Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

There were a number of comings and goings during the night of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP]/18[SUP]th[/SUP] September 1944.

C Company of the 3rd Battalion was commanded by Major Lewis.




They left the central route on which the 3rd Battalion had halted in the evening and were now moving independently. In so doing, they found a clear route to the bridge, albeit after numerous incidents.




For example, they encountered various German vehicles in the early stage of their journey. Several Germans were killed, but they lost a sergeant who was shot in the throat and also killed.




They were also able to deceive a large group of German soldiers, by forming the company into small groups of threes and pretending to be a German unit marching past in the dark.




Also, when they entered Arnhem, they met and destroyed an armoured car with a Gammon bomb.




Part of the company would subsequently be able to get through to supplement the bridge force.

 

[panda1gen]

As they approached the bridge, Major Lewis came forward to report to the 2nd Battalion. As his company attempted to join the 2 Para perimeter, two platoons got mixed up with a German force that was planning to attack from the town centre and a violent clash ensued.

One of the platoon commanders and a sergeant were killed and approximately one and a half platoons were taken prisoner. Because of this late encounter, only about forty-five of the hundred or so men of C Company 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Parachute Battalion, that so nearly reached the bridge, came in safely.




Meanwhile, Major Doug Crawley's B Company of the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion, were delayed by the Den Brink action. After they disengaged, they continued to advance through the dark Arnhem streets to their original objective, the pontoon bridge area.




When the operation was planned, aerial photographs revealed that the pontoon sections were all in place. Now however, the centre section had been removed and moored alongside the section on the northern bank.

Although Lieutenant-Colonel Frost knew that, he still directed B Company to the pontoon in the hope that some means of crossing the river could still be improvised. After Lieutenant Grayburn's attack across the road bridge failed, Frost needed to find an alternative route to attack the southern bridge defences from the rear, only then could he capture the entire bridge.




Frost also ordered Major Douglas Murray, of the 1st Parachute Squadron, to take some of his sappers and Lieutenant Pat Barnett's Brigade HQ Defence Platoon, and go back along the river bank to find boats, barges or other means to pass B Company and the Defence Platoon over to the south side of the river.

In the event no transport across the river was found and the plan was abandoned. Captain Frances Hoyer-Millar of B Company said,

'There were all sorts of wild ideas going through everyone's heads.'

With varying degrees of difficulty, most of the men sent to the pontoon area were later able to come back into the perimeter. B Company's rearguard, No. 4 Platoon, was cut off however (see later).




Most of No. 2 Platoon, 9th Field Company Royal Engineers, also arrived at the bridge during the night, adding another thirty or so men to the bridge force.




A persistent story still circulated after the battle, that the RASC captured a German lorry loaded with ammunition and drove it through to the bridge that night.

As discussed in the earlier posts about the RASC, it was believed to be incorrect. A lorry did reach the outskirts of Arnhem but no further. The 'ammunition taken to the bridge by the RASC' was in fact contained in the four jeep trailers brought in earlier by Captain Gell's RASC platoon.

(Ref: Arnhem 1944, the Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook)

 

[panda1gen]

2nd Parachute Battalion's C Company was still missing, stranded in Arnhem town. After the Germans blew up the railway bridge, C Company set out to capture its second objective, the local German headquarters in Arnhem. The HQ was based in a building near the railway station, two miles further on. Initial progress was good. Soon after the company passed the large building of St Elizabeth Hospital, they saw a party of German soldiers getting off a bus.

Lieutenant David Russell describes what happened:

“After a quick whispered briefing by Major Dover, my platoon opened fire with small arms.




This resulted in much scuffling, moaning and groaning, shouting - every sign of a party caught by surprise. A number of survivors dived into the shelter of a vehicle against the hospital.




The Piat fired on them – more groaning, and the survivors ran off into the hospital entrance. Another Piat was fired which resulted in more cries - 'Nicht schiessen!' and so on.




We told them to come to us, and about nine came over. I had learned German at Sherborne; I hadn't been able to get to Germany to complete my linguistic studies, but that would soon be rectified. The Germans said they had come by bus from the centre of Arnhem. They were probably local troops who had no idea where our troops were. They said they had suffered badly from our fire.




We then shot up a white vehicle, but this turned out to be a Dutch ambulance with a British medical officer, Captain Tobin, who was very annoyed.

The company then entered a part of Arnhem where the houses came right up to the pavement and where there was nowhere to deploy when they came under fire, as they soon did. The leading troops had to fall back, leaving two men dead, and the whole company sought shelter in a small hotel on the north side of Utrechtseweg, about 600 yards from the German headquarters and a mile from the bridge”.




The further experiences of C Company will also be described later.

The 16th Parachute Field Ambulance had not gone to the bridge and deliberately stayed in Arnhem town, at its planned destination, St Elizabeth Hospital. It arrived without difficulty and had set up inside the hospital by 10pm. Two operating theatres were taken over and Dutch doctors and nurses volunteered to assist the British surgical teams as some 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion casualties already needed treatment.

 

[panda1gen]

Major Dennis Munford commanded the supporting Light Regiment Battery of the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airlanding Regiment and was at the bridge, based with Brigade HQ, as planned. His signalers however, were unable to make contact with their battery, either with the type 22 or the 68 set.

The wireless set No. 22 was a general-purpose low-power vehicle and ground station (with facilities for man pack). Frequency range 2–8 MHz. MO control. RF output 1.5 W. R/T, CW. Range up to 20 miles (~ 32 kilometers). It was used by airborne troops and anti-aircraft units.




The wireless set No. 68 was similar to the No. 18 set, but with a lower frequency range. The wireless set No. 18 was a ‘man-pack’ set, used for "short range telephony and C/W working in forward areas", about 5 miles (8 km) maximum, Bn HQ to Company HQ, 6–9 MHz.




None of Major Gough’s or Major Hibbert’s radio sets were in contact with the divisional area either. There could be no support from Munford’s battery of 75-millimetre guns without radio contact.

This was an interesting personal view on communications I thought. https://qsl.net/g4bxd/arnhem.htm

The guns were due to move to Oosterbeek in the morning so Munford and Captain Tony Harrison decided to go back to the divisional area that night. There, they would check the jeep sets and collect fresh batteries.




To achieve this, two jeeps were driven at top speed along the Utrechtseweg, which surprised the Germans who did not expect any Allied traffic from the bridge. When they reached HQ, Munford updated them on 2 Para at the bridge, which was the first such news to reach Divisional HQ. Their two radio sets were ‘re-netted’ and their batteries checked.

The two jeeps then set out back to the bridge, Munford's jeep made it back unharmed, but Captain Harrison’s jeep was hit and he was seriously wounded.




Lance-Bombardier Bill Crook was the skillful jeep driver, who took Munford safely through a journey of about fourteen miles there and back, in the dark and all through German-occupied areas.




Meanwhile, Bombardier J. L. Hall, one of the artillery signalers at the bridge was busy whilst the two officers were away. He persevered with trying to make contact by moving to a different building and experimenting with different aerial positions and ultimately made contact with his battery, on a 68 set.



The following is a direct quote from the excellent book, ‘Arnhem 1944, the Airborne Battle, by M. Middlebrook’.

“This ends the description of the attempt by the 1st Parachute Brigade Group to reach and secure its objectives during those first hours when it had the most advantage of surprise. The actions of this period have deliberately been described in the fullest detail because what happened on that Sunday afternoon, evening and night set the scene for the remainder of the battle. It had mostly been a period of disappointment.

All of the 1st Battalion and most of the 3rd were stuck well short of their intended destinations; only about 750 men out of more than 2,000 in the brigade group had reached - but had not captured - the bridge. Casualties had not been heavy; forty men were dead (including the seven from the Reconnaissance Squadron), about a hundred were wounded, and possibly about a similar number had been captured by the Germans.

In addition, both the brigade commander and the divisional commander had become separated from their respective headquarters”.

 

[Arnhemjim]

For the more technically inclined members of the Forum, you may (or may not) find the following blog posts I published a few years back regarding the state of communications during Operation Market-Garden; http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2011/04/communications-at-battle-of-arnhem.html , https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2019/09/wireless-sets-of-1st-airborne-division.html , http://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/2017/02/forgotten-in-market-garden-raf-fighter.html .
Arnhemjim aka Arnhem Jim
Arizona Territory

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

After failing to reach Arnhem on the first day, the 1st and 3rd Battalions both set off before dawn on Monday the 18th of September. The 1st Battalion had never properly halted during the night. It now headed south-east and entered Oosterbeek from the north, marching quietly down Stationsweg, aiming to pick up the lower road into Arnhem.



Ans Kremer gave this account:

“When I woke up it was still dark and all the others had gone. I could hear noises in the street and was very frightened. I found the others at one of the windows, watching those soldiers passing down the street - dark shapes, quietly, in Indian file. Mother asked who they were; Father said they must be English, because they were so quiet. One of them lit a cigarette, and someone immediately knocked it out of his hand. There was some whispering, and then they moved on.

In my memory, it went on for hours, but I know that it could not have been so long. We had our breakfast then, but all of a sudden we heard them come back again, one behind the other in single file and again not talking.



We went to the door and watched them, no one saying anything; we didn't; they didn't. All of a sudden, Mother said, 'I can't stand it any more', and went into the street and asked, in English, 'Are you English?' The man said, 'Yes', and then laughed and said, 'The Germans aren't awake yet, so we are going to stop and have breakfast.'

I remember hanging on to my mother and saying, 'What did he say? What did he say?' That was my first example of British humour.”




Initially, both Battalions made good progress, but the opposition had not gone away. Battalion Krafft and the forward patrols of 9th SS Panzer, which they met previously, had reacted in an ad hoc manner. They were not helped by the German units on the coast, who did not think to inform the inland units of the air armada. This meant that they were initially surprised.

 

[Desertkiwi]

I'm probably repeating myself here but this is such a great thread......

Also enjoying the civilian perspective which adds so much much to the impacts of occupation. :salute::

 

[panda1gen]

I'm probably repeating myself here but this is such a great thread......

Also enjoying the civilian perspective which adds so much much to the impacts of occupation. :salute::

Thank you very much I appreciate it - glad you like it.


Already, the Germans were working to a more considered plan. Field Marshal Walther Model, ‘the Fuhrer’s fireman’, commanded Army Group B, half of Germany's forces in the Western Front. He was in Oosterbeek at the time of the airborne landings, so was on-the-spot to assess the situation and direct operations.




The British were therefore unfortunate in that they were denied any significant period of enemy command confusion. Normally this was an expected advantage following an airborne landing.

Instead, the Germans were very quick to act in a co-ordinated way, with a view to winning the campaign, rather than merely mount a reactive response to the immediate threat. Allied intelligence knew II SS Panzer Korps were in the Arnhem area, but they were, as the Allies correctly deduced, short of almost all of their equipment.




The II SS Panzer Korps consisted of the 9th (Hohenstaufen) and 10th (Frundsberg) Divisions. They had earlier fought together in Russia, and both divisions were now reorganizing around Arnhem after retreating from Normandy. Parts of the 9th had gone to Germany for complete refitting,






...... whilst the rest of the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] was in the process of handing over some of its equipment to the 10th, which was in slightly better shape.




New orders were that instead, available vehicles and weapons would now be shared between the two divisions and for the coming battle reinforcements would arrive, supplemented by local units.

 

[villagehorse]

The Germans probably were feeling really unlucky coming back from bitter fighting elsewhere to rest and refit and suddenly to be confronted with this new dilemma so quickly. Good story Kevin. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

'The Germans probably were feeling really unlucky coming back from bitter fighting elsewhere to rest and refit and suddenly to be confronted with this new dilemma so quickly. Good story Kevin. Robin.'

Thank you Robin, I agree that they could not have been happy about it - to escape from the Falaise gap, retreat 200 or so miles without air superiority and within less than two months have to fight this lot, all without their heavy equipment - not much fun in that! The fighting quality of these troops seemed intact, although the lack of equipment would count against them.

 

[panda1gen]

Using his seniority, skill and experience, Model immediately took the Korps directly under his personal command. Liaising with the nearby Korps commander, SS General Wilhelm Bittrich, he then directed the strategy to be employed against the airborne landings. The two Panzer divisions in Bittrich's corps were to attack at once.




Model gave clear orders:

1. Bittrich would deploy Obersturmbannführer Walther Harzer's 9th SS Panzer to focus on the British landing. He was to isolate the British force at the bridge, prevent any reinforcement and eliminate the troops already there.






2. Standartenführer Heinz Harmel's 10th SS Panzer was ordered to move south to Nijmegen and protect the important road bridge. It must prevent the relief force from reaching Frost at the Arnhem Bridge.




Instead of the expected confusion or dithering by the Germans, 1st and 3rd Battalions met elements of the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Panzer Division on the first evening, as the defensive strategy had already been decided.

The part of the division that had gone to refit in Germany was recalled and it would subsequently return with new tanks.

The most immediate issue for Harzer was to prevent British Airborne reinforcements from reaching the bridge.

Immediately after the landings, Obersturmbannführer Ludwig Spindler, the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Panzer Division's artillery commander, took command of the kampfgruppe which was formed for the task and would bear his name. He must form a blocking line west of Arnhem. He started with only 120 men of his own artillery regiment, acting as infantry, but other units were quickly gathered. He was ordered to establish a defensive line running south to the Rhine. It would eventually cover every western approach to Arnhem.

Spindler gives his orders .......

 

[panda1gen]

Simultaneously, Spindler began forming a second blocking line about half a mile from the Arnhem Road Bridge. He had help in knowing where to deploy it as on the night of the 17[SUP]th[/SUP]/18[SUP]th[/SUP] September, in Arnhem central telephone exchange, two German women operators stayed at their posts all night. The information they were able to provide on the progress of the British units was so valuable to Spindler that General Bittrich decorated them both with the Iron Cross.




Kampfgruppe (KG) Spindler would eventually be composed from 16 different units, but for now was essentially two companies of his own artillery unit as infantry, a StuG regiment of 120 men without their StuGs and 87 men of an anti aircraft unit.




100 men of the engineer battalion of the 9[SUP]th[/SUP] SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, when acting as Kampfgruppe Möller, had already been in contact with the British paratroopers earlier that afternoon and they now also joined Spindler.




They were further supplemented by the 300-man battalion led by Krafft, which although it was in training, had already distinguished itself in blocking the 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Airborne advance.




The 10th SS Panzer Division was ordered towards Nijmegen and Division Tettau would be a new organization, operating against the western side of the British landings.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

3rd Parachute Battalion

See from post #1581 for the earlier 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion story

Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch's 3rd Parachute Battalion was without C Company, which had already found its way to the bridge by a separate way the previous evening.

At about 4.30 a.m. on the 18[SUP]th[/SUP] September, 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion left its overnight position just west of Oosterbeek. The most direct route to the Bridge was believed to be blocked but patrols found side roads to the south that appeared to be clear.

a patrol finds a clear route


Brigadier Lathbury and Major-General Urquhart were still with 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion, so Fitch conferred with them.

one of the senior officers in a quiet moment

Fitch felt the need to consult


They decided to abandon the main Oosterbeek-Arnhem road and head south, through Oosterbeek, to use the lower road into Arnhem. As on the previous day, B Company again led and good initial progress was made due to the darkness and absence of opposition. They passed through the whole of Oosterbeek and the bridge under the railway at Oosterbeek Laag Station was also safely negotiated.




They progressed a mile through the outskirts of Arnhem so a valuable two and a half miles of progress was made in total. At this point, the leading platoon reached a building on the edge of the river known as the Rhine Pavilion.

With 20:20 hindsight, if the 3rd Battalion (encumbered as they were by the unwanted presence of two senior officers), had not stopped but had pushed on by this route overnight, it might already have reached the bridge.

German troops block the routes to the bridge

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Further down the column, a number of German snipers had climbed and roped themselves to trees in the wooded area between Oosterbeek and Arnhem.




From there they could target the centre and rear of the long column, which they fired upon as it became light. Several of the snipers were shot and fell out of the trees, to be left dangling from their ropes or crash all the way down to the ground. The success of the sniper fire (and some bursts of machine-gun fire near the railway bridge) ......




was that it caused gaps to appear in the column (and annoyance at being held up by 'minor opposition').




Of much more importance was that when the leading men of HQ Company took cover from such fire, they later found that the last man of the leading part of the battalion had passed out of sight, around a bend in the road. Consequently, they took a different route to the one taken by the front of the column. This in turn meant that the battalion's mortars, Vickers machine-guns, transport, ‘A’ Company and three of the four battalion anti-tank guns all became detached from the main column.




When he paused at the Rhine Pavilion, Fitch found that he only had B Company, a few Royal Engineers and one anti-tank gun. However, he was still stuck with, as Major Bush the second in command said, 'one major-general who needed to get back and one brigadier who wanted to go forward'.

 

[panda1gen]

Lieutenant Cleminson's No. 5 Platoon lead, but the splitting of the battalion led to him being ordered to halt, to allow the rest of the battalion to catch up. Cleminson's view was that substantial progress could have been made if the battalion had been up in strength behind him at that point:

'The Germans were certainly not in major strength yet, and I had only had one serious casualty in my leading section so far that morning.'




The bridge was only one mile beyond the furthest point reached by them at 0700 hours. Cleminson' pulled back his platoon to take cover with the remainder of B Company in some large houses between the Utrechtseweg and the river. The separated part of the battalion did not appear and eventually met up instead with the 1st Battalion, which was also moving into Arnhem at that time.




By now it was fully daylight and the Germans observed Cleminson's platoon retire and the apparent British hesitation to advance. They sent forward a tank and possibly a self-propelled gun. They were not sure where the airborne men had taken cover so did not yet fire into the houses. They did however open fire with distant and unseen weapons as soon as anyone moved into the open.




Additionally, the pathway on the north river bank was dominated by German positions in a factory on the south bank. The Germans were therefore able to keep the 3rd Battalion men pinned down in those houses for the next six hours.




The German infantry did not advance too closely and the armoured vehicles were deterred with Gammon bombs. These damaged or disabled them and by so doing kept them at a distance. Few 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion casualties were suffered in the houses at that time, but it was a long stalemate that suited the Germans.

 

[villagehorse]

Hard to say whether these continual delays by various groups reaching the bridge, would have changed the final result. Sure more men at the bridge head could have meant they held it longer, but it appears 30 Corp were still days away and even possibly never coming as the German buildup strengthened. Just something to ponder. Your story and effort Kevin, is appreciated. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

Hard to say whether these continual delays by various groups reaching the bridge, would have changed the final result. Sure more men at the bridge head could have meant they held it longer, but it appears 30 Corp were still days away and even possibly never coming as the German buildup strengthened. Just something to ponder. Your story and effort Kevin, is appreciated. Robin.

Thanks for the comments Robin. I think it is an interesting question.

It was arguably the intransigence of the Air Force commanders, who refused the requested 'coup de main' on the bridge itself (similar to Pegasus Bridge over the Orne on D Day), or landings at the bridge (this would normally be planned for both ends at once) and insisted on drop/landing/resupply zones ~7 miles from the target that caused these delays and allowed the Germans time to block the approaches.

Given that just around a battalion, instead of the planned two Brigades, held the bridge for twice as long as expected, I think it is a 'moot point', but they would have needed resupply at the bridge.

The same air force commanders refused to allow a night or dawn landing (and therefore two lifts on the first day), which also seems almost inexplicable.

The attack did not start until the afternoon and the late air force timetable also directly impacted on 30 Corps ability to advance as they needed daylight and had precious little of it. Also, as a result of this, 107 Panzer were able to attack the 101st at Son, I covered this in some detail, see earlier.

I tried to explain the air force commanders' reasons earlier, but am not compelled by their logic. Arnhem Jim also covers these issues on his blog.

 

[panda1gen]

XXX Corps were doing their best .......

(yes I know some of these units were not there but request they be viewed as generic 'Brits').

 

[Arnhemjim]

Hello panda1gen,
Most sincerely appreciate the MID (Mentioned in Dispatches). Thank you very much. While certainly not trying to divert your tread, perhaps Robin may not have had the opportunity to read my total analysis of the planning; https://arnhemjim.blogspot.com/p/operation-market-garden.html Keep up the great work.
Warmest regards,
Arnhem Jim
Arizona Territory

 

[panda1gen]

Radio contact was made with the 1st Battalion, now about a thousand yards behind the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP]. By this link contact was also made with the separated part of the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion. It was told to get through to the main body with as much of the reserve ammunition in the Bren carriers as possible, so that the attempt to reach the bridge could be resumed.




A Bren carrier loaded with ammunition duly arrived, with a group of men (variously reported as between twenty and forty strong) at about 2.30 p.m. Lieutenant Leo Heaps, a Canadian officer attached to the 1st Battalion drove the Bren carrier and Lieutenant Burwash, an officer from the 3rd Battalion's HQ Company led the infantry.




It was known that Major Dennison of A Company had been badly wounded, but Burwash could give little news of the remainder of the battalion. Peter Waddy’s company had led the 3rd Battalion's advance all the way from the dropping zone twenty-four hours earlier, but Major Waddy was killed when he went out into the open to unload the ammunition from the Bren carrier. Major Bush was watching and said:

“Peter Waddy had no need to go out, but he was very impetuous; he would have a go at anything. 'It's all experience,' he would say with his boyish appearance. I saw him killed. There was just a blinding flash and the muck being blown about from this one mortar bomb, and there he was, prostrate. There was not a mark on him - killed outright by blast”.

His young company sergeant-major, twenty-three-year-old Reg Allen, also died with him. Allen had just been awarded an American decoration for his bravery in Tunisia. (author's note: I have not managed to find further information on him or what decoration he received). It is thought that they were the only fatal casualties of that long stalemate.




Soon after this, parties of Germans were seen to the west of the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion houses, threatening to surround the battalion's position. Again, Maj. Alan Bush describes this:

“One patrol was only twenty yards away. I could see every bit of their equipment. I remember one had a big fat arse and I thought, 'What a target!' They were being very casual. Three of our men were ready to open fire, but I ordered them not to. RSM Lord was there and he nodded approval; you can't start a battle with the divisional commander and the brigadier in the same house”.