Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[MLH13]

Outstanding display! And equally appreciate the history lesson. Well done! {bravo}}

Mark

Radio contact was made with the 1st Battalion, now about a thousand yards behind the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP]. By this link contact was also made with the separated part of the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion. It was told to get through to the main body with as much of the reserve ammunition in the Bren carriers as possible, so that the attempt to reach the bridge could be resumed.

View attachment 280224


A Bren carrier loaded with ammunition duly arrived, with a group of men (variously reported as between twenty and forty strong) at about 2.30 p.m. Lieutenant Leo Heaps, a Canadian officer attached to the 1st Battalion drove the Bren carrier and Lieutenant Burwash, an officer from the 3rd Battalion's HQ Company led the infantry.

View attachment 280223


It was known that Major Dennison of A Company had been badly wounded, but Burwash could give little news of the remainder of the battalion. Peter Waddy’s company had led the 3rd Battalion's advance all the way from the dropping zone twenty-four hours earlier, but Major Waddy was killed when he went out into the open to unload the ammunition from the Bren carrier. Major Bush was watching and said:

“Peter Waddy had no need to go out, but he was very impetuous; he would have a go at anything. 'It's all experience,' he would say with his boyish appearance. I saw him killed. There was just a blinding flash and the muck being blown about from this one mortar bomb, and there he was, prostrate. There was not a mark on him - killed outright by blast”.

His young company sergeant-major, twenty-three-year-old Reg Allen, also died with him. Allen had just been awarded an American decoration for his bravery in Tunisia. (author's note: I have not managed to find further information on him or what decoration he received). It is thought that they were the only fatal casualties of that long stalemate.

View attachment 280226


Soon after this, parties of Germans were seen to the west of the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion houses, threatening to surround the battalion's position. Again, Maj. Alan Bush describes this:

“One patrol was only twenty yards away. I could see every bit of their equipment. I remember one had a big fat arse and I thought, 'What a target!' They were being very casual. Three of our men were ready to open fire, but I ordered them not to. RSM Lord was there and he nodded approval; you can't start a battle with the divisional commander and the brigadier in the same house”.

View attachment 280225

 

[panda1gen]

Outstanding display! And equally appreciate the history lesson. Well done! {bravo}}

Mark

Thank you Mark, I am glad you like it.

 

[panda1gen]

One officer had much closer contact with the Germans at this time. Lieutenant Ted Shaw was the anti-tank troop commander and he had accompanied the only 6-pounder to reach this area. The gun crew was commanded by Sergeant Gus Garnsworthy.




They had earlier engaged a German light gun south of the river,




....... but were then put out of action by mortar fire.




Lieutenant Shaw was sitting at the foot of the stairs in one of the houses.

“I was opposite the door to the street, when a shot whistled past my ear. It was Sergeant Garnsworthy firing a single shot from his Sten, past me and out of the window to the right where he had seen a German infantry section passing. A Bren opened up then, firing from further up the street on the left, and that forced two Germans to come into our house - only six or seven feet from where I was sitting. I fired at them with my Sten; one fell into the house; one fell outside.

The one inside was wounded - hit in the stomach. I made him as comfortable as I could in a chair, but I couldn't do much because there was firing at the rear of the house, and it was obvious that we had to get out. We tried the back way. It was quite a drop to the ground, so I got a long table, put it out of the window and slid down it. But I came under rifle fire and had to come back into the house through a door that I found. I eventually got away by dashing down the street with the lads”.





With the recent reinforcement and replenishment of ammunition, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch decided it was time to get his men out of the houses in which they had been pinned down throughout the day. They would seek a route further away from the river and try to find a new way to the bridge.




Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

 

[panda1gen]

Also, around the same time, Brigadier Lathbury suggested to Major-General Urquhart that they should try to break out and find a way back to their HQ’s. About 4.0 p.m. the whole group started to leave through the back gardens of the houses. A quick escape was hampered by the need to climb over walls of various sizes.




The river was to the rear of those gardens, so the only way to go was northwards, into streets of smaller houses, on the north side of the Utrechtseweg and west of St Elizabeth Hospital. Urquhart, Lathbury and Captain Willie Taylor, Lathbury's Intelligence Officer, became separated from the main group.

Disorientated, they set off alone down one of the streets, going eastwards, in the wrong direction and towards German-held ground.




Lieutenant Cleminson recognised that the three officers were heading the wrong way and tried to warn them.




Cleminson wanted one of his sections to follow him and protect the senior officers. As Cleminson put it however,
'The men had more sense and stayed put.'




The (now) four officers (including Cleminson), ran wildly through short stretches of street, but every intersection was under German fire. It was at one of these that Brigadier Lathbury was hit in the leg then again in his spine. The three others dragged him into a nearby house where Urquhart shot a German through the window with his revolver, at point-blank range. Lathbury could not be moved and urged the others to leave him, so Urquhart, Taylor and Cleminson dashed through the back garden and into a short path, which ran between the backs of the houses.

They were given shelter in another house where a very brave couple, Mr and Mrs Derksen, hid them in their attic. Urquhart wanted to move again, but Cleminson and Taylor persuaded him that it was too dangerous. The Germans decided the issue when a German self-propelled gun clattered up and established itself outside the front of the house they were hidden in.




German infantry could also be seen in the surrounding streets. The three officers would remain hidden and out of contact for more than twelve hours.

 

[MLH13]

Fantastic imagery and coupled with the storyline, makes for an impressive presentation. {bravo}}

Mark

 

[panda1gen]

Fantastic imagery and coupled with the storyline, makes for an impressive presentation. {bravo}}

Mark

Thank you Mark, I appreciate it.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The 3rd Battalion was now free of the senior Officers, but Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch still failed in his latest attempt to get his battalion moving forward.

German fire dominated the streets ........




...... and they were forced to take shelter again.




The men he had still with him were split up and put into two groups of houses in streets west of the hospital.




Fitch had around 140 men available to fight again the next day. Fifteen had been killed and between forty and fifty were wounded (some of these casualties would have occurred in separated parts of the battalion, involved in fighting elsewhere).

 

[panda1gen]

XXX Corps were still fighting their way up 'Hell's Highway' ......

 

[sfarrelly]

Once XXX corps got close enough their long range artillery could now reach 1st Airborne and provide some support....

 

[panda1gen]

Once XXX corps got close enough their long range artillery could now reach 1st Airborne and provide some support....

View attachment 281612

Great stuff Stephan.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Continued from #1687

The 1st Parachute Battalion

See from post # 1596 for the earlier 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Battalion story, where I described how Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie's battalion kept moving for most of the night.

Dobie had tried to disengage from strong German opposition encountered on the route to his objective. R Company had suffered heavily when fighting in the woods so not all of his battalion was with the main body and only a few of R Company had yet rejoined. After deciding that he could not reach his original objective, he decided to join Frost at the Bridge and marched south-east to evade the Germans in the North.




When he reached the main Utrechtseweg in Oosterbeek, Dobie decided to try it towards Arnhem. He had heard that 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion had reached the bridge by the lower Oosterbeek road, but Dobie wanted to save time by trying this more direct route. He had heard nothing to the contrary from 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion, so he presumed that it had passed along this route safely. Major Ronnie Stark's S Company led the battalion column, with Lieutenant Bob Feltham's No. 7 Platoon out in front.




They left the built-up area of Oosterbeek and came to allotments, just before they would pass under the railway line. German troops manned positions on the railway embankment. The leading two men went under the railway and immediately were forced to surrender.




The remainder of the section witnessed this so scrambled back. The Germans opened fire on the rest of the platoon, wounding Lieutenant Feltham in the arm and killing three men. A mortar caused further casualties and Lieutenant Feltham was wounded a second time. The platoon went to ground and returned fire as best they could.

 

[panda1gen]

Sergeant Frank Manser (see #1064) commanded the section deployed on the right of the road. He described what happened to his men:

“We were advancing, with some large trees between ourselves and the roadway.



I passed one of the trees and came upon a German strongpoint, probably put up the day before. It was made of sandbags, and there were four Germans with one machine-gun.




It was so unexpected that I still had my tommy gun slung over my shoulder. They were as surprised as I was; I was only three yards from them. I just said, 'You are my prisoners', even as I was still unslinging the tommy gun. One of them said 'Englander?', but whoever was behind the gun opened fire down the road towards Lieutenant Feltham; that's when he was wounded in the arm.

I jumped back behind the tree, went back about twenty yards, and called for my section, 'Section forward!' Colonel Dobie came up as well, and I told him what was happening.




The section came up, and I got the Bren group organized and started firing at them.




The rest of the platoon came across from the other side of the road to me, and the Germans seemed to be reinforced as well. We tried to make a charge, but they were too strong for us. We had one or two wounded in the section, but no one killed”.

 

[panda1gen]

Major Stark assessed the railway embankment position as too strong an obstacle so started to order his other two platoons to make a flank attack.

Dobie intervened before he could start it. His parachute battalion was supposed to reach Arnhem Bridge as intact as possible and then fight the important defensive battle to hold until relieved by ground forces. Dobie therefore wanted to avoid fighting any major engagements on his way to the bridge.

In this typical platoon action, Major Stark had already had two men taken prisoner, seven killed and others wounded, yet he had still not made progress.






Dobie therefore decided to attempt to sidestep the defence and advance again further south. The lower road route appeared to be the last option available to him, but it was still only 5.30 a.m. The battalion successfully moved down to the lower road via a side road, only briefly delayed by a sniper.




As they approached the railway bridge at Oosterbeek Laag Station, they met up with some of the detached elements of the 3rd Battalion. All of his own mortars and some of his Vickers machine guns and attached anti-tank guns were still way back with R Company, so David Dobie was took charge of them.

The Germans recognised the importance of this road under the railway embankment, so defended it with recently created strong points in houses alongside the road about 700 yards ahead, rather than by manning the embankment itself.

The defence also contained some armoured vehicles at Den Brink (on the rare high ground to the north of the road), and further infantry positions in the wool factory and brickworks to the south, which covered the area between the road and the river.




As soon as it passed under the railway, the battalion came under fire. It was now about 8.0 a.m. with full daylight. With no easier route available to use, the 1st Battalion now had no alternative but to fight its way through to the bridge.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Great installment, Kevin!! . Excellent photos as usual.

 

[OzDigger]

Once XXX corps got close enough their long range artillery could now reach 1st Airborne and provide some support....

View attachment 281612

Terrific setup Kevin, I've always liked the look of the 5.5 inch gun, a great set from Figarti.

 

[panda1gen]

Terrific setup Kevin, I've always liked the look of the 5.5 inch gun, a great set from Figarti.

Thanks Oz, I encouraged Stefan to post after he wrote to me, they are great sets and photos.

I enclose something I found on the internet with some minor modifications and profound apologies to the author as his name was not on my copy.

25pdr gun


Artillery and Mortar Tactics of WW2
Posted 27 Mar 2006



After reading a discussion of area effect for artillery in the Crossfire Discussion Forum I became curious about the tactics of artillery and mortars during WW2. I had a quick google for "Artillery Tactics" and looked up some of my books to get a sense of how it all worked.

Polish 4.2" mortar


General Terms


A couple of general terms:


Time On Target (TOT) missions involved timing the firing of multiple batteries so that all fire on the same location, with the firing times adjusted to cause the rounds to all impact at the same time (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996).

Bombardment may cease after the initial volley or be maintained in Fire For Effect mode, creating a sustained saturation of the area with detonations.


This tactic was used by the Americans in WW2 (Sulzen, 2000), however, Sultzen is incorrect that only the Americans used it - the British also used this technique.


Fire For Effect means that the battery will fire continuously at it's maximum sustained rate (Ellis, 1980; Evans, 2001-5; Hopkins, 1996).


The Americans stopped firing when the Forward Observer (FO) called "Cease Fire", but the British normally fired a certain number of rounds per gun.


According to Ellis the Americans called this a 'Serenade' in WW2 although by Vietnam they were certainly using the term 'Fire for Effect'.


A Barrage was a belt of fire that could be stationary (standing) or moving in front of the attacking troops (Evans, 2001-5).



A Concentration was when two or more batteries engage the same target (Evans, 2001-5).




Effectiveness of fire


Evans (2001-5) lists four aims of artillery fire (Neutralising, Morale, Lethal, Material). All four happen at the same time, but the effects earlier in the list are much easier to achieve than those later in the list.


For example, a 25 pounder needs to land 8 - 32 shells per hour for neutralisation (for about 10% casualties; Global Security Organisation, n.d.), but 600 shells in a 100 x 100 yard sector are required to militarily 'destroy' the target (meaning 30% casualties).



Neutralising: To prevent enemy movement and observation, and in cases of greater effect to prevent the effective use of enemy weapons.


The effect only lasted during the bombardment, which meant in attack so the friendly infantry had to 'lean' on the bombardment to ensure they reached the enemy positions before the enemy realised the bombardment had stopped and reached their guns.


Morale: To produce, in addition to neutralisation, a lack of will to resist continuing for some time after the end of the bombardment.


Lethal: To kill or wound enemy personnel. Military 'destruction' was generally considered to be 30% casualties.


Material: To destroy or damage enemy equipment





Terrain significantly reduces the effect of fire (Evans, 2001-5). 'Natural' or 'average’ ground offers about 5 times as much protection to a prone soldier as an 'unnatural' level surface like a football field.


Fortifications, being man made protective terrain, not surprisingly also significantly affects the lethality of fire. Evans (2001-5) lists some interesting estimates on how vulnerability changes with the posture of the target.


The following table gives the relative risk of becoming a casualty to ground-burst shells on ‘average’ ground:

Posture​	Risk​
Standing	1
Lying	1/3
Firing from open fire trenches	1/15 - 1/50
Crouching in open fire trenches	1/25 - 1/100

In the Far East the allies found that a Japanese fortifications were resistant to anything except a direct hit from a bomb or large naval gun (Ellis, 1980).


In one incident in 1944, where 684 rounds of 3.7-inch howitzer shells and 670 rounds of 25-pdr shells landed in an area 250 yards square, the Japanese suffered only two confirmed dead and minor damage on a few communication bunkers; there was no material damage on the main combat bunkers.


The allies found that individual guns fired at point blank range were much more effective - the trick was getting the guns in place.

5.5" gun

 

[OzDigger]

Thank you for that info Kevin. I was surprised about the high number of rounds required to be effective against enemy positions, especially if they were strongly constructed.

 

[panda1gen]

Thank you for that info Kevin. I was surprised about the high number of rounds required to be effective against enemy positions, especially if they were strongly constructed.

You are welcome Oz. I am glad you find it interesting, I shall be providing some more detailed info on the shoots and composition/organisation of the Royal Artillery Regiment shortly.

I read somewhere that in Burma 2pdrs ATG direct fire against Japanese bunkers might help but 4.5" or 5.5" 'usually' 'helped'. As above though, it must have been difficult getting a shot, assuming that you could even find it in the camouflage.

I think I also read about US tank destroyers doing the same thing in the Westwall.

 

[panda1gen]

Some further history on British artillery, before I turn to the USA and Germany and their use of artillery. I shall return to Arnhem later, after this artillery discussion.

British Artillery Tactics

Fire plans of British artillery (technically called 'programme shoots') were either barrages, concentrations, smoke screens, or a combination (Evans, 2001-5).

Targets in a fire plan were ranged or predicted. They could also be on a timed programme or on-call. Targets in fire plans were normally fired ‘time on target’ (ToT) from late 1942.

Note: A British Field Artillery Regiment was organised into two field batteries each of three troops of four guns, or later of three batteries of two troops (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a). In either case the Regiment comprised 24 guns.






Barrage

A Barrage was a belt of fire that could be stationary (standing) or moving in front of the attacking troops (Evans, 2001-5).

Barrages were largely used for covering fire, i.e. to neutralise the enemy. A Barrage was usually the main part of a British fire plan for an assault.

'Ordinary' barrages could be any shape, but the 'quick' barrages introduced mid war had to be a rectangular shape (Evans, 2001-5).

In 1942 it took a regiment 3 hours to prepare an 'ordinary' barrage from when the commander issued orders, this included deploying the guns but not dumping the ammo. It was 10 to 12 hours for a division and 24 for a corps.

'Quick' barrages were only used by deployed units so preparation time was shorter: 60 to 80 minutes for a regiment (assuming no more than 10 lines).

Barrages were structured on a grid with vertical unit lanes and horizontal firing lines (Evans, 2001-5). In a barrage a troop fired within its own unit lane with each gun firing at aim-points spread evenly along lane width.

Lines were usually 100 yards apart. The width of a unit lane depended on the size of unit firing (hence number of guns) and type of barrage.

A 25-pdr troop (4 guns) lane was at most 140 yards.

• A regimental lane could any of the following:
• • 560 yards maximum for a creeping barrage. This was normally two batteries wide, with the third battery superimposed across the full width of the lane.
  • 400 yards for a dismounted infantry assault
  • Full width (??) for an armoured assault.

Evans (2001-5) also provides a table showing the frontage covered by HE shells of various types (a various is given below).

That for a 25 pounder is 35 yards, which when multiplied by 4 gun in a troops gives the the 140 yards mentioned above. This suggests larger guns had correspondingly wider troop lanes.

Gun ​	Frontage covered by HE shell (yards)​	Safe Distance (yards)​
25-pdr Gun	35	200
3.7" How	35	200
4.5" Gun	55	350
5.5" Gun	70	400
155-mm Gun	70	400
7.2" How	100	700

In fire plans, when targets or barrage lines had to be engaged for a particular duration, 'rates of fire' (rounds per minute) were ordered with a duration in minutes (Evans, 2001-5).

 

[Terp152]

Some further history on British artillery, before I turn to the USA and Germany and their use of artillery. I shall return to Arnhem later, after this artillery discussion.

British Artillery Tactics

Fire plans of British artillery (technically called 'programme shoots') were either barrages, concentrations, smoke screens, or a combination (Evans, 2001-5).

Targets in a fire plan were ranged or predicted. They could also be on a timed programme or on-call. Targets in fire plans were normally fired ‘time on target’ (ToT) from late 1942.

Note: A British Field Artillery Regiment was organised into two field batteries each of three troops of four guns, or later of three batteries of two troops (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a). In either case the Regiment comprised 24 guns.

Barrage

A Barrage was a belt of fire that could be stationary (standing) or moving in front of the attacking troops (Evans, 2001-5).

Barrages were largely used for covering fire, i.e. to neutralise the enemy. A Barrage was usually the main part of a British fire plan for an assault.

'Ordinary' barrages could be any shape, but the 'quick' barrages introduced mid war had to be a rectangular shape (Evans, 2001-5).

In 1942 it took a regiment 3 hours to prepare an 'ordinary' barrage from when the commander issued orders, this included deploying the guns but not dumping the ammo. It was 10 to 12 hours for a division and 24 for a corps.

'Quick' barrages were only used by deployed units so preparation time was shorter: 60 to 80 minutes for a regiment (assuming no more than 10 lines).

Barrages were structured on a grid with vertical unit lanes and horizontal firing lines (Evans, 2001-5). In a barrage a troop fired within its own unit lane with each gun firing at aim-points spread evenly along lane width.

Lines were usually 100 yards apart. The width of a unit lane depended on the size of unit firing (hence number of guns) and type of barrage.

A 25-pdr troop (4 guns) lane was at most 140 yards.

• A regimental lane could any of the following:
• • 560 yards maximum for a creeping barrage. This was normally two batteries wide, with the third battery superimposed across the full width of the lane.
  • 400 yards for a dismounted infantry assault
  • Full width (??) for an armoured assault.

Evans (2001-5) also provides a table showing the frontage covered by HE shells of various types (a various is given below).

That for a 25 pounder is 35 yards, which when multiplied by 4 gun in a troops gives the the 140 yards mentioned above. This suggests larger guns had correspondingly wider troop lanes.

Gun ​	Frontage covered by HE shell (yards)​	Safe Distance (yards)​
25-pdr Gun	35	200
3.7" How	35	200
4.5" Gun	55	350
5.5" Gun	70	400
155-mm Gun	70	400
7.2" How	100	700

In fire plans, when targets or barrage lines had to be engaged for a particular duration, 'rates of fire' (rounds per minute) were ordered with a duration in minutes (Evans, 2001-5).

Great info. I do remember the artillery corps had to relearn the basics of the barrage science for the desert campaign. Chris