Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)

[panda1gen]

Great info. I do remember the artillery corps had to relearn the basics of the barrage science for the desert campaign. Chris

Thanks Chris

I suppose every country had to relearn or adapt to new developments. One of my favourite reads is Barrie Pitt's desert trilogy. My impression was that each side ('even' the Italians) were still pretty good artillery in the desert.

I still find the science hard to understand at times - more on this to follow.

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

A Pepperpot barrage was where guns of all types (artillery, mortars, machine guns, infantry guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, naval guns, tank guns) and even aircraft were used (Ellis, 1980).



Moving barrages had as many lines as needed to achieve the depth required for the attack. Moving barrages could be either creeping, rolling or block.

• Creeping Barrage: only one line was engaged at a time. When fire lifted from one line, it moved backwards to the next line.
• Rolling Barrage: several lines were engaged at once (eg a-a & b-b, when fire lifted from a-a it went to c-c).
• Block Barrage: several lines engaged simultaneously and all lifting together to a new block.

Concentrations

A Concentration was when two or more batteries engage the same target (Evans, 2001-5). Early in the war a concentration basically mean all batteries fired at the same point. Statistical variation meant the larger units covered a wider area.

- A regimental concentration covered about 250 × 250 yards,

- A divisional concentration covered about 350 × 350 yards,

- A divisional with Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA) covered about 400 × 400 yards.



Timings for fire plans of concentrations were similar to those for barrages, but where the number of lines affected the preparation time for the barrage, each separate concentration added to the preparation time.

Although used before, linear concentrations became popular around the time of El Alamein in 1942 (Evans, 2001-5).

Popularly called "Stonks" there were in fact several types, only one of which was the true Stonk.

The four Concentrations given below were used by the NZ Divisional Artillery (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a) but at least the Stonk and Murder were in use by British artillery in general:


Stonk ("Standard Concentration")

This was a Linear Target along a Regimental front of 600 yards identified by its centre point and vertical axis (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a).

According to Evans (2001-5) by 1944 stonks were standardised as 525 yards long (Ellis, 1980, implies 1943).

Evans also says "2[SUP]nd[/SUP] NZ Division continued to use its 1200 × 300 yard stonks," but the dimensions actually correspond a Rumpus (see below).

Additional facts about a British "Stonk" (Hassett & Burns, n.d. b):


"Stonk" is probably a portmanteau word for "standard concentration".

1. The original 1940-1941 Stonk was a square of 300 yards by 300 yards, each battery covering a linear frontage of 300 yards, with the batteries echeloned plus and minus 100 yards from the centre point.

2. The Stonk in the latter part of the war, post Alamein, was substantially different from the original version. It was a 600 yards linear regimental target based on a grid reference and bearing.

3. Stonks were generally pre-planned in the sense that they were nominated and recorded and it was unusual for them to be initiated on the spot.

4. Observation Posts (OP) could initiate Stonks but there is no record of the technique ever being used as part of an observed fire programme.

5. Each Stonk was given a codename or number.

6. The number of rounds was nominated each time the Stonk was called for.

7. In the post Senio period they were occasionally used by the medium guns as a means of covering an area where German tanks had been seen.

8. The technique was used post Alamein for the definition of Defensive Fire Tasks in support of the infantry in static positions.

9. They were also used in depth on some occasions ahead of the line of the barrage.

 

[OzDigger]

Kevin, thank you for the ongoing Arty education, also enjoying the photos as usual. Based on the 'safe' table, the 7.2 inch Howitzer must have been small but deadly, when I say small I only had the Dinky version, so size is relative I guess.

They must be rare, however I managed to get one of those Figarti Bofors guns, looks great in my Aussie Tobruk display. I'm surprised I haven't busted some pieces off it yet, as you may have discovered, Figarti items can be 'delicate'.

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin, thank you for the ongoing Arty education, also enjoying the photos as usual. Based on the 'safe' table, the 7.2 inch Howitzer must have been small but deadly, when I say small I only had the Dinky version, so size is relative I guess.

They must be rare, however I managed to get one of those Figarti Bofors guns, looks great in my Aussie Tobruk display. I'm surprised I haven't busted some pieces off it yet, as you may have discovered, Figarti items can be 'delicate'.

Oz

Glad you like the photos and the 'arty education', there is a bit more to come. I was given some dinky military stuff including that gun for my 6th Birthday - combined with some airfix figures I spent many happy hours. :wink2:

All the best, Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

Murder

Originally known as Method A (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a).

This was a concentration of all the guns of either a Regiment or the Divisional Artillery on a pin-point target.

Evans (2001-5) says in Italy a murder was for 3 minutes.



Method B

Possibly not widely adopted at Regimental level but became the basis of RUMPUS (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a). This was originally a Regimental concentration of rectangular shape with a Battery frontage (i.e. 200 yards) for use against small company localities.

The Batteries' tasks were echeloned along an axis 100 yards apart. If more than one round was ordered the Batteries searched 50 yards by 25 yards.



Rumpus

This was a Divisional Artillery variation of the original Regimental METHOD R. It went through several standardisation stages (Hassett & Burns, n.d. a).

The first Regiment covered a normal frontage of 600 yards the other Regiments 100 yards apart on the vertical axis.

Given more than one RGF the Regiments searched 50 yards by 25's. this was modified later with two Regiments side by side and one superimposed on a frontage of 1200 yards, all searching on the vertical axis 150 yards by 50's covering a depth of 300 yards.

Smoke Screens

Smoke screens were used in fire plans, they could be predicted, although a ‘tester’ to confirm the local wind was often used.

Screens could be multi or single battery and positioned about 250 yards from the enemy to be blinded. Gun aim-points were placed on a linear, with the distance between them depending on the wind direction.

If the wind was along the line of the required screen then points were 300 yards apart, if across the line they were 75 yards apart.

Whenever smoke was used there were alternative HE targets in case the screen was ineffective. One technique was to create a lane a few hundred yards wide between two screens that screened tanks from defiladed anti-tank guns, if the wind was favourable these screens could be rolling.

Smoke screens could be sustained for long periods, on at least one occasion all day.



Quick Barrages / Quick Fire Plans

The British were more concerned with speed than accuracy and introduced quick barrages in 1941, followed in 1942 by quick fire plans (Evans, 2001-5),.

Both were regimental fire plans using simplified procedures and standard layouts (Evans, 2001-5). They were used used by Forward Observation Officers (FOO) to support small unit actions (patrol, company, squadron, or battalion). Orders were verbal and were usually just for FOO's own battery.

Fire zones were rectangular and the fire plan mentioned only a few targets . The British found these fire plans particularly useful when operations turned to pursuit or during advances against light opposition.

They were usually concentrations using a mix of timed and on-call targets. Increasingly battalion mortars were included in quick fire plans.

Defensive Fire Plans (or SOS targets)

Defensive fire (DF) was pre-planned by FOOs in consultation with the supported company commander (Evans, 2001-5).



A DF was generally a standing barrage of one or two lines intended to block or harass enemy advances; stonks were widely used, as were three sided box barrages. DF plans were 'on-call'.

When not otherwise engaged a battery (and/or regiment or higher formations) would aim at the designated DF; by 1943 regimental DF plans were found to be the most effective.

In Burma DFs were often 25 yards from the forward infantry positions.

The key to successful harassing fire was to avoid predictability in the times or places of targets (Evans, 2001-5). Unfortunately, the Germans learnt that the British tended to stop firing at meal times.

Other fire

The British recognised five different categories of target outside fire plans, with a sixth added in 1943 (Evans, 2001-5). These were:

Immediate neutralisation (IN) – the ‘standard’ type of shoot, section ranging. Although called neutralisation, the aim could be to cause casualties and damage.

Fleeting opportunities – moving targets or targets likely to move, could be ranged with gunfire (without bracketing) or section ranging with the guns firing at different ranges, the aim was usually to cause damage and casualties.

Close to own troops – special rules about maximum corrections.

Pin-point – normally a single gun target with the aim of destroying a 'point' target. The CPO selected the least worn gun and ordered angular elevations, with the gun laying using its field clinometer not the gun rule.

Registration – to record for future engagement. It could be recorded 'corrected' or 'uncorrected', the latter meant that it had to be used within the current meteor period because its registered location was not adjusted for correction of the moment.

Quick smoke – an abbreviated smoke screen procedure where guns aim-points were not laid out in an optimum line. The observer calculated where to place it and how much to fire. Smoke was considered a form of neutralisation because it ‘neutralized’ observation by the enemy.

 

[panda1gen]

XXX Corps are still fighting their way to Arnhem ......

 

[WesternOutlaw]

Great shot. Really like the perspective.

 

[panda1gen]

Great shot. Really like the perspective.

Thanks Rob, glad you like it. I have been enjoying your photos as well.

This photo was taken as seen, no artificial background, hence the perspective. Hope this helps.

Best wishes

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

To continue from #1705

German Artillery Tactics

Germans could also do map based fire ("blind") or impromptu fire spotted by an FO (Sulzen, 2000). Their impromptu fire was dependent on them having accurately surveyed the battery's position and firing positions for the FO; it also involved complicated maths by the battery when called upon, and hence was relatively slow to arrive, about 15 min from call to shell fall.



The Germans carefully accounted for a range of factors (elevation changes, wind, temperature, etc.) that the British ignored. That meant, although slow, they tended to be quite accurate. Firing time against a previous target, or near a previous target, was faster as they kept their previous calculations. If the Germans had time to prepare they pre-plotted ("registered") firing points so that effective fire could be quickly delivered as needed.


American Artillery Tactics

The Americans used the British system but they pre-computed the firing data for a large number of variations of wind/temperature, barrel wear, elevation differentials, etc (Sulzen, 2000). This meant they could get almost the same accuracy as the Germans, but had a reaction time of only 3 min for impromptu fire. Higher level assets could also be called in; the inclusion of the division support supposedly added an additional three minutes to the fire mission, and including corps assets added another three minutes, so in theoretically in 9 minutes an entire corps artillery could land in one grid reference.




Vietnam Artillery Tactics (Hopkins, 1996)

One Round - a ranging shot.

Battery One means that the 6 cannon fire one round in unison.

Fire For Effect means that the battery will fire continuously at it's maximun sustained rate, adjusting on the fly, until the FO calls "Cease Fire".

Zone And Sweep directed the battery to fire a Battery One pattern on the target and also one kill radius beyond, below, left and right of the target, expending 30 rounds, patterning an "X" on the target and surrounding area.

Typical kill radius was 30 meters for a 105mm or 4.2inch round, 50 meters for a 155mm and 80 meters for an 8inch round.

Time On Target (TOT) missions involved timing the firing of multiple batteries so that all fire on the same location, with the firing times adjusted to cause the rounds to all impact at the same time (Hopkins, 1996). A typical TOT might involve 4 batteries (24 guns), of different calibers; some firing rounds fuzed for ground burst, some for airburst. The effect is that a particular jungle clearing might be quiet and peaceful one second and in the next second be totally enveloped and saturated with explosions in the air and on the ground. Bombardment may cease after the initial volley or be maintained in Fire For Effect mode, creating a sustained saturation of the area with detonations.

This tactic was used by the Americans in WW2 (Sulzen, 2000), however, Sultzen is incorrect that only the Americans used it - the British also used this technique (Evans, 2001-5)


Mortars

Mortars were general considered infantry weapons (??), although the Russians considered their 120mm mortar as true artillery (??). The primary role of mortars is to provide immediately available, responsive indirect fires that support the manoeuvre of the company or battalion, and that reinforce direct fires during close combat (Global Security Organisation, n.d.).

In the early war the British considered a single 3" mortar to be a viable fire unit, but by 1944 the shot dispersal caused by longer ranges meant a fire unit was at least 2 tubes (Bull, 2005). For a short period of time the six 3" mortars of in a British infantry battalion could bring down more weight of fire than an eight gun field battery (Bull, 2005). At intense rate one 3" mortar could put down 200 lb of projectiles at rapid rate in one minute. This compares favourably with the 125 lb a 25 pounder could put down in the same period.



A single American 81mm mortar could bring down a concentration 100 yards by 100 yards (Bull, 2005). The American 81mm mortar was thought to have the same mobility as a heavy machine gun (Bull, 2005). For the Americans priority was always given to observed targets, however, plotted targeting was also possible (Bull, 2005). For plotted targets, woods and reverse slopes were prime targets in both attack and defence as this could disrupt advancing/retreating enemy.

Each Russian 82-mm mortar company, with nine pieces, fired in support of its own rifle battalion (Intelligence Bulletin, 1946). The company could lay down a fixed barrage 275 yards wide, with each tube typically firing 14 rounds. Action was begun by firing two company concentrations of three rounds each, followed by four platoon salvos at 5-second intervals.

Zone fire was conducted against enemy assembly areas and troop concentrations, the zone engaged by one medium mortar company being not larger than about 7 acres (an area about 180 x 180 yards in total). Zone fire was conducted at the rate of about 18 rounds per 2 acres per minute. Elevation and deflection was shifted in order to cover a zone adequately, each platoon firing 2 to 4 rounds for every shift of about 50 yards. Short, intense concentrations were fired at visible targets in exposed positions. These concentrations usually lasted for 2 to 3 minutes, with the ammunition expenditure being about 50 rounds per 2 acres per concentration.

In defence the mortars of a Russian Rifle Regiment were normally grouped into a provisional medium mortar battalion, containing 27 medium mortars (82mm) and six heavies (120mm) (Intelligence Bulletin, 1946). Such a battalion could fire a barrage 600 to 700 yards wide.

Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the ground-level flooring is solid enough to withstand the recoil (Global Security Organisation, n.d.).

References

Bull, S. (2005). World War II Infantry Tactics: Company and Battalion [Elite 122]. Osprey.

Ellis, J. (1980). The Sharp End of War: The fighting man in World War II. London: Book Club Associates.

Evans, N. F. (2001-5). British Artillery In World War 2.

Global Security Organisation (n.d.). Mortars. [Available on-line http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mortars.htm]. Author.

Hassett, R. D. P. and Burns, J. (n.d. a). The Development of Artillery Techniques by 2 NZ Divisional Artillery of World War 2. [Available on-line http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/tech1.htm]. Royal New Zealand Artillery Old Comrades' Association.

Hassett, R. D. P. and Burns, J. (n.d. b). The Mystery of the Origin of the Stonk. [Available on-line http://www.riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/stonk.htm]. Royal New Zealand Artillery Old Comrades' Association.

Hopkins, J.M. (06 Dec.1996). Artillery Terms and Tactics. [Available on-line http://www.vietvet.org/arty.htm].

Intelligence Bulletin. (May 1946). ON THE WAY! The Employment of Mortars in the Red Army. [Available on-line http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ontheway/index.html]. Lone Sentry.

Sulzen, J. (2000). Artillery Practices by the Major Combatants of WWII. [Available on-line http://etloh.8m.com/strategy/artil.html]. Etloh Technologies.

http://www.balagan.org.uk/war/ww2/snippet/artillery.htm



If this kind of thing is of interest, both by Ian V Hogg:

The Guns (ISBN 0-345-24991-7-250) – ‘a great introduction to WW2 artillery’.

Allied Artillery of WW2 (ISBN 1 86126 165 9) - ‘does what it says in the title’.

Also – In the Face of the Enemy: A Battery Sergeant Major in Action in the Second World War by Powdrill, E A. (Pen and Sword):
Kindle Edition. ISBN: 978 1 84415 850 8 ISBN: 9781844684502 (epub) ISBN: 9781844684519 (prc)

 

[panda1gen]

Following the artillery aside, I shall continue from #1693


Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The scene was now set for the largest set-piece engagement of the day. Major Chris Perrin-Brown's T Company would advance with artillery, anti-tank guns and other heavy weapons in support.









Some elements of the 3rd Battalion, now under Dobie’s command, would also be involved. Lieutenant Jack Hellingoe of No. 11 Platoon and Lieutenant Eric Vere-Davies of No. 10 Platoon, were two of T Company's platoon commanders. They described their parts in the battle.

Hellingoe's platoon was in the lead, when it came under fire. ('Chris' was his company commander).


“When it happened, we just burst in through the doors of the nearest house and went upstairs, right into the loft. The Germans were spraying the houses; bullets were coming through the roofs and windows, whizzing around the rooms inside and hitting the walls behind us. They were really brassing those two houses up.

Private Terrett, the Bren gunner, bashed some slates off with the Bren and put the gun down on the rafters pointing through the hole. We could see straight away where the firing was coming from, from the houses and gardens up on the higher ground, only 150 to 200 yards away. You could easily see the Germans moving about there.

Most of the fighting in Arnhem was at very short ranges. I told Terrett to get firing and I think he got a couple of mags off at least before the Germans got on to him and a burst hit him. It took the foresight off the gun, took the whole of his cheek and eye away, and we both fell back through the rafters, crashing down into the bedroom below.

I wasn't hit, but Terrett wasn't moving at all. Someone slapped a dressing on him, and he was dragged away. I thought he was dead, but I found out many years after the war that he was still alive - a great surprise. He had lost an eye, but they made a good job of his face.

Chris decided that we should move out to the back of the houses and go through the gardens, which should have been sheltered from the fire from higher up on the left. We had terrible trouble getting through those gardens because of the fences between each garden - netting, stakes, sometimes concrete panels.

As soon as we got started, the Germans who were on the right opened fire on us; we didn't know where from. We could only make very slow progress - about 400 yards in about an hour. It was terrible; there were blokes crawling over cesspits, and bullets were coming through the concrete panels which we thought would protect us – they turned out to be hollow. We had a number of casualties. I couldn't see who they were, but you could hear shouts for medics and men saying, 'I'm hit', the usual thing soldiers say when hit. The whole of T Company was involved in that move, and I think we got quite badly mauled”.




Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie personally briefed Eric Vere-Davies for his attack:

“He said he was giving the orders personally because it was most important to the battalion that we took the area of the chimneys ahead on the hill and up the road in front of us from where we were being held up, and he knew that I could and would do it.

I had got about twelve men left and went straight in with them. We passed our company commander and his second in command lying together by the side of the road in a ditch and looking a bit out of it with the Colonel running the show, and charged straight up the road to the high ground with the buildings at the top.

It was a good fast advance under sniper and machine-gun fire, and we all got to the top - no casualties. Once we had taken the factory area, we placed a Bren gun in position to fire into the houses from whence the trouble came, and the gunner engaged the target area by firing into the house windows. He was stopped soon after with a bullet in his face.

The house was still occupied by some screaming Dutch people - what a row! A young girl ran from one house doorway to another and was shot through the upper leg. My medics attended to her, but we had to hold the mother off; she went berserk. Food and drink were offered to us by civilians as the battle raged! I had eight or nine men left with me. I decided to try to advance further as the factory was now cleared. The civilians disappeared, sensibly going to their cellars.

We went after a machine-gun nest with a Bren and a rifleman. Old soldiers say that you never see the one that hits you. I did - it was a tracer. I was on one knee and, as I positioned the Bren gunner on to his target, I saw the tracer bullet coming over in a flat arc from our right flank. The bullet went through the top of both my legs, severing the sciatic nerve in my right leg on the way. A second bullet then went through my small pack and wounded me in the neck. I believe the same sniper must have got Jack Hellingoe before our chaps got him”.




'Waho Mahomed!' was the battle-cry that the 1st Parachute Brigade had used in North Africa. Jack Hellingoe described his platoon's attack.

“I was called back to an O-Group, with senior officers there. Chris was there and an artillery colonel who, I found out later, was 'Sheriff' Thompson - I knew the name, but not the man - but I don't remember seeing David Dobie there. They were all spread around the garden, keeping their heads down.

I was the only platoon commander there. They told me they wanted me to take my platoon and do a sweep through a factory area, a collection of brick buildings with scrub-covered heaps of old stone among them. 'Clear the factory'; that was my order. The artillery colonel said that he would be supporting my attack with his guns.

I sent a runner back for the section sergeants and I gave my orders to them in front of all the other officers. We started off about forty strong; Chris had sent some extra across at the last minute. We came under fire, and some of us were hit, including myself, in the right foot, but I was able to carry on, dragging my foot. We were firing as we went through those scrubby hillocks of stone, shouting, 'Mahomed, Mahomed, Waho Mahomed', to keep our spirits up.

My batman, Private Baker, lost his leg there, and I was hit again, in the left ankle. I think most of our casualties were caused by just one German who stayed behind when the others ran, and he was firing single shots at us from close range, but we couldn't see him. We lost our momentum then, and I don't really know what happened after that”.

Due to their wounds, both Hellingoe and Vere-Davies were out of the battle and they later became prisoners of war.

 

[panda1gen]

As there were no subalterns left, Major Perrin-Brown and his second in command, Captain Jimmy Ritchey, each took an experienced platoon sergeant and divided the available strength of the company into two parts, so despite these losses, T Company continued to attack along the road.





It took until nearly 4 p.m. to cover the next half-mile, to the junction of the lower road and the Utrechtseweg. They were now coming into the area where the 3rd Battalion had been in action earlier that day. Every house had to be checked, as although German resistance was not strong, frequent bursts of long-range machine-gun fire down the roads and across the open spaces caused steady casualties. Snipers also caused casualties.






T Company were reduced to only twenty-two men at the end.




Immediately behind the leading troops, Corporal Donald Collins of the Royal Signals was with Battalion HQ. He remembered;

“Bullets flying about everywhere, yet, to my amazement, I saw at different intervals Dutch ladies cleaning the inside of their front windows. I presume that their curiosity overcame their caution, and they were doing this as an excuse to see what was going on.”

By now Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie had decided that his battalion could go no further. There was a proposed plan to put S Company, which was still in reasonable shape, into jeeps and push them on to the bridge, but in the event it had to be abandoned because the jeeps could not be produced.

The battalion was near St Elizabeth Hospital, close to where the 3rd Battalion had also come to rest. It too moved into houses in the area for cover.

Private Douglas Charlton remembered;

“Our numbers were dwindling fast when we got to the hospital. We were ordered out of the hospital grounds by men in white coats because our presence was bringing a lot of fire on the hospital. There were bodies of our 3rd Battalion lying everywhere. Officers and NCOs were running in and out of houses trying to chivvy men along; some had stayed behind to comfort dead or dying comrades.

Someone made tea, and we ate from our ration packs; we also ate bottled pears from the cellar of the house we had occupied. Then I was detailed to go with a sergeant and four men back along our route to look for stragglers. I had been on the move without sleep for more than forty hours and was none too pleased.

It was dark now, and we found medics patching up the wounded along the way as well as many reluctant heroes hiding in the houses; these were directed to our new position or they joined us. We were making our way back when the sergeant stopped at the window of a house and listened to the sound of voices inside. He entered; there were shouts and shots; the voices were German. He staggered out of the door and shouted for me to get going and then he collapsed; I never saw him again. The rest of us ran like hell in all directions.”

Private James Shelbourne;

“Eventually the advance came to a frustrating halt below a high boundary wall of St Elizabeth Hospital, and I took a breather in the kitchen of a house there. A group of the lads were standing among the pots and pans, trying to calm down an incoherent sergeant-major who had evidently received a massive shock to his nervous system. To stay could be unnerving. In the garden of that same house I was startled to find an upturned German helmet filled to the brim with bright red arterial blood. Did this obscene sight trigger off the sergeant-major's breakdown? Perhaps not, but it certainly gave me a turn.”


Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Battalion had come alongside its sister 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion, even though it started from much further back. In doing so, 1[SUP]st[/SUP] Battalion lost twenty-three killed, the highest single day battalion loss in the 1st Parachute Brigade, over the whole battle. Both battalions commanders were determined to renew their efforts as the bridge was only just over a mile away.

However, their strength was diminishing whilst the German defence was stiffening.




Two small parties of men did manage to advance further. Using his initiative, Lieutenant John Dickson of the 3rd Battalion managed to independently lead a dash along the narrow piece of ground between the lower road and the river from the Rhine Pavilion.

When he reached the end of the open stretch he came to the small harbour area, near the pontoon bridge. Here he joined with two more 3rd Battalion men who had reached this point by other route. After finding their way forward blocked, they all took shelter in a house.




Another party also reached that area, lead by Major Tony Deane-Drummond of the Divisional Signals. He arrived from Divisional HQ, in order to inform the fighting units to change radio frequency for that day. After doing this, Deane-Drummond then took control of a group of leaderless men. He managed to force his way forward to that same little harbour area, taking shelter in a building with three men.




The two groups, numbering just seven men, were unaware of the other's existence, but were at the tip of that Monday's advance, just 800 yards from the nearest part of the bridge perimeter.

German troops entered both buildings, but Dickson's party took refuge in the roof and Deane-Drummond's hid in the basement. Both groups managed to escape and avoid capture for the time being.

 

[Terp152]

Kevin, always interesting texts to accompany the masterful photos. :salute:: You intrigued me enough to get a copy of Middlebrooks book. Now, to find time to sit down and read it and the other 50+ books in the que. :redface2: Chris

 

[panda1gen]

Kevin, always interesting texts to accompany the masterful photos. :salute:: You intrigued me enough to get a copy of Middlebrooks book. Now, to find time to sit down and read it and the other 50+ books in the que. :redface2: Chris

Thanks Chris. Glad you like the photos. Having covered the XXX Corps breakout, Son, Eindhoven and the link up with the 101st and the battle for Best so far, I thought I would be finishing this 'interminable' thread by now.

However, Middlebrook's book has such good detail (and I especially like the quotes from the participants), so that I am not finished yet! I am delighted you bought his book and feel sure that you will enjoy it.

Kevin

 

[panda1gen]

C Company and No. 4 Platoon, 2nd Parachute Battalion

As the above action came to a halt just west of St Elizabeth Hospital, two groups from the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion, representing nearly half of the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] Battalion's rifle-company strength, were still missing and badly needed at the bridge.

They still hoped to rejoin their battalion at the road bridge, but Major Victor Dover's C Company had been forced on the Sunday evening to take shelter on the Utrechtsestraat (the continuation of the Utrechtseweg), only a quarter of a mile beyond the advances of the 1st and 3rd Battalion attacks.

Lieutenant Hugh Levien's No. 4 Platoon had penetrated more deeply into Arnhem, but had been cut off from B Company. They remained stranded a mile short of the bridge.




They spent the night keeping watch in shifts, with only one C Company casualty, a man who was shot through the head. They made radio contact with the bridge at 'stand-to' next morning and were given fresh orders.




The company was ordered to abandon its original mission to capture the local German HQ in Arnhem. Instead, they should disengage (by withdrawing slightly to the west), before cutting south. The intention was for the company to reach the lower road and proceed to the bridge by that route. They left at 7.0 a.m. (by the back door) and attempted to move through the back gardens of the houses on the north side of the Utrechtsestraat.




Lieutenant David Russell's No. 7 Platoon was leading:

“The gardens were very tricky, with high walls and many little yards; progress was desperately slow with enemy fire all around us. We eventually emerged into a small garden where fire was falling from the 20-millimetre gun which had been firing on the building we had left and also from a Schmeisser; the Germans were obviously following our route. Victor Dover told me to push on. We had to crawl along through rose beds, our equipment catching in everything; my Sten became clogged with dirt.




We reached the point where I decided to cross the road. Cannon fire had set the house we had just left ablaze, and the road was covered by a machine-gun firing on fixed lines. No. 1 Section ahead of me rose as one man and made a dash for it. I crawled on for a few more yards, gave the signal to Sergeant Campbell behind me to go, and got across the road, luckily unscathed”.

 

[wwiibuff]

Lots of great photos on this thread. Thanks Kevin for taking the time to share.

 

[panda1gen]

Lots of great photos on this thread. Thanks Kevin for taking the time to share.

Thanks Duke. I am also admiring your photos. All the best.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Only Russell and seven men managed to get across that road. Moving to the south, they met Lieutenant Cleminson's platoon, who had been fighting on the lower road at the head of the 3rd Battalion.




The remainder of C Company 2 Para were unable to follow. They tried to move but were soon pinned down. Major Dover was forced to surrender as the opposition was too strong and a white flag was eventually offered. They were only about 400 yards from 3rd Battalion but were trapped as this was the area where the Germans were setting up their inner blocking line. It is understood that the remainder of the company - three officers and about a hundred men – were taken prisoner. This was the first large-scale haul for the German, but there would be more.




Meanwhile, when B Company 2 Para moved to join the battalion in the bridge perimeter, No. 4 Platoon, lead by Lieutenant Levien, acted as rearguard. They moved from a previous position close to the Rhine pontoon and most of B Company made it through, but in the growing light they were seen and the Germans opened fire.




No. 4 Platoon was left stranded. The first man to be hit was Sergeant Frank Kemp, whose misfortune was a wound to the scrotum with the loss of a testicle. With typical British understatement Sergeant Kemp reported to Levien that he had,

'dropped a bollock'.

The Germans allowed him to be evacuated by Red Cross jeep, whilst another casualty was left in the relative safety of a private home.




Although one small group lead by Sergeant Bertie Carrier reached the bridge, the remainder of the platoon was fragmented and forced into side streets. Of Carrier’s group that did reach the bridge, two of them were later killed there.

Lieutenant Levien's eleven man party was now isolated. They were aided by a brave Dutchman, Jan Brouwer, who ushered them into a house in the Bakkerstraat. There, the courageous Miss Mieke Engelsman took them. Her elderly parents were meanwhile displaced to another house. By using the telephone, Levien was able to contact his company commander who was now at the bridge. They were quickly surrounded by the Germans, but managed to hold out for twenty-four hours. Only when they had used up nearly all of their ammunition did they surrender.

 

[villagehorse]

Now I know where the term ‘what a load of bollocks’ came from {sm4}, more interesting facts from this battle. Robin.

 

[MLH13]

Kevin......I am enjoying this thread and the storyline coupled with your photos is a nice treat.

Mark