Battle for Arnhem.... (2 Viewers)

[panda1gen]

Now I know where the term ‘what a load of bollocks’ came from {sm4}, more interesting facts from this battle. Robin.

Kevin......I am enjoying this thread and the storyline coupled with your photos is a nice treat.

Mark

Thanks for the kind words, glad you like it.

 

[WesternOutlaw]

Always like the focus in your images; vivid and impressive.

 

[panda1gen]

Always like the focus in your images; vivid and impressive.

Thanks Rob, I like your shots and compositions. All the best.

 

[panda1gen]

I discussed earlier how the divisional commander became separated from his headquarters for a crucial period after the drop.

The HQ, in Major-General Urquhart’s absence from the previous afternoon, was left in the care of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mackenzie, his Chief of Staff.

... at Div HQ


In the planning for the operation, Mackenzie was clear on who should command if Urquhart became a casualty. It was decided that Brigadier Lathbury should replace Urquhart as he was experienced and likely to be an acceptable choice to the other commanders.

If Lathbury was also a casualty, Brigadier Hicks of the Airlanding Brigade would replace him, likewise, in the unlikely event of Hicks also being unavailable, Brigadier Hackett of the 4th Parachute Brigade would take over.

Mackenzie knew that by Monday morning, only part of the 2nd Battalion and some other troops had reached the Arnhem road bridge. He also knew that both the 1st and 3rd Battalions were still short of the bridge and were encountering strong opposition.

paras engage near the Hospital but can't advance ......

The German resistance in Arnhem was growing .....

German troops near the Hospital ......


It is likely that this information came from the divisional artillery, whose radio communications were generally working well, including with Divisional HQ.

Assessing the current intelligence, Mackenzie concluded that the remnants of the 1st Parachute Brigade Group in the streets of western Arnhem were no longer strong enough to push through to the bridge alone. Therefore, the push to Arnhem Bridge needed reinforcing, but the only possible troops available were two and a half battalions of the Airlanding Brigade.

There were two problems with redeploying them to Arnhem however. Firstly, they were currently in position to protect the landing grounds for the second lift (which was expected later that morning) ......

Airlanding Brigade paras deploy to protect the landing grounds


...... and secondly, despite his rank, Mackenzie did not have the authority to move any of these troops.

 

[villagehorse]

The drama builds. Robin.

 

[panda1gen]

The drama builds. Robin.

Thanks Robin, it is very encouraging to have positive comments, I appreciate it. All the best, Kevin.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Urquhart and Lathbury were still out of contact with Mackenzie and the Divisional HQ, but Hicks was nearby. (Hackett was still in England and due to board a second lift plane that day). Mackenzie travelled by jeep




and between 7 and 8 a.m. he found Hicks.




He duly asked Hicks to take command of the division and after appraising him of the situation in Arnhem, suggested that more men should be sent to Arnhem. Hicks arrived at Divisional HQ around 9.15 a.m. (leaving the Airlanding Brigade under the deputy brigade commander, Colonel Hilaro Barlow).

Within fifteen minutes, he issued orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Derek McCardie of the 2nd South Staffords. He was to organise the 60 per cent of the battalion that had landed the previous day and march them to Arnhem.

1[SUP]st[/SUP] Parachute Brigade would therefore assume control of the 2nd South Stafford Battalion, but the problem here was that Brigadier Lathbury was still missing. As a result the brigade itself was without effective command although everyone hoped that he could yet be found in Arnhem. The despatch of this unit was therefore a risk.

In addition to these command issues, there was an additional risk. The Airlanding Brigade battalions were deployed to protect the landing areas, at least until the second lift arrived safely. Therefore, moving the South Staffords left the area north of Wolfheze relatively unprotected.



That defence duty was passed from a battalion to only a troop of the Reconnaissance Squadron and fifty glider pilots, so it would be questionable whether they could manage if there was any serious German attack in that area.



As the morning passed, the patchy information received indicated that the 1st and 3rd Battalions were still struggling to make any real progress in Arnhem, so by 2.0 p.m. Brigadier Hicks decided to further reinforce their efforts.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The second lift had been expected in mid-morning, but it was delayed for four hours.

Nevertheless, Hicks ordered the remainder of the South Staffords to go straight to Arnhem, as soon as the second lift arrived.

He also ordered the 11[SUP]th[/SUP] Battalion from the 4th Parachute Brigade to do likewise. It was a bold command move as, without any consultation, Hicks (ranked a brigadier) removed a battalion from a second brigadier’s command the moment it arrived in the field.




According to the plan prepared in England previously, 4th Parachute Brigade was to skirt around Arnhem to take up positions in the north of the town. In Hicks’ judgement, the attempt to reach the bridge was more important and urgent than the planned movement drawn up days earlier.

The men from the 2nd South Staffords, currently about 420 strong, set off at 10.30 a.m. towards Arnhem from their positions around Wolfheze. Unfortunately they soon sustained casualties when, just after leaving Wolfheze, some men were wounded when they were strafed by German fighters.




After that, all went well until they came to the same position that 1st Battalion had been fired upon earlier that morning. This was where the main road into Arnhem ran through the railway embankment, just east of Oosterbeek.

1st Battalion had been stopped and forced to move south, to the lower Oosterbeek railway bridge. Now the South Staffords had exactly the same experience. Just like the 1st Battalion, their advance was halted and they too were forced to side-step to the lower road.




In the event, it took seven hours to cover five and a half miles, during which they endured two men killed and several wounded. As well as the strafing, they encountered snipers in Oosterbeek, followed by more serious fire in Arnhem.




They had to change their route several times, but they eventually met what was left of the 1st Battalion when they reached the area near St Elizabeth Hospital.

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

Lieutenant-Colonel George Lea's 11[SUP]th[/SUP] Battalion was the next to arrive, after its parachute drop that afternoon.




The unit made good progress after a swift drop zone rendezvous, although they were then delayed by over two hours close to the Hartenstein Hotel. The Divisional HQ had moved there and Brigadiers Hicks and Hackett may have argued about the battalion's best employment.

‘A’ Company’s commander, Major David Gilchrist later reported,

“A nice, quiet afternoon walk to Oosterbeek, with no interference and no sounds of battle, followed by sitting on our backsides for several hours on a grassy bank near the Hartenstein. We were all perfectly happy at that stage.”

Later, skilful Dutch guides led the 11[SUP]th[/SUP] Battalion to the St Elizabeth Hospital area of Arnhem, but despite this they still suffered at least three men killed.



The second-lift element of the 2[SUP]nd[/SUP] South Staffordshire Battalion, were the last reinforcements to arrive. They were also delayed, as the changes of direction made by the first part of their battalion, made their path more difficult to follow.




Nevertheless, they duly arrived in the rear of the 11th Battalion, becoming the last group to pass under the railway bridge at Oosterbeek Laag Station to fight in Arnhem.

So, by midnight on Monday these two fresh battalions, both at nearly full strength, could join the 1st and 3rd Battalions. These two had suffered some losses and were a little weary, but were still an effective force. A co-ordinated attack could now be made to push on to the bridge, probably the last real chance of getting sizeable reinforcements through to Frost at the bridge.

However, although they were all available and in the same area, there was no senior commander there to coordinate an attack. Divisional HQ did not send or designate anyone. To compound the irony, in hiding, only a few hundred yards away, were a healthy divisional commander and a wounded brigadier.

 

[panda1gen]

At 8.0 p.m. on Monday, Lieutenant-Colonel McCardie of the South Staffords expressed himself willing to follow Dobie’s wishes, as McCardie felt that Dobie seemed to represent the best authority of the 1st Parachute Brigade. They planned a two battalion attack for 9.0 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobie took the initiative in co-ordinating and 1st Battalion HQ became the prime focus for the coming action.

Although the Staffords were about 600 strong, they were still split into two parts. They would attack on the upper road past St Elizabeth Hospital. Now that its ‘R’ Company had finally come up (see earlier), the 1st Battalion would attack again along the river-bank road. Although the 3rd Battalion was close by, it was not yet in contact and the 11th Battalion had not yet arrived.




However, before the attack move could be made, there followed a period of confused orders and counter-orders that tried Dobie's patience. Brigadier Hicks initially ordered that any attack be postponed, as his Divisional HQ had received a report that the Frost’s force at the bridge had fallen.




Subsequently, at around 1.0 a.m. (on Tuesday the 19th), orders came to withdraw the whole force to Oosterbeek.

Meanwhile, after about an hour and a half, the false report about the surrender at the bridge was corrected, so Dobie was ordered to resume his attack again.

He arranged for Derek McCardie to meet him again, and also took the opportunity to invite Lieutenant-Colonel George Lea, as the 11th Battalion had now arrived.

Dobie's Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant 'Tsapy' Britneff described how,

“The scene was, I suppose, dramatic - a darkened, bullet-shattered house with Col McCardie and others sitting and standing round a table lit by a single candle; a wireless set whistling in the background”.




Dobie and McCardie were both absolutely determined to reach the 2nd Battalion at the bridge before dawn. Dobie sat at the head of the dining-room table,

'We must help Johnnie Frost', was the theme as he gave his orders.

The plan was for 1st Battalion to take the embankment road. Simultaneously the South Staffords would advance parallel along the main road. The 11th Parachute Battalion would follow on behind. The starting time would be around 0400 hours.



They understood that they must reach the bridge before dawn, because,

“To be caught on the embankment was death”.


Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

 

[panda1gen]

As he and his depleted battalion moved forward along the embankment by the Rhine, Dobie was surprised to meet part of Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch's 3rd Battalion.

Fitch's men had just made an (independent) attempted advance, along the same embankment route that Dobie planned to use, but they (the 3[SUP]rd[/SUP] Battalion) were in the process of pulling back and could see that there was no way through. They had advanced for about half a mile, until they were heavily fired upon from German positions at the end of that open area.




In the process, they sustained a dozen casualties, who included one of Fitch’s few remaining officers and RSM Lord, who were both injured.




Captain Richard Dorrien-Smith was a 3rd Battalion officer who had once served in the same company as Dobie. Major Alan Bush of the 3rd Battalion described this conversation between him and David Dobie: Dobie: Good morning!

Dorrien-Smith: Where the hell do you think you're going?

Dobie: I'm going up here.

Dorrien-Smith: I wouldn't do that if I were you. It's full of mortars and machine-guns.

Dobie: How do you know?

Dorrien-Smith: Because I've bloody well been there.

Dobie: Well, come and show us.

Dorrien-Smith: Not bloody likely.




Dobie was reportedly 'quite infuriated' that his way ahead to the bridge might be blocked, Lieutenant Britneff observed, but he still decided to press on. John Fitch also decided to lead his weary men forward yet again, in support.

Alan Bush said,

'Now that we had got rid of the divisional commander and the brigade commander, Fitch was determined to do everything he could to support David Dobie and help get through to the bridge.'

The 3rd Battalion were by now reduced to only around fifty effective men. They now moved on to the slope, to the left of the river bank, where they attempted to find what cover they could among some bushes. From there they could give some supporting fire to the 1st Battalion attack.




It should be noted that listed among the ‘3rd Battalion men’ in this and recent actions were Royal Engineers from C Troop, 1st Parachute Squadron. They had opted remain with the 3rd Battalion ever since leaving the landing area.

About half an hour later, Derek McCardie's South Staffords started their forward move. They were a short distance to the north, astride the main road (the Utrechtseweg). This ran uphill, in front of the St Elizabeth Hospital, which was the dominant building there.




Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

 

[panda1gen]

Ref: Arnhem - 1944: The Airborne Battle by M. Middlebrook

The problem was that this road steadily diverged from the river bank, ensuring that the attacking forces gradually separated. This reduced the co-ordination between the battalions even as both units made good initial progress.

The defence line which had held the 1st and 3rd Battalions on the previous evening had been pulled back some 700 and 900 yards. It was now located at the far end of an open space in and around some buildings. In addition, they placed forces on either side of the open space, set well back in cover. This ensured that they could fire their own heavy weapons into the flanks of the British attacks but could not be engaged as effectively by the lighter British paratrooper weapons.

The flanking defences to the north were set on an embankment on the far side of the railway cutting. The southern flank was set in the brickworks, across the Rhine on the south bank of the river. The positions were carefully conceived so that fire from neither German flanking force would hit their own men opposite. Fire from the south bank would finish up hitting the steep embankment, whereas any loose shots from beyond the railway would pass over the heads of the Germans on the south bank.

Five 'battle groups', all from the 9th SS Panzer Division, manned these defences, one on either flank and three in the defence line ahead. They were well supplied with armour, heavy weapons and ammunition, were comparatively fresh and could remain in the protection of their trenches, houses or armoured vehicles. As a result, the advancing men would be fired on heavily from both flanks, as well as by weapons and vehicles at the far end of the open space.



There were some entrenched positions opposite to the paras .......




An NCO urges his men into their positions ......




The paras were facing five SS 'battle groups' ......




They had some heavier weapons .......




And when the paras advanced they would face fire from troops and vehicles from three directions ........

Then it started to get light.

 

[panda1gen]

One unforeseen result of the German withdrawal of a few hundred yards was that Major-General Urquhart ....




..... and two companions were released from their hiding place. Urquhart and Captain Taylor were driven back to Divisional HQ and Lieutenant Cleminson rejoined the 3rd Battalion. Their fourth group member, the badly wounded Brigadier Lathbury, was too badly wounded to be rescued so had to remain in hiding in another house.

 

[panda1gen]

The butcher’s bill for the over-optimistic view of potential German opposition and the decisions to drop the division so far from its objectives was about to be paid.

This skirmish would arguably prove to be the turning-point of the Battle of Arnhem as the airborne men advanced in the growing light.




In contrast to the Germans, many of the airborne troops were tired and short of ammunition.




The river and railway dictated that there was no room to manoeuvre so there could be no flanking move. There was no effective artillery support, no friendly armour and no fighter bombers to call in for support.




The Paras were comparatively lightly armed, with mainly personal weapons only. Consequently, they needed to get to very close quarters to be able to fight effectively on anything like equal terms.




This meant they must advance in the open and, given the coming daylight, German firepower would be unlikely to permit this.

 

[panda1gen]

Many of the Paras had experience of fighting in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, but even with further training and exercises in England, it had not prepared them especially well for fighting in urban Arnhem.

Major Perrin-Brown's T Company advanced along the left flank along the grassy bank of the riverside road (the Onderlangs).

Major Stark's S Company advanced on the right, along the esplanade next to the river itself. So the 1st Battalion attack moved on, despite neither company mustering more than a platoon in total.




The Germans reinforce prior to the paras' advance .....




As they were spotted by the Germans in the growing light, the paras came under intense fire. Most of this was from armoured vehicles and infantry weapons, set up in and around buildings on the upper road, at a range as little as 150 yards.






The South Staffords had not yet reached the German positions, so the Germans were not yet distracted by their attack.

The range was so short that the Germans were even throwing grenades at the nearest advancing paratroops.

 

[Horus]

Youtube suggested I might be interested in this and I think you may too !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ph8M88MWZ64

 

[Terp152]

Youtube suggested I might be interested in this and I think you may too !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ph8M88MWZ64

An amazing collection of vehicles. Thanks for sharing Steve. :salute:: Chris

 

[sfarrelly]

wow totally awesome!

 

[panda1gen]

An amazing collection of vehicles. Thanks for sharing Steve. :salute:: Chris

Chris,

Thanks for this, I had not seen it. Looks like they had fun. Great to se the authentic vehicles and kit.

 

[panda1gen]

As they reached some outlying German positions in the more open space, the paras charged.




They managed to clear them at close quarters using bayonets and grenades, taking some prisoners, who were marched to the rear.




After advancing about 800 yards, the paras had nearly reached the end of the open area. At this point, the main German defences (set up ahead) opened up.

The paras’ advance paused and David Dobie went forward. In a pause, his remaining strength was counted. He had thirty-nine men left, including himself. Major Timothy's R Company had the lead, but they were now down to just six men. Dobie went forward with the leading elements to try to find positions in which they could take cover, but he was then wounded in the head (not seriously).

It was clear that there was no way to advance and no immediate shelter from the murderous fire.







As there was no way through, Dobie ordered his men to get into some houses to their left. Dobie, Major Timothy and five men went into one house, Major Perrin-Brown and seven men reached another. Major Stark's group was further back as they had taken shelter in captured German trenches.




It was now 6.30 a.m. and after two hours of trying, the attack was over.