Battle for Arnhem.... (1 Viewer)
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panda1gen
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To continue from post #1,939 on the previous page .....
Further north Fallschirmjägers,
Jungwirth’s grenadiers,
and other crews of 559/Panzerjäger Battalion prepared to join in the action.
Orders were hastily given, with arcs of fire and priority targets allocated to individual assault guns.
Further north Fallschirmjägers,
Jungwirth’s grenadiers,
and other crews of 559/Panzerjäger Battalion prepared to join in the action.
Orders were hastily given, with arcs of fire and priority targets allocated to individual assault guns.
Wolfgang_UK
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The StuG is a great model,- does look good from any angle in any setting.
panda1gen
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Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
News of the arrival of German armour and infantry on Hell’s Highway at Koevering was received with consternation amongst the Allies at St Oedenrode. 502 PIR had only a few antitank guns but 907th Glider Field Artillery (GFA) Battalion was within four hundred yards of the nearest burning trucks.
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson promptly ordered Battery B to be deployed in the ground defence role, while Battery A was to continue firing in support of 501 PIR at Eerde. Captain McGlone, Battery B commander, immediately ordered the guns out of their deep pits from which they could only provide conventional indirect fire support. Deploying to cover the approaches to St Oedenrode with direct fire, McGlone bolstered his line with
‘One .30-caliber machine gun, two ground mounted .50s and all twenty-eight bazookas in the battalion’.
However, Kampfgruppe Jungwirth still had limited combat-power, so did not attempt to approach St Oedenrode.
Just after dark, Captain McGlone and 907/GFA’s Executive Officer set out to discover what was going on in front of his guns. By the light of a burning tank, they spotted movement ahead of them, which proved to be a British Brigadier, who had been cut-off by the German attack. He had assembled a ‘platoon’ of ‘de-horsed’ tank crews, RASC drivers and twelve American Glider Pilots, who had been heading back south. These he had positioned in defensive positions, which had helped to prevent German infantry moving on the screen of Battery B guns in front of St Oedenrode.
Brigadier Glyn Hughes had been sent forward from VIII Corps to find out what was happening, on his Corps’ flank as they advanced to the east of Eindhoven.
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
News of the arrival of German armour and infantry on Hell’s Highway at Koevering was received with consternation amongst the Allies at St Oedenrode. 502 PIR had only a few antitank guns but 907th Glider Field Artillery (GFA) Battalion was within four hundred yards of the nearest burning trucks.
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson promptly ordered Battery B to be deployed in the ground defence role, while Battery A was to continue firing in support of 501 PIR at Eerde. Captain McGlone, Battery B commander, immediately ordered the guns out of their deep pits from which they could only provide conventional indirect fire support. Deploying to cover the approaches to St Oedenrode with direct fire, McGlone bolstered his line with
‘One .30-caliber machine gun, two ground mounted .50s and all twenty-eight bazookas in the battalion’.
However, Kampfgruppe Jungwirth still had limited combat-power, so did not attempt to approach St Oedenrode.
Just after dark, Captain McGlone and 907/GFA’s Executive Officer set out to discover what was going on in front of his guns. By the light of a burning tank, they spotted movement ahead of them, which proved to be a British Brigadier, who had been cut-off by the German attack. He had assembled a ‘platoon’ of ‘de-horsed’ tank crews, RASC drivers and twelve American Glider Pilots, who had been heading back south. These he had positioned in defensive positions, which had helped to prevent German infantry moving on the screen of Battery B guns in front of St Oedenrode.
Brigadier Glyn Hughes had been sent forward from VIII Corps to find out what was happening, on his Corps’ flank as they advanced to the east of Eindhoven.
panda1gen
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As darkness set in, grenadiers of Major Jungwirth’s Kampfgruppe established themselves in the woods astride the road, in all-round defence.
Their positions were reinforced, under the cover of darkness, by the arrival of three 88mm guns.
However, during the night the Germans were not left to improve their positions unmolested. Again, the Allied artillery blasted their positions, with guns from 7th British Armoured Division (The Desert Rats) and 50th Northumbrian Division joining the shoot, from gun positions south of Eindhoven.
Nonetheless, in a SITREP at dawn, Major Jungwirth reported to General Poppe that,
‘approximately fifty enemy vehicles destroyed and until now eight officers and thirty-two NCOs and men had been captured and sent to the divisional command post’.
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
Their positions were reinforced, under the cover of darkness, by the arrival of three 88mm guns.
However, during the night the Germans were not left to improve their positions unmolested. Again, the Allied artillery blasted their positions, with guns from 7th British Armoured Division (The Desert Rats) and 50th Northumbrian Division joining the shoot, from gun positions south of Eindhoven.
Nonetheless, in a SITREP at dawn, Major Jungwirth reported to General Poppe that,
‘approximately fifty enemy vehicles destroyed and until now eight officers and thirty-two NCOs and men had been captured and sent to the divisional command post’.
Ref: Battleground Europe - Operation Market Garden
Hell’s Highway - By Tim Saunders
wayne556517
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panda1gen
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25-26 September 1944 – Allied Counter Attack From The South
During the night, it had become apparent from patrol reports submitted by the 502 PIR and the British 52/Recce Regiment that there were several groups of Allied soldiers holding positions along the line of the road.
In some cases they were almost mixed in with the enemy. This meant that it was impractical to use the growing weight of Allied artillery in a decisive manner and that the road would have to be physically cleared.
Lieutenant General Horrocks, had returned south to St Oedenrode to discuss the increasingly bleak prospects for MARKET GARDEN with General Dempsey and promised to help. Meanwhile, Major General Maxwell Taylor’s 101st attacked Koevering from both north and south. The nearest XXX Corps formation was 50th Division. They had their 69th Brigade already deployed ahead, at Nijmegen. Their remaining infantry brigades were deployed covering the right flank, so they had few troops available.
It was agreed therefore, that 131 (Queen’s) Infantry Brigade would come under 50th Division’s command from 7th Armoured Division. With them would be the tanks of 5/Inniskillen Dragoon Guards (5/Innis DG or the ‘Skins’) and the 8/Hussars. The plan was for the Allies to attack north, with 1/502 PIR on the left and 131 Brigade the right sides of the road.
However, the traffic was so bad that the British did not completely assemble until early afternoon.
Sergeant Boardman of the ‘Skins’ recalled the road move:
‘… the regiment was now under command of the Queen’s Brigade. The road was packed with vehicles nose to tail unable to move forward or back, but the Military Police, once again, played a wonderful role in sorting it all out. By 07.00 hrs we reached the main square in St Oedenrode where we met a very angry Corps Commander, (Lt-Gen Horrocks), who was desperately trying to get forward to join his own TAC HQ.’
50th Division were possibly keen to get a bad tempered corps commander out of their Headquarters, so they volunteered the Durham Light Infantry’s Carrier Platoon from 151 Brigade to take him north to The Island. The six carriers and their precious cargo, took a circuitous route across country, so managed to avoid contact with the enemy and the General.
Sometime after 10.00 hours on 25 September Horrocks finally reached his TAC HQ.
With Hell’s Highway still closed and the previous night’s crossing operation a failure, he confirmed that the evacuation of 1st British Airborne would go ahead that night (25 /26 September).
During the night, it had become apparent from patrol reports submitted by the 502 PIR and the British 52/Recce Regiment that there were several groups of Allied soldiers holding positions along the line of the road.
In some cases they were almost mixed in with the enemy. This meant that it was impractical to use the growing weight of Allied artillery in a decisive manner and that the road would have to be physically cleared.
Lieutenant General Horrocks, had returned south to St Oedenrode to discuss the increasingly bleak prospects for MARKET GARDEN with General Dempsey and promised to help. Meanwhile, Major General Maxwell Taylor’s 101st attacked Koevering from both north and south. The nearest XXX Corps formation was 50th Division. They had their 69th Brigade already deployed ahead, at Nijmegen. Their remaining infantry brigades were deployed covering the right flank, so they had few troops available.
It was agreed therefore, that 131 (Queen’s) Infantry Brigade would come under 50th Division’s command from 7th Armoured Division. With them would be the tanks of 5/Inniskillen Dragoon Guards (5/Innis DG or the ‘Skins’) and the 8/Hussars. The plan was for the Allies to attack north, with 1/502 PIR on the left and 131 Brigade the right sides of the road.
However, the traffic was so bad that the British did not completely assemble until early afternoon.
Sergeant Boardman of the ‘Skins’ recalled the road move:
‘… the regiment was now under command of the Queen’s Brigade. The road was packed with vehicles nose to tail unable to move forward or back, but the Military Police, once again, played a wonderful role in sorting it all out. By 07.00 hrs we reached the main square in St Oedenrode where we met a very angry Corps Commander, (Lt-Gen Horrocks), who was desperately trying to get forward to join his own TAC HQ.’
50th Division were possibly keen to get a bad tempered corps commander out of their Headquarters, so they volunteered the Durham Light Infantry’s Carrier Platoon from 151 Brigade to take him north to The Island. The six carriers and their precious cargo, took a circuitous route across country, so managed to avoid contact with the enemy and the General.
Sometime after 10.00 hours on 25 September Horrocks finally reached his TAC HQ.
With Hell’s Highway still closed and the previous night’s crossing operation a failure, he confirmed that the evacuation of 1st British Airborne would go ahead that night (25 /26 September).
panda1gen
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Meanwhile, at 07.30 hours, with only the leading elements of 131 Brigade having arrived in St Oedenrode, 1/502 PIR, reinforced by Company H and ten tanks from the Guards Armoured Division’s Armoured Replacement Squadron, launched an attack north. The Armoured Replacements had been extracted from the traffic jam and sent forward overnight.
Staff Sergeant Patheiger, of HQ Company 502 PIR, was with attacking infantry and described what happened:
‘Almost immediately, four of the supporting tanks were knocked out by 88mm fire and the company accompanying the tanks were pinned down by small arms fire from automatic weapons and artillery.
Four more tanks were brought up to assist the advance, but were put out of action by enemy 88mm fire almost immediately upon getting into position. When the 88mm guns were spotted, friendly troops were so close it was unsafe to bring artillery fire upon them.
One 57mm AT gun was brought up and laid on the 88mm gun, which was in a position behind a hedgerow near the road. Several hits were made and it was put out of action. In a fire fight that lasted until 18.00 hours, the enemy was pushed back bit by bit.’
Staff Sergeant Patheiger, of HQ Company 502 PIR, was with attacking infantry and described what happened:
‘Almost immediately, four of the supporting tanks were knocked out by 88mm fire and the company accompanying the tanks were pinned down by small arms fire from automatic weapons and artillery.
Four more tanks were brought up to assist the advance, but were put out of action by enemy 88mm fire almost immediately upon getting into position. When the 88mm guns were spotted, friendly troops were so close it was unsafe to bring artillery fire upon them.
One 57mm AT gun was brought up and laid on the 88mm gun, which was in a position behind a hedgerow near the road. Several hits were made and it was put out of action. In a fire fight that lasted until 18.00 hours, the enemy was pushed back bit by bit.’
villagehorse
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Can’t imagine what it would be like being the crew of a Sherman tank, knowing you were up next and seeing the continual hits on your fellow tankers. Amazing courage. Robin.
panda1gen
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Robin,
By Tank into Normandy (Cassell Military Paperbacks) - Stuart Hills
I don't know whether you have read this, he gives a good account of what it was like. They had real guts. It must have been terrifying knowing the power of the tank and AT guns pitted against your merely 'medium' tank.
All the best,
Kevin
panda1gen
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villagehorse
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Your thread takes on even more significance Kevin, with the 80th anniversary in the new few weeks. Understand K&C have some new MG figures in the pipeline, but whether they make September, might be a bridge too far. Nevertheless some new items for your wonderful scenes might not go astray. Amazing thread retelling a great story. Robin.
Louis Badolato
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Kevin,
I completely agree with Robin, this thread has incredible information and significance, not to mention some of the best photos on the forum, as does your Battle of the Bulge thread. Now if only someone could talk our old friend Bob (UKReb) to return to his wonderful Civil War thread, Diodramas would return to being one of the most watched subforums!
I completely agree with Robin, this thread has incredible information and significance, not to mention some of the best photos on the forum, as does your Battle of the Bulge thread. Now if only someone could talk our old friend Bob (UKReb) to return to his wonderful Civil War thread, Diodramas would return to being one of the most watched subforums!
panda1gen
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Most of what I have written has been based on 'Allied' sources. I shall try later to cover things a bit more from the German viewpoint.
For now, it may be worth remembering that the Allied command expected little resistance based upon the two front destruction of their forces.
The Germans were short on men and materiel, but organised what they could.
For now, it may be worth remembering that the Allied command expected little resistance based upon the two front destruction of their forces.
The Germans were short on men and materiel, but organised what they could.
