Observation Post] to the mortar.

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This took time, and the company had some casualties before I could get the first bomb on the ground. My fire controller could see little of the ground ahead due to its broken nature, but he very efficiently searched it with groups of rapid fire which made the enemy withdraw hurriedly, leaving a truck behind.

We left this alone, as it was getting dark by now and it might well have been booby-trapped, and we continued the advance after reorganizing. Our casualties were one dead and three or four wounded’.

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Love the figures, the photos and the History. Great dios.
Best & Safe Wishes,
Pat & Pat

Thank you for the kind comments, they are appreciated. Best and safe wishes to you too.

Kevin


Meanwhile .......


Major Timothy summed it all up as follows:

‘We kept losing people, a few here and a few there, and by the end of this phase I was down to twenty or thirty men. What happens in close country is that people have a go at this and that and you never see them again. It was a bash-bash-bash sort of business. The missing men weren't all killed or wounded. The idea is that you meet up again somewhere, but it didn't often happen’.

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Where has everyone else gone?

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Wo bist du Tommy?


Major Ronnie Stark's S Company had also become involved in the fighting, but most of it had managed to disengage when Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie, realizing that the opposition was heavy, swung the remainder of the battalion away along a track through the woods on the right, hoping to reach the Amsterdamseweg by that way.

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Good progress was made along this track until a report came back that five German tanks and about fifteen half-tracks loaded with infantry were on the main road ahead and other German infantry were digging in, near the junction between the track and the main road.

Sergeant Frank Manser ('Panzer' Manser to his friends), of No. 7 Platoon S Company, gave Dobie some bad news:

‘My section had been lead section for some time. Colonel Dobie was up with Company HQ. He knew me well and, when we were resting at the top of a rise and he was unsure of which way to go, he said, 'Manser, go up there and see if we can get that way.' I went up a track, all on my own, about 500 yards, and came to a gate. I looked over it, and there were the Germans at the far end of a field, the nearest about 300 yards away. There were lots of vehicles, armoured cars, etc., and lots of troops moving about - a company at least, possibly more, obviously getting themselves into defence positions. We could have got that way easily, but they had beaten us to it’.

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'Panzer' Manser scouts ahead

IMG_2434csr.JPG German 'light' armour ahead


The German troops who had earlier fought R Company in the woods were probably from Kampfgruppe Weber. This was a hastily formed battle group made up of men from the Luftwaffe signals unit at Deelen airfield.

3271csr.JPG Luftwaffe half track


These later arrivals were the first elements of the two (9[SUP]th[/SUP] and 10[SUP]th[/SUP]) SS Panzer divisions to come into action in the Arnhem area. They were from Kampfgruppe Von Allworden. This was a mixed unit, mainly of men and vehicles from the 9th SS Panzer Division. The SS were supplemented however, by some naval personnel, to bring Kampfgruppe Von Allworden to around three companies in strength.

592crsz.JPG A sailor's lot is not a happy one?


Further attempts to bypass them through the woods were made, but the relatively lightly armed parachute battalion found it impossible to move along the axis of the main road and every attempt failed. The high ground objective at Arnhem was still more than three miles distant and it was getting dark.

The battalion was not well positioned as one company was still in the woods more than a mile in the rear. Dobie sent Major John Bune, his second in command, back by jeep to find out what was happening to R Company. He returned to report that the company had disengaged, but the need to care for the wounded was slowing its return. Dobie therefore sent all available jeeps back to evacuate the wounded, expecting that this should allow what was left of R Company to hurry its return.

IMG_7138csrz.JPG Jeep sent to help R Company
 

It was at about this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Frost, of the 2nd Battalion, reported that his force had arrived at the bridge in a remarkably clear wireless message. He needed reinforcements, as there was no sign of the 3rd Battalion (see previous).

IMG_3695rc2srz.JPG Lt Col Frost was at the bridge (see previous)


Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie now made an important decision. Major Chris Perrin-Brown was commander of T Company and was walking alongside Dobie when the signal was received:

“I don't think David Dobie replied to the message. He just called an O-Group. He was of the opinion that we were in such a muck in the woods that we would never fight our way through. He said, 'I'm not going on to the north of Arnhem; we'll try to get down to help Johnnie at the bridge.'

I was instructed to lead off. Guides were left for R Company, who would catch up during the night, but Major Bune and the jeeps carrying R Company's wounded never rejoined. Major Bune was ambushed and killed some time during the night, although the jeep convoy and the wounded are believed to have reached the safety of the main divisional area”.

IMG_71731rcsrz.JPG Lt Col Dobie calls an 'O Group'


The 1st Battalion moved off again, but now south-eastwards towards the bridge, T Company in the lead. They kept meeting a few Germans, so there were frequent delays. There were also more casualties, including one of the platoon commanders, Lieutenant John McFadden, who was wounded and would die in captivity nearly three weeks later. Behind came the rest of the battalion.

IMG_5263srz.JPG Meeting a few more Germans?


Lieutenant Britneff said:

'All transport - Bren carriers, anti-tank guns, jeeps and trailers - were manhandled, with no engines started, so as not to alert the Germans. It was extremely heavy going through the woods.'

IMG_72651csrz.JPG 'This is not the kind of "Big Push" I had in mind' ....


There would be no overnight break or sleep, although the force made occasional stops. Lieutenant Colonel Dobie and his 1st Battalion had made almost exactly the same amount of progress as the 3rd Battalion, but they were no more than halfway to Arnhem and had given up the attempt to reach their original objective. 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Battalion had suffered more than 100 casualties by now, including Major Bune and eleven men killed. Many of the casualties were ‘missing’, most of whom became prisoners.

IMG_2869sr.JPG A para and his wounded mate are taken prisoner and moved to the rear ....

 

The Divisional Troops on the First Day


The Germans did not mount an attack on the troops of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airlanding Brigade divisional units around Wolfheze, or in the landing areas. Instead, they used whatever troops were available to block the moves towards Arnhem, as they quickly recognized that the river crossings were the objectives of the landing.

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The 2nd South Staffords remained near Wolfheze and reported a 'quiet night'.

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The other two airlanding battalions did move to some extent from their landing zones. The 1st Border deployed three companies, a short distance south, around the landing areas south of the railway line.
B Company went further on, south to the village of Renkum, where it took up position around a brickworks.

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It was by the river, so it overlooked both the main road from the west and the local ferry over the Rhine. It was considered that both of these routes would probably be used to bring in reinforcements. B company was in a relatively exposed position.

It would be attacked during the night.

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ref: M Middlebrook
 

The other airlanding battalion, the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers, found themselves in a position that fully illustrated the weakness of the landing plan. At this initial phase, every effort should probably have been directed eastwards, towards the Arnhem bridges. Instead, the KOSB companies all moved nearly three miles in the opposite direction, as it became necessary to protect a new dropping zone for the second day's lift.

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This was because two of the three original landing spaces near Wolfheze were now blocked by the wrecked first-lift gliders.

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The KOSB companies made their separate ways along wooded tracks ..........,

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.............. but encountered no opposition.

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(However, No. 5 Platoon, in B Company, did apprehend a 'buxom blonde dressed in a smart flannel suit', with her German boyfriend. She was from the Luftwaffe and was passed back to Wolfheze, where she apparently generated some curiosity).
 
Could not find the blonde Kevin? Ever hopeful 😀. The story goes forward, your attention to this event is outstanding. I continue to be intrigued. Robin.
 
Could not find the blonde Kevin? Ever hopeful 😀. The story goes forward, your attention to this event is outstanding. I continue to be intrigued. Robin.

Thank you Robin, for the likes and constructive comments.


The KOSBs’ only action took place on the main road, the Amsterdamseweg. This was at a place called Planken Wambuis. No. 1 Platoon of A Company was commanded by the Canadian officer, Lieutenant L. Kane.

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They were positioned to stop any German traffic moving along the road. A Bren gunner, Private William Anderson, described one of the encounters:

“Planken Wambuis is Old Dutch for 'wooden jacket'; it had been a place where timber was cut to make coffins. Shortly after we had taken up position at a bend in the road, we heard a car. It was a pick-up type truck and it passed, and nobody fired a shot. I don't know why.

The platoon commander shouted many things at us - 'When I say fire - ACT!' A little while later, an ambulance, followed by a smaller truck, came round the corner, and we all let loose.

Both vehicles ran off the road. When we went down to them and opened the ambulance, we found it was full of fully armed Germans; a few were wounded. The other truck was riddled with bullets; when two of our lads opened the doors, the men inside fell out dripping with blood”.

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The 'Germans' were members of the 9th SS Wach Battalion, many of which were Dutch SS volunteers, either Nazi sympathizers or of mixed Dutch-German blood. Holland had a higher proportion of SS volunteers than any other occupied country. Some others had joined the SS to avoid deportation to Germany to work as forced labourers. They came from Ede, with orders to attack the airborne landing. This SS company reported heavy casualties of twenty-five dead and sixty wounded, mostly in this action with Lieutenant Kane's platoon.

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I'm happy to see that Urquhart, who stood up to Montgomery and Boy Browning to try to save lives in opposing Market Garden, lived to the ripe old age of 101, and accomplished so much with the UN peacekeepers over the years. My sincere condolences to his family.
 
Brian Urquhart had to have had titanium testicles to stand up to not only the “military genius” of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Viscount of Alamein, KG GCB DSO PC, OC 21[SUP]st[/SUP] Army Group, but LtGen Frederick Arthur Montague "Boy" Browning GCVO KBE CB DSO, OC 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Allied Airborne Army, as well. Montgomery’s and Browning’s apparent combined ignorance of this new type of warfare was only exceeded by their pompous arrogance, recalcitrance and unbelievably engorged egos. For those who might be so inclined you may want to visit; https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html . My most sincere condolences to his family for the loss of a magnificent gentleman.

Arnhem Jim
Arizona Territory
 
I've read a bit over the year's about airborne troops from all sides and find them all to be a bit of a breed. Mostly fearless, courageous warriors, coupled with the right amount of intellect and wit to help get them through the tightest scrape's Their NCOs and officers also needed an equal measure of the right stuff to get them there, plus balls the size of coconuts to fly into complete chaos.

Just love this thread....
 
I'm happy to see that Urquhart, who stood up to Montgomery and Boy Browning to try to save lives in opposing Market Garden, lived to the ripe old age of 101, and accomplished so much with the UN peacekeepers over the years. My sincere condolences to his family.

Brian Urquhart had to have had titanium testicles to stand up to not only the “military genius” of Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Viscount of Alamein, KG GCB DSO PC, OC 21[SUP]st[/SUP] Army Group, but LtGen Frederick Arthur Montague "Boy" Browning GCVO KBE CB DSO, OC 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Allied Airborne Army, as well. Montgomery’s and Browning’s apparent combined ignorance of this new type of warfare was only exceeded by their pompous arrogance, recalcitrance and unbelievably engorged egos. For those who might be so inclined you may want to visit; https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html . My most sincere condolences to his family for the loss of a magnificent gentleman.

Arnhem Jim
Arizona Territory

I've read a bit over the year's about airborne troops from all sides and find them all to be a bit of a breed. Mostly fearless, courageous warriors, coupled with the right amount of intellect and wit to help get them through the tightest scrape's Their NCOs and officers also needed an equal measure of the right stuff to get them there, plus balls the size of coconuts to fly into complete chaos.

Just love this thread....

I would also like to add my condolences.


Thanks for taking the trouble to comment on 'this interminable thread', your comments and views are appreciated. To stir the pot a bit ......

Louis, I know you love Monty, but would he have had to have done the same if he served under Patton, for example, a certain prison break comes to mind?

Jim, Montgomery, Browning and others were clearly below standard on hindsight, but intelligence presented them with a tantalizing prospect. They might be able to cut off the Ruhr. I am not trying to defend them, but do feel that the complexities and competing priorities should be considered.

As for character, what characteristics and personality traits did the average Army Commander have? At El Alamein Monty fought off Churchill and delayed attacking until he had trained his men to a high standard and accumulated the resources to fight a WW1 type frontal assault through miles of minefields.

Clearly, this was a one off, short term 'offer', that did not allow these strong leadership traits to play out. Monty could not have launched this without the consent of Eisenhower, how come he never seems to 'cop it'? How opposed or in favour of Market Garden were all the other senior commanders? What competing issues did Ike have and why did he OK the plan?

When it came to operational planning, there were many different priorities to manage. For one example the Air Force did not allow the 1st Airborne to drop close to Arnhem and refused 2 drops on day one. The dispersed and distant LZs proved to be crucial. I have showed what a small force actually reached the bridge. Ironing out major problems like this in the very short planning time would be difficult.

This was also a new and untried concept on this scale. They were chasing an enemy that was apparently too weak and unable to stop the Allies on just about all current reports. The V2's were causing carnage in London and the Russians were destroying the Wehrmacht in the East. Where might they stop and what politics might be at play?

If 'H' hour had been earlier and all of 1st Airborne had dropped on the bridge on day one, even with two lifts, might the outcome have differed? For example, how long would Krafft's battalion have lasted in this scenario. XXX Corps were also hampered by the late start (see earlier) and darkness coming early.

It is easy in hindsight to pick out all the flaws, which are glaringly obvious, but if you believed at the time that they could be overcome, might you have said 'go' if you were in charge?

One thing I think we can all agree on are desert kiwi's comments about the quality of the fighting men involved, on all sides. I hope they are never forgotten.
 
I would also like to add my condolences.


Thanks for taking the trouble to comment on 'this interminable thread', your comments and views are appreciated. To stir the pot a bit ......

Louis, I know you love Monty, but would he have had to have done the same if he served under Patton, for example, a certain prison break comes to mind?


Come now Kevin, you know I dislike Patton every bit as much as I dislike Montgomery. They were both glory hounds, and had no problem sacrificing their men's lives to obtain that glory. Give me men like Bill Slim and Jim Gavin over attention whores like Monty and Patton any day and twice on Sunday.
 
Come now Kevin, you know I dislike Patton every bit as much as I dislike Montgomery. They were both glory hounds, and had no problem sacrificing their men's lives to obtain that glory. Give me men like Bill Slim and Jim Gavin over attention whores like Monty and Patton any day and twice on Sunday.

Louis, you are such a charmer! I can't help but agree. I do wonder what some of the better generals would have made of it ........ But Ike does seem to have been given a pass.


Meanwhile ......

The rest of the King's Own Scottish Borderers spent the night quietly, even in their most exposed positions. The most westerly company (B Company), was now nearly ten miles from the Arnhem bridge and this battalion was the only one to have no fatal casualties on that first day.

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The divisional units, still deployed around Wolfheze, also passed a mostly quiet night, whatever the Germans were doing, it was away from them.

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Divisional HQ spent the night in four gliders, that were robust enough after the landing.

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There was also the team of war correspondents, whose signalers managed to contact England on a 76 set, something the Divisional Signals had not yet achieved. The reports of Stanley Maxted and Alan Wood were relayed to London. Here they formed the basis for the first radio broadcasts and press reports of the landing.

The first day and night for the 1st British Airborne Division ended with fatal casualties totaling - ninety: twenty-one were in the glider crash in England, sixteen in other incidents in the air or on landing and most of the remainder in the attempts by the 1st Parachute Brigade to reach Arnhem.
 

1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne Corps HQ

The Advanced Headquarters of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] British Airborne Corps landed around twelve miles south of Arnhem Bridge. Lieutenant-General Browning's Corps HQ flew from Harwell in thirty-two Horsa and six American-built Waco gliders, which carried American signals parties.

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loading the mahogany K&C Horsa (courtesy of L Badolato - thanks Louis)


Three Horsas were lost, one force-landed in England, one went into the sea and one landed in German occupied Holland. Two injured glider pilots were the only landing casualties. Approximately 200 men and over twenty jeeps of Corps Headquarters were landed safely.

IMG_6544src.JPG HQ jeep


Most of the 82nd US Airborne Division landed safely around them.

IMG_1190csr.JPG A busy day ahead


There was a small protection force for Browning's headquarters, consisting of the sixty-eight uninjured glider pilots.

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'A guard of sixty-eight uninjured glider pilots - I bet the Gerries are c#@%%ing themselves'


To supplement them, the glider pilots of No. 20 Flight, B Squadron, part of the Arnhem lift, were ordered (in England) to move to Corps HQ by any means possible after landing ...... (good job this was not essential as it might have proved rather difficult).

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'Which genius thought this one up? You have to be joking!'


The corps HQ landing was in a remote area, with no German combat troops present, but a few stray Germans were taken prisoner - an unusual event for a corps level headquarters.
 

There was one Corps HQ fatal casualty after the landing. Lieutenant Fuller Gee of the Royal Signals was sent off on one of the airdropped motorcycles, to lay a land-line to the nearby Americans.

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Unfortunately, he ran over a German mine which blew both of his legs off and he died that night. An American signals officer attached to Corps HQ, Lieutenant Nick Carter (seconded from 101st US Airborne), completed the link up by land line.

The 82[SUP]nd[/SUP] were quickly engaged in different fights in several landing areas. The 82nd did capture the important bridge over the river Maas at Grave and another over a nearby canal obstacle. But as a result of its dispersion and some minor local German counter attacks, it was slow to move to attack the vital Nijmegen road and rail bridges. As a result, they did not take the Nijmegen road or rail bridges on the first day as planned. (The road bridge was the last one before Arnhem Bridge on XXX Corps ‘Club Route’).

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There was soon a physical connection with the Americans as well. Although they landed with the first wave, Browning and his headquarters were never any in serious danger.

However, his signals organization was always under enough strain to limit his influence as the Corps Commander. His signalers did manage to contact the Corps Rear HQ in England that night, but less than ninety minutes contact, in two short periods, was all they managed with 1st Airborne that day (only twelve miles from Arnhem).

(ref M Middlebrook)

I included a brief account of 2 Para earlier, based on the official history (it begins at post #1388). I shall return to them again soon.
 

So, to recap so far, I shall briefly review the overall position at the end of the first day.
The Germans had already started to reinforce around Arnhem. I shall shortly discuss how their forces were ordered to quickly get in position to put pressure on the relatively lightly armed British paratroopers.

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The 82[SUP]nd[/SUP] captured the bridge over the Maas at Grave and another over a nearby canal obstacle. But, it was slow to move to attack the vital Nijmegen road and rail bridges so they did not take them on the first day as planned.

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Further south, the 101st captured all but one of its bridge objectives. The Germans managed to demolish the Canal Bridge at Son, north of Eindhoven. It needed to be replaced by a Bailey bridge, which would impose a delay on XXX Corps. See from around post#1350 for the 101[SUP]st[/SUP] actions at Eindhoven, the subsequent battles for Best and with the 107[SUP]th[/SUP] Panzer Brigade counter attacks.

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XXX Corps started its advance at 2.35 p.m. as planned, much later than it would have liked due to synchronising with the air drops, but failed to complete its breakthrough of the German front-line defences. It did advance around eight miles, but then reluctantly stopped for the night (it was starting to get dark from around 1630 hours). See from around post #1300 for the initial XXX Corps advance.

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Great pictures and story telling Kevin {bravo}}{bravo}}{bravo}}

Stay safe mate

Martyn:)
 

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