Battle for Arnhem.... (2 Viewers)

[Louis Badolato]

Great pictures and story telling Kevin {bravo}}{bravo}}{bravo}}

Stay safe mate

Martyn

I’m with Martyn, tremendous photography and analysis of the details of the campaign!

 

[panda1gen]

Great pictures and story telling Kevin {bravo}}{bravo}}{bravo}}

Stay safe mate

Martyn

I’m with Martyn, tremendous photography and analysis of the details of the campaign!

Martyn and Louis

Thanks for the kind comments and encouragement, it is appreciated.

You stay safe too.

Best wishes

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

At several points on this thread, I have referred to the planning of the battle, especially with regard to the over optimistic view at SHAEF. I recently came across the following written information, so have decided to share it and briefly revisit the intelligence picture and planning, before returning to the muck and bullets of battle.

The victory in France and the sheer speed of the advance to Holland encouraged what has been described as ‘reckless optimism’ at Allied HQ. The view by September 1944 was exemplified by the written findings of the Allied Intelligence Committee:

“... no organised resistance may be expected after 1 December 1944: indeed it may well end before that date.”


The Director of the British War Office, General John Kennedy, optimistically, but probably accurately at that time, wrote on 6[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944,

“If we continue to advance at the same pace as that of recent weeks we should be in Berlin on 28 September.”


The only question seemed to be, could they keep advancing at this rate? Note that the view on estimated likely resistance was an Allied assessment, not merely a British view, and SHAEF also agreed with it.

This then, was the background to SHAEF asking one Corps, XXX Corps, to move the sixty-four miles to Arnhem, on essentially one road, over two of the most formidable rivers in Europe (plus many smaller ones), within 2-3 days.




There were two flanking Corps for XXX Corps, but both were significantly weakened due to limited supplies and all three had many water obstacles, polder and close terrain to cross. Also, the use of an Airborne Army of three divisions was a totally new and untried concept.




To illustrate how far SHAEF’s expectations had changed, contrast the plan above against the appreciation of Patton’s 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Army, when he advanced 60 miles in only 2 weeks to a position at the southern side of the Falaise Pocket at Argentan, after breaking out of the bocage into open country.





Operational Appreciation M 525, was issued on September 14[SUP]th[/SUP] 1944, by Monty:

Since the fall of Le Havre our supply situation has improved, and we are now in a position to undertake operations to capture the Ruhr.

Although the port of Antwerp is now in our hands we cannot use it because the enemy commands the north of the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt estuary will be the main task of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Canadian Army.

The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] US Army has crossed the German border on our right flank and has reached the Siegfried Line. Further South the US 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Army has established a bridgehead over the Moselle.

In conjunction with the 12[SUP]th[/SUP] Army Group we now wish to concentrate on operations to encircle, isolate and occupy the industrial heart of Germany. Our immediate aim is the Ruhr but in the course of the proposed operations we propose to open up Antwerp and Rotterdam. Once these deep water ports are functioning, our maintenance facilities will improve and operations can develop. Occupation of the Ruhr will follow: this will open the way to a powerful thrust deep into Germany by way of the northern route.

My intention therefore is the destruction of all enemy forces west of the line Zwolle-Deventer-Cleve-Venlo-Maastricht, to advance east and to encircle the Ruhr.

Operational boundaries will be as follows:

Inclusive to the 12[SUP]th[/SUP] Army Group: Hasselt-Sithard-Garzweiler-Leverkusen-Rhine.
Inclusive to the 21[SUP]st[/SUP] Army Group: Opladen-Warburg-Braunschweig.
​

D-Day for the operation is Sunday 17[SUP]th[/SUP] September but if bad weather hinders airborne operations on that day it is possible that there may be a postponement.”


Canadian 1st Army were to clear the Scheldt


Irish Guards of the Guards Armoured Division would lead XXX Corps (Lt. Col. J.O.E. Vandaleur of the Irish Guards is shown in a 'borrowed' Humber A.C.)

It is also clear from these writings that the importance of Antwerp (and Rotterdam) was not ignored and was fully appreciated. See from #1277 for my earlier look at the planning and background to the battle.

 

[panda1gen]

In failing to anticipate the increased German resistance, I suggest that SHAEF underestimated a number of factors, some of which might have been:-

German War Production:

Despite the strategic bombing campaign, thanks to Albert Speer’s work, much war production was sustained or even increasing. This meant that some of the decimated armoured divisions (e.g. 9[SUP]th[/SUP] and 10[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Panzer) and under-strength infantry and artillery forces could be quickly reinforced or re-equipped.

At the depot ........


AFV production also improved, for example, by producing more StuGs and assault guns, which were less complex to make than tanks (but more limited tactically due the lack of a rotating turret). This also made good use of highly productive, established factories and processes and used useful hulls from otherwise obsolete models, e.g. the 38(t) and Pz III.

Armed with the equivalent of the PAK40 anti-tank gun or better, they could take out the average medium tank from long range and were suited to a defensive posture by virtue of a low silhouette and good armour protection.

Just fewer than 19,000 tanks and SPG’s were made in 1944, over 7,000 more than in 1943.


These included:

1,051 Tigers and variants,

3,777 Panthers, 226 Jagdpanthers,

a damaged Panther A is repaired ......


..... 3,126 Panzer IVJ,


1,006 StuG IV and another 2,000 assorted Pz IV based SPGs.


1,687 Hetzers and 669 other 38(t) based SPGs,


.... and 4,752 StuG III and StuH 42s.


Another respected weapon was the ‘88’ flak and anti-tank gun. It accounted for many tanks and planes during the war and could kill a Sherman tank at well over 1km range.

Nearly 6,500 were made in 1944 alone, almost 2,000 more than in 1943.


Despite all of this effort, there continued to be production and distribution problems due to air attack, which did mean that there were usually some shortages of fuel, weapons, equipment or ammunition.

Ref: Wikipedia

 

[villagehorse]

Amazing this late in the war with intensive bombing and shortage of raw materials, war production was not only sustained, but in some cases, increased. Very interesting Kevin. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Amazing this late in the war with intensive bombing and shortage of raw materials, war production was not only sustained, but in some cases, increased. Very interesting Kevin. Robin.

Thank you Robin, I appreciate your comments and I hope I can keep your interest a little longer.

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

Next factor ........

Technology:

German technology was advancing rapidly, however it was only in a few cases this translated to weapons on the battlefield. Almost certainly the most advanced weapon system developed was the V2, the world’s first ballistic missile, which had been bombarding London since 8 September 1944. Once launched, it took around 5 minutes to reach its target, which it hit without warning. It continued to hit London and Antwerp in particular.

It could only be theoretically stopped by destroying its manufacture, but this was located deep in a mountain, set up in a secret factory in a converted mine. London was spared a little as it was pushed out of range by the Allied advance, which was no help to Antwerp as it stayed in range from Germany. MI5 turned a Nazi agent who reported false ‘hits’ on London, to steer targeting to fields outside the city, which probably saved many lives. Bad though the V2s were, especially for Antwerp, they did not prove decisive.




Perhaps the best examples of implemented battlefield technology were the cheap but technically advanced and effective shaped charged anti-tank weapons, the most famous of which were the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck infantry anti-tank weapons.





Millions were now being produced, which made relatively humble infantry potent tank killers if allowed to ambush AFV’s or fight them in close combat.

Even the obsolete early war 37mm ATG could now be equipped with a short range but powerful shaped charge grenade that could kill most Allied tanks.




The assault rifle was another, which gave SMG firepower capability at much longer range, but it was not yet widely available.

 

[panda1gen]

The Weather:

The coming of autumn and winter had a foreseeable, adverse impact on ground forces mobility especially ‘off road’, due to mud. This was a major problem in the polder of Holland anyway. Supply consumption would be expected to be increased and transportation of supplies may also be affected, depending upon the state of the roads and railways.

It would also especially affect tactical air operations, negating to some degree a major strength of the Allies.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/weather-eye-operation-market-garden-mfxclhdqzvf

“Weather was crucial for the airlift; meteorologists had forecast at least two days of clear skies, starting on September 17, 1944. The operation began well, with 2,000 gliders towed across the North Sea carrying 20,000 men and hundreds of tons of equipment.

On September 18, however, fog over England halted most of the air operations involving the second wave of gliders and their reinforcements, while over Germany and the northern Netherlands the weather cleared, allowing the Luftwaffe to attack Allied forces.

By the time the delayed second wave took off from England, the battle on the ground was starting to go badly. Fog continued to play havoc with the airlift, leaving the troops on the ground short of supplies, with no sign of reinforcements as the Germans counterattacked.

The first good weather appeared only on September 23 but allowed the delayed third wave of airborne troops to take off from England.”


I have not been able to find data on Dutch weather for 1944, but include data from London in the UK as a proxy. Precipitation increased and daylight hours decreased from September.

http://london-weather.eu/article.85.html

The first 2 weeks of August were generally dry and warm with spells of sunshine. The warm weather extended into the third week, and on the 16th the maximum temperature almost reached 28°C. It became increasingly humid and the warm weather ended at the end of the third week. On the 21st the highest temperature was only 15.1°C., and then the remainder of the month was rather cool and changeable. On the 24th. over 18mm of rain was measured.


September - Cool with above average rainfall and near normal sunshine.

Mean Temperature	13.3°C
Monthly Highest	20.9°C	Total Rain	57 mm
Monthly Lowest	3.8°C	Total Sun	143 hrs

There were many dry days during this September and most of the rain that fell was fairly light. However, on the 2nd, over 17mm of rain was recorded. The most notable aspect of the month was the lack of warm days. On the 14th, the high was close to 21°C, but even as early as the 11th the minimum temperature was below 4°C. The coolest weather was reserved for the end of the month and the maximum temperature on the 24th was only 13.6°C.


October - Rather cold, dull and wet.

Mean Temperature	9.8°C
Monthly Highest	15.5°C	Total Rain	69 mm
Monthly Lowest	0.1°C	Total Sun	81 hrs

There was some fine and mild weather early in the month and on the 2nd it was sunny all day. The maximum temperature on the 6th was above 15°C., but during the second week it became somewhat cooler. It rained regularly during October, and on the 17th over 13mm of rain fell. However, much of the rain during the month was light. During the last week it became cold, and after an early ground frost, the maximum temperature on the 29th was only 7.8°C.


November - Wet and rather cold with sunshine slightly below average.

Mean Temperature	6.8°C
Monthly Highest	14.3°C	Total Rain	87 mm
Monthly Lowest	-1.0°C	Total Sun	51 hrs

Cloud cover would increasingly reduce visibility and opportunity for Allied aircraft in NW Europe.

 

[panda1gen]

The Effect of the Weather on Tactical Air Support

So, the degree of close support by the RAF and USAAF would be reduced by the weather and reduced daylight.

Radio communication issues affecting 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne at Arnhem, were also important, I discussed these previously from around post#1395.

The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Tactical Air Force was the Royal Air Force group that supported the Commonwealth troops fighting in Western Europe in the period 1944-45. Strength returns of 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] TAF are available from ‘AIR 22-Air Ministry: Periodical Returns, Intelligence Summaries and Bulletins’


RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force Strength 1944-45

2nd Tactical AF	1-Jan-44	1-May-44	1-Sep-44	1-Jan-45
SE Fighters	697	1,017	1,080	1,044
Army Coop		120	112	112
Medium Bombers	319	294	360	396
Sum	1,016	1,431	1,552	1,552

These numbers refer to operational aircraft. The fighters used were the Spitfire and P-51 Mustang, together with the Hawker Typhoon fighter and ground attack aircraft. These planes made up the majority of 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] TAF strength.




There were also a smaller number of medium bombers of the Mosquito, Mitchell and Boston (A20 Havoc in the USAAF service) types, as well as a small number of Auster observation aircraft.




Whilst 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] TAF was mainly deployed in the UK, forward airfields were quickly established in Normandy within days of the D-Day landings. This trend continued with the rapid advance across NW Europe, shown below.




Although close deployment like this would help to some degree, the weather and communications problems would limit the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] TAF ability to provide close support for Market-Garden. In addition, some fighter squadrons were withdrawn to the UK in a futile attempt to stop the V2’s.

An RAF vehicle skirts around destroyed buildings. Liberation came at a price.

An RAF tanker fights its was up a congested road, to supply an advanced airfield.

 

[panda1gen]

The Terrain:

The advance after the Normandy breakout was into relatively open country. The Allies now faced closer terrain with more defensive barriers, including hills, forests




and major rivers that the Germans could exploit in defence.




This meant that the Germans did not necessarily have to fight a mobile battle. They would be less exposed to air attack than if they were moving and more likely to be entrenched. They might also have more shelters for protection against artillery and air attack.




This increased protection might also include more flak units, especially along the bomber routes.




As the Allies advanced they would also meet more prepared defences, e.g. in the Westwall, which Market-Garden was supposed to bypass before winter.

 

[panda1gen]

The Supply Situation:

Until Antwerp or Rotterdam was fully open, supplies landed in Europe would not match demand, especially for new mobile operations. This was foreseeable, as was the destruction of the distributive French rail network, which was now being repaired and new locomotives introduced. From the first week of September 1944 when Le Havre and Antwerp were captured, supply was improving to some degree, just not fast enough.

After the war in Europe was won, Ike said that without exception, the Russians wanted to ask one thing.

“It was,”

Eisenhower wrote in Crusade in Europe,

“to explain the supply arrangements that enabled us to make the great sweep out of our constricted beachhead in Normandy to cover, in one rush, all of France, Belgium and Luxembourg, up to the very borders of Germany. I had to describe to them our systems of railway repairs and construction, truckage, evacuation, and supply by air. They suggested that of all the spectacular feats of the war, even including their own, the Allied success in the supply of the pursuit across France would go down in history as the most astonishing.”

https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2018/12/26/the-supply-front-the-allies-key-to-victory/



This may have been astonishing, but it did not get them into Germany. Antwerp needed to be opened by clearing the banks of the Scheldt.

https://www.holland.com/global/tourism/holland-stories/liberation-route/the-battle-of-the-scheldt.htm


The German Will to Fight:

Most armies in history have fought harder defending their homeland. It was therefore likely that there would be an increased German will to defend the Heimat (homeland). In addition, although the war was clearly lost, especially after the July bomb plot, Hitler’s totalitarian state and its Nazi machinery would not permit any hint of defeatism.


The Resilience and Skill of the Surviving German Forces:

Perhaps this was the most important factor in halting the Allies in late 1944. This resilience would be demonstrated despite them suffering huge losses (especially of armour) in France and, by some order of magnitude, much worse losses on the Eastern front. It should also be remembered that most of the German Army, unlike the Western Allies, was still not motorised.




What reserve troops they had left in Germany or were freshly assembled (Volkssturm), could be more easily deployed to key areas, the nearer the Allied advance came towards Germany.




The Quality of the German Military Leaders:

This point should be included in calculating the ‘resilience and skill’ of the German forces, but I have specifically mentioned it as decisive leadership played a significant part in defending against the Allied advance. I shall show how it was particularly relevant to how the defenders would respond to Market-Garden, see later. For example, Model had a well deserved defensive reputation.




Although Allied Intelligence had correctly recognised that units like 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] SS Panzer Corps had been virtually destroyed, they still had a significant cadre of very experienced and capable troops, who could be re-equipped from the nearby Ruhr. Following the nearly complete destruction of Army Group Centre by the Russians, reinforcements were mainly being sent to the east, but given the immediate threat to her war economy posed by Market-Garden, Hitler unsurprisingly prioritised it instead.

Market-Garden was halted with US and Commonwealth casualties of around 15,000 to 17,000.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden


However, in reality, the truth was that from September 1944, the Western Allies found increased resistance all along the front, not just for Market-Garden. For just three examples in and around Holland:

The US 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Army suffered around 7000 casualties at Aachen, but did take the city.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aachen


In the Hürtgen Forestbattles, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] US Army casualties were much higher, some 33,000 from 19 September to 16 December 1944. To February 1945 it is estimated that there were 55,000 US Casualties. This engagement seemed to be the lowest point of US involvement in NW Europe in 1944-45 and the battles are generally considered to be a German defensive victory. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hürtgen_Forest


The battle of the Scheldt cost the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Canadian Army 12,873 casualties in the complex five week offensive actions from late September to early November 1944. This casualty rate proved controversial. Was this another priority decision taken consequential to Allied Intelligence believing that the Germans were finished?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Scheldt


Furthermore, the preparations and build up to the 16 December ‘Wacht Am Rhein’ offensive were starting to be implemented in September after Hitler decided to attack, but this massive operation also apparently remained completely undetected by Allied Intelligence. Grievous though the Allied casualty figures were, Hitler had no hesitation about taking many multiples of these losses. The following link reveals that even fatal casualties were in the millions from early 1944.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_casualties_in_World_War_II

“Overall, Overmans estimates (fatal) losses for the entire war on the Eastern front at 4 million and in the West 1 million”. However, millions of Axis troops would continue to resist and well over 1 million Axis soldiers would die in the last battles in Germany from the beginning of 1945.

 

[panda1gen]

With apologies for ‘jumping about a bit’, I am now going to return to the ‘muck and bullets’ and revisit 2 Para. I gave an earlier account starting at post # 1411, based on a relatively brief official history, but now hope to give more detail.

Ref: Arnhem 1944, the Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook


The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Parachute Battalion

The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion was led by the veteran Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost, whose reputation as an able and aggressive leader had helped earn the battalion a key role, as it was 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion that was ordered to seize the road and rail bridges at Arnhem with the absolute priority of the road bridge.

It would then establish a defensive perimeter, including on the south bank at the road bridge. They expected to work closely with 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion to form the defensive perimeter and together greet XXX Corps, (hopefully) within forty-eight hours.

After landing they set off along the southern route (code-named 'Lion'), which ran through the woods from Heelsum. It then ran along the oldest of the east-west roads in this area to Arnhem. The route passed close to the Rhine all the way and into the older part of Oosterbeek, nearest the river.

The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion flew in with 481 men, around 100 less than either the 1st or 3rd Battalions. Half of B Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron (part of No. 2 Platoon 9th Field Company, Royal Engineers), was also attached to the battalion column. Anti tank support was provided by four 6-pounder anti-tank guns of the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery (with a fifth gun joining later). Major Bill Arnold was the battery commander and most of his headquarters also joined 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion.

2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion were however, infuriated by the final airborne assault plan. Any basic airborne plan would have included drops or glider landings near the target bridges on the north and south side of each crossing. The Arnhem air planners had refused this request, so the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion had to march to their objectives around seven miles away. Their key advantage of surprise would be lost.

In addition, if possible, a detached force from 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion would capture the German Army headquarters in Arnhem.

‘A’ Company was the advanced guard, led by Major Digby Tatham-Warter, and they were in action before the rear of the column was even on the move. Variously, 'a column of lorries and a staff car' or 'two lorries and three cars', was heard to approach.






Lieutenant Andrew McDermont's No. 3 Platoon was in the lead,




took up ambush positions and either killed or captured all of the thirty or so Germans in the vehicles.





It was probably the reconnaissance troop of Battalion Krafft's No. 2 Company, whose war diary recorded them as being wiped out.

 

[panda1gen]

2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion had a trek of almost three miles through the woods and each platoon of ‘A’ Company took it in turn to lead.




They made good progress and signalman Bill Jukes describes one of the few encounters along this route:

‘It was difficult to believe that I was back in the war again. The degree of difficulty I was experiencing must have been nothing compared with that of a German soldier who came cycling towards us down a side road. He must have been out for his afternoon spin and didn't even know we had landed. When he saw us, he probably thought his last hour had come. His machine began to wobble until he eventually fell off. We took him prisoner and loaded him and his bike with all our gear, and took him along with us’.

Another man told of two German-Dutch couples that were also surprised. Whilst the Dutch girls ran off, the Germans were taken prisoner. Brigadier Lathbury appeared in the column and after conferring briefly with John Frost departed for 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion (see earlier).

They were just planning to speed up the advance by shuttling A Company platoons forward in jeeps, when the leading troops came under fire as edge of the wooded area was reached.





Lieutenant Robin Vlasto described what happened. The 'Jack' he mentions was Lieutenant J. H. Grayburn, a fellow platoon commander,

“We come to a T-junction, and Jack seems rather lost but goes left. Just as Digby, Mac and myself approach it, some Jerries concealed in woods ahead opened fire, and we get down sharpish! There is a good deal of rifle fire, and some mortar bombs fall fairly close, but it doesn't seem to be very determined resistance. Jack goes in under a smokescreen, and Mac moves round the left, and enemy shift off fairly quickly — quite as per the training pamphlet, and Digby is as pleased as punch”.






Digby Tatham-Warter had earlier served with the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry. He described how he utilised this experience to help his company communicate with each other in action:

“I must explain that, over the years of training, I had never acquired much confidence in the small wirelesses used at platoon and company level, and I had trained my company in the use of bugle calls for signalling orders and intentions in advance-guard actions. The calls were much the same as those used in Sir John Moore's Light Division in the Peninsular Wars. I had found this method extremely successful in training exercises, and it gave me great satisfaction to see it working perfectly under enemy fire.

Each platoon and Company HQ. had two buglers trained to sound the simple calls we used. While Jack Grayburn was working round to the right of the enemy machine-gun, I was joined by Colonel Frost. He had been hard on the heels of my company and now came forward, impatient at the delay, to see the situation himself. But we did not have to wait long for Grayburn's bugle call signalling that he was back on the axis road, and I sounded the call to resume the advance”.

 

[panda1gen]

2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion marched quite near to the Heveadorp - Driel ferry across the Rhine.

It was apparently unknown to Divisional Intelligence, although different historians disagree whether it was known to higher command - logic would suggest they should have known. It was capable of carrying eight jeeps on each crossing.

There was no plan to pass a jeep mounted assault force to the south bank to attack the southern end of the Arnhem bridges. Given that the Reconnaissance Squadron jeeps should have already captured the bridge this might not be quite the oversight that some may make out ........

But neither was there a plan to secure it for later use ....... Again, given how matters progressed with the different Parachute Battalions, it seems unlikely they could have held it anyway. And then there were the Germans, who might have launched a pot shot or two at anyone brave enough to try to use it and could probably destroy it relatively easily themselves if they wished to?

If 'higher command' did know, they may have thought it to be damaged ..... or simply too risky to use.

So 2 Para march on ......

 

[villagehorse]

Kevin I think your considerations in regard to the ferry are very sensible and logical. Good to see it put to words. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin I think your considerations in regard to the ferry are very sensible and logical. Good to see it put to words. Robin.

Thank you Robin. Best wishes, Kevin.

 

[panda1gen]

By this time, every unit had stragglers and outliers. 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Lt ‘Loopy’ Bushman, an Australian officer attached to the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne reserve HQ, found himself alone by an occupied farm, near Ochmamoney. Without hesitation, he took out the sentry with a combination of a penknife and bad breath, then held up over twenty Germans who were settling down for the night with his Sten.






He was observed in this daring manoeuvre by another attached Aussie straggler, Lance Sergeant ‘Cobber’ Robin Batman, who backed him up with a hand grenade.




Other soldiers, lost and seeking shelter for the night, then drifted in.






The story of this gallant action was first published in the ‘Victor’ boys comic and although the participants were by now dead, an Aussie investigative reporter (M. Adeituppe) managed to find records and testimony enough that Bushman received a posthumous BSO in the Bar and Batman an OFC.

The grateful residents of the little village of Ochmamoney pay tribute every year at this time with a Scots piper playing a lament, ‘Och the New’. Some say that Bushman’s ghost can still be heard at this time of year, yelling ‘cop this you b@st@rds’, others say it was just the chickens.

 

[panda1gen]

The last entry was sent on 1st April in the UK..... To return to 2 Para.....

The 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion reached Oosterbeek at about 6.0 p.m., where the joyful Dutch civilians gave them a very warm reception.






Orders were passed along the column forbidding the men to take any alcoholic drinks that they may be offered.

Captain Tony Frank remembered two aspects of the march through this area:

‘One was the incredible number of orange flowers or handkerchiefs that suddenly appeared like magic. The Dutch were very much in family groups, in staid clothing, out on this fine Sunday afternoon. The second memory was of the problem of trying to stop them slowing our men down by pressing cakes, milk, etc., on them.

It was an atmosphere of great jubilation at the start of the move, mainly in the country area near Heveadorp and in Oosterbeek, but it petered out when the first hold-up and sporadic firing started. There weren't so many Dutch out then, but a few stout ones stayed on and watched the fun’.






Private Sidney Elliott remembers: '

The Dutch population rushed out of their houses, cheered us, shook hands, gave us drinks, apples and marigolds - and some of us were lucky enough to receive the odd kiss. How could this be war? It was a question that would be answered very soon.'

Julie Beelaerts van Blokland, a young lady living in the Hemelse Berg Hall which was near the lower road in Oosterbeek, remembers:

‘We saw a lot of activity across the field, and the whole family went out. I remember noticing that a lot of the soldiers seemed small, with their squat helmets and laden with equipment. It is a memory I shall never forget, all those men and the jeeps, etc. We were very curious at the strange uniforms, equipment and vehicles. It was all new to us. We were out there a long time; it went on and on and on. We never did see the tail of the column before we went back home’.

 

[panda1gen]

The Dutch kept saying that the Germans had all gone to Arnhem, but there were still a few left and the column was attacked twice. Firstly there was sniping near Oosterbeek Laag (Lower Oosterbeek) Station,




...... but A Company soon stopped it.




Secondly, the Mortar Platoon, well down in the column, was hit by a burst at almost point-blank range from behind a hedge.



....... mortar platoon hits the deck .......


At least three men were wounded, one of them mortally, Private George 'Brum' Davies died of his wounds the next day.

 

[panda1gen]

‘C’ Company and some sappers of the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] Field Company left the column in Oosterbeek with Major Victor Dover in command.






They moved into meadow land between the road and the river, to prepare for an attempt to capture the large railway bridge, which ran across the river from a long embankment.






Six flak positions had been plotted from air photographs, but these were found to be deserted, perhaps after being strafed that morning.



The same strafing fire also killed some cows. A Royal Engineer vividly remembers, 'seven dead black-and-white cows; every year when I go back there are always black-and-white cows in that same field'.