Battle for North Africa (2 Viewers)

[swalterh]

Some interesting history threads recently, I hope they continue. Everyone has bias and I cannot see why anyone would be upset to see a member in America being Pro American, I am always surprised when they are not :wink2: ^&grin However it is important to note that not agreeing with someone being 'Pro' American' does not make them 'Anti' American.


Some observations so far.

Total War: I prefer the following (Oxford) definition: "a war which is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants (including civilians) involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the accepted rules of war are disregarded." Imo a Total War has not yet occured, including, ACW, WWI and WWII, but of course those more personally involved are likely to consider otherwise. Btw I am well aware that Britain did not offically favor the Southern States, but the Northern states were a competitor regarding food imports etc.

Treaties etc:

Hitler was a psychopath and racist to the degree that his beliefs frequently overuled a sound military alternative, but he was not stupid. Hitler felt obligated to declare war on the US because of Germanys treaty with Japan, he did not like the idea.

The ANZUS Treaty does not obligate the United States or Australia to go to war if the other nation does.

Australia is a independent nation, our laws considers Britain to be a foreign power the same as say the United States. For example a person holding dual Australian/British citizenship cannot become a member of the Parliament of Australia. Queen Elizabeth II is a Constitutional (Ceremonial) Monarch of Australia, and cannot dictate government policy/decisions made, including going to war.

Battle for North Africa: I would favor Rommel as being the better and more aggresive battlefield commander, Montgomery being superior regarding logistics and planning. Both were great moral boosters for their time but history has demonstrated that both were also overated, not a surprise considering the amount of propaganda (from all sides).

Matt

You include some very interesting and IMO valid information in this post that has the potential to generate some fun discussions.

Shane

 

[swalterh]

Some interesting history threads recently, I hope they continue. Everyone has bias and I cannot see why anyone would be upset to see a member in America being Pro American, I am always surprised when they are not :wink2: ^&grin However it is important to note that not agreeing with someone being 'Pro' American' does not make them 'Anti' American.

I agree with you 100% on this.

I also expect that a member who resides in a specific country should, by the nature of their subject focus, be more knowledgeable about and able to share opinions regarding their respective nation's participation in a particular conflict.

Shane

 

[Mitch]

Not sure Hitler was a psychopath but, it should be interesting to hear under what term he is labelled as that. He overruled many nervous Generals with the boldness of his plans in the early conquest of the west and Scandinavia when their plans were either less offensive or, there was a belief that Germany was not ready for war. Fortune often favours the bold and, as happens with most rulers he was caught in his own self belief after these and, some of the huge early military successes in Russia.

Racist?? more than likely. again though was he more racist than some of the allied counterparts? The manner in which the British Empire ruled was rather draconian to what we now call ethnic minorities. The US hardly treat blacks well and, there were still attacks and killings of blacks in the US at this time. Many historians and writers have likened what happened pre war to the Jewish people in Germany to the treatment of blacks in the US and, the way that we policed the Irish. Now of course they (the germans) took it to another level but, the similarities are clear beatings, segregation, restriction from certain employment, schooling and medical treatment protective custody to name a few and, I forgot deaths!!!

Again when we use terminology we should remember that what happened in Germany was not solely just because of Racism it plays a part but, is more complex and, goes further back in pre and post first war Germany.

Mind, this is an entire subject for another interesting thread but, has nothing to do with Africa!! What is next for the African theatre?
Mitch

 

[swalterh]

Total War: I prefer the following (Oxford) definition: "a war which is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants (including civilians) involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the accepted rules of war are disregarded." Imo a Total War has not yet occured, including, ACW, WWI and WWII, but of course those more personally involved are likely to consider otherwise. Btw I am well aware that Britain did not offically favor the Southern States, but the Northern states were a competitor regarding food imports etc.

I can agree to build consensus off of this definition regarding total war. In an attempt to offer further commentary and perhaps provide some more clarity on this issue for use in future discussions, I wish to invoke a concept from contemporary military theory.

For the sake of clarity, when seeking to qualify and quantify the nature of the participating combatants’ behavior in a particular conflict, current US military doctrine breaks down military operations into four quadrants. These quadrants are an attempt to provide perspective regarding the “official” societal efforts (even if covertly executed) of the forces and institutions involved.

Note: In no way does this explanation seek to diminish the horrors of battle for the individual solider that is placed in harms way. As Mitch has alluded to in numerous posts, any act of combat is or at least should be a total effort for the combatant engaged against an enemy who is trying to kill him.

These quadrants include High Intensity-Long Duration (i.e. WWI, WWII, ACW, Napoleonic Wars, SYW, etc…), the next quadrant is High Intensity-Short Duration (i.e. Austro-Prussian & Franco-German Wars, certain individual campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars, etc…), another quadrant is Low Intensity-Long Duration (i.e. the more recent operations in Iraq & Afghanistan) the fourth quadrant is Low Intensity-Short Duration (i.e. many of Britain’s Colonial Wars during the 19th Century, the Ashanti Campaign is one that immediately comes to mind, the Whisky Rebellion of 1791, etc…).

Obviously there will be some instances of overlap since all conflicts will not neatly fit into any one specific quadrant. For example, the American Revolutionary War could be considered to be of Medium Intensity-Long Duration.

 

[swalterh]

Not sure Hitler was a psychopath but, it should be interesting to hear under what term he is labelled as that. He overruled many nervous Generals with the boldness of his plans in the early conquest of the west and Scandinavia when their plans were either less offensive or, there was a belief that Germany was not ready for war. Fortune often favours the bold and, as happens with most rulers he was caught in his own self belief after these and, some of the huge early military successes in Russia.

Racist?? more than likely. again though was he more racist than some of the allied counterparts? The manner in which the British Empire ruled was rather draconian to what we now call ethnic minorities. The US hardly treat blacks well and, there were still attacks and killings of blacks in the US at this time. Many historians and writers have likened what happened pre war to the Jewish people in Germany to the treatment of blacks in the US and, the way that we policed the Irish. Now of course they (the germans) took it to another level but, the similarities are clear beatings, segregation, restriction from certain employment, schooling and medical treatment protective custody to name a few and, I forgot deaths!!!

Again when we use terminology we should remember that what happened in Germany was not solely just because of Racism it plays a part but, is more complex and, goes further back in pre and post first war Germany.

Mind, this is an entire subject for another interesting thread but, has nothing to do with Africa!! What is next for the African theatre?
Mitch

Mitch

Agreed on the Hitler part, it’s probably best left for another thread.

Aside from El Alamein and the American operations I personally haven’t explored the theatre much. I have done some study on the airborne assault against Crete. I’d rather if someone with more of an interest in the theatre provides the direction and details. So, please pick your favorite topic regarding the African Theatre and “Let’s go!” (Sorry for the Ike reference. I mean have an enjoyable discussion)

Shane

 

[swalterh]

The ANZUS Treaty does not obligate the United States or Australia to go to war if the other nation does.

On this matter you are correct. The ANZUS treaty does not officially “oblige” any of its signatories to participate in conflicts that any of the other parties may chose to engage in. This was an overreaching provocation on my part and for this I apologize.

The signatories, by the letter of the ANZUS treaty, “voluntarily” elect to participate in joint actions in accordance with their constitutional processes. I will take this opportunity to point out that Australia is the only ally who has provided combat support to the US in every single one of America’s major military actions since WWII?

 

[swalterh]

On 20 May 1941, the Germans launched their invasion of the Island of Crete. This was to be the first offensive in history to exclusively utilize an airborne assault force. This battle saw fierce fighting as the elite German Paratroopers slugged it out with Australian, New Zealand, British and Greek defenders.

The British and Commonwealth troops put up a stout fight and the initial waves of German attackers suffered heavy casualties. But, the Germans were finally able to capture an airfield which enabled them to fly in vitally needed supplies and reinforcements. This development proved too much for the Allies to overcome.

After eight days of intensive fighting, the Allies decided to attempt a withdrawal of troops to Egypt. During this evacuation, the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses at the hands of Luftwaffe fighters and attack aircraft. Thousands of British/Commonwealth troops were successfully transported from Crete to Egypt, but approximately 5,000 allied soldiers were left to surrender to the Germans.

The resulting allied defeat proved to be the result of German air superiority in the region. Again we see how on the modern battlefield the proper use of airpower is of vital importance to the success of surface operations.

Given this fact, would it have been more prudent for the Allies to withdraw from Crete without giving battle? Or, did the fighting on Crete serve to bloody the Germans enough to prevent them from being more aggressive in Africa and the rest of the Mediterranean Theatre? One could argue that the damage done to the German Paratroopers at Crete weighed heavily enough on the High Command’s mind that they elected not to attempt a similar operation against Malta.

 

[RPZ]

On 20 May 1941, the Germans launched their invasion of the Island of Crete. This was to be the first offensive in history to exclusively utilize an airborne assault force. This battle saw fierce fighting as the elite German Paratroopers slugged it out with Australian, New Zealand, British and Greek defenders.

The British and Commonwealth troops put up a stout fight and the initial waves of German attackers suffered heavy casualties. But, the Germans were finally able to capture an airfield which enabled them to fly in vitally needed supplies and reinforcements. This development proved too much for the Allies to overcome.

After eight days of intensive fighting, the Allies decided to attempt a withdrawal of troops to Egypt. During this evacuation, the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses at the hands of Luftwaffe fighters and attack aircraft. Thousands of British/Commonwealth troops were successfully transported from Crete to Egypt, but approximately 5,000 allied soldiers were left to surrender to the Germans.

The resulting allied defeat proved to be the result of German air superiority in the region. Again we see how on the modern battlefield the proper use of airpower is of vital importance to the success of surface operations.

Given this fact, would it have been more prudent for the Allies to withdraw from Crete without giving battle? Or, did the fighting on Crete serve to bloody the Germans enough to prevent them from being more aggressive in Africa and the rest of the Mediterranean Theatre? One could argue that the damage done to the German Paratroopers at Crete weighed heavily enough on the High Command’s mind that they elected not to attempt a similar operation against Malta.

I do not think a mass airborne invasion of Crete was anticipated, and they probably thought they could fend off anything else. In any event, German losses were so high they appalled Hitler to the extent that he forbade any such future operation. From then on the German Paras were used almost exclusively as sort of special ground troops.

A good read on the Fallschirmjäger if you have not already done so is Hunters from the Sky by Charles Whiting. In my opinion the German paras were one of, if not the best, fighting outfits of the war.

 

[swalterh]

I do not think a mass airborne invasion of Crete was anticipated, and they probably thought they could fend off anything else. In any event, German losses were so high they appalled Hitler to the extent that he forbade any such future operation. From then on the German Paras were used almost exclusively as sort of special ground troops.

A good read on the Fallschirmjäger if you have not already done so is Hunters from the Sky by Charles Whiting. In my opinion the German paras were one of, if not the best, fighting outfits of the war.

I agree that the allies seemed secure in the fact that the Royal Navy dominated the surface of the Mediterranean and were hardly concerned with a potential German attack on Crete. I also agree with your comments pertaining to the German paratroopers and the Germans reluctance to utilize them in further massed airborne assaults.

I have not read this particular title by Whiting, but I have read his account of the Battle in the Hurtgen Forest. I like his style and he seems to do a good job utilizing first-hand accounts from the front line soldiers. I’ll add this one to my amzon.com with list.

 

[RPZ]

I have not read this particular title by Whiting, but I have read his account of the Battle in the Hurtgen Forest. I like his style and he seems to do a good job utilizing first-hand accounts from the front line soldiers. I’ll add this one to my amzon.com with list.

Another one with a good firsthand account of the Crete operation is Daedalus Returned by Baron Von De Heydte. The 1,000 copy limited reprint can be found for about $80 while original printings are running considerably higher.

 

[Poppo]

On 20 May 1941, the Germans launched their invasion of the Island of Crete. This was to be the first offensive in history to exclusively utilize an airborne assault force. This battle saw fierce fighting as the elite German Paratroopers slugged it out with Australian, New Zealand, British and Greek defenders.

The British and Commonwealth troops put up a stout fight and the initial waves of German attackers suffered heavy casualties. But, the Germans were finally able to capture an airfield which enabled them to fly in vitally needed supplies and reinforcements. This development proved too much for the Allies to overcome.

After eight days of intensive fighting, the Allies decided to attempt a withdrawal of troops to Egypt. During this evacuation, the Royal Navy suffered heavy losses at the hands of Luftwaffe fighters and attack aircraft. Thousands of British/Commonwealth troops were successfully transported from Crete to Egypt, but approximately 5,000 allied soldiers were left to surrender to the Germans.

The resulting allied defeat proved to be the result of German air superiority in the region. Again we see how on the modern battlefield the proper use of airpower is of vital importance to the success of surface operations.

Given this fact, would it have been more prudent for the Allies to withdraw from Crete without giving battle? Or, did the fighting on Crete serve to bloody the Germans enough to prevent them from being more aggressive in Africa and the rest of the Mediterranean Theatre? One could argue that the damage done to the German Paratroopers at Crete weighed heavily enough on the High Command’s mind that they elected not to attempt a similar operation against Malta.

The british command knew by "Ultra" decoding system the day and all the details about the german operation, and they decided to resist. This was the best decision ( the intelligence service was in my opinion the best secret service in ww2,and abwher the worst!!), in fact the german losses let them leave the further projects to attack Cyprus and Malta. If Malta was taken, maybe the north african battle would have had a different issue...

 

[Mitch]

I thought Crete actually took the allies of guard? The problem for the German Fallschirmjagers was they did not learn from the early campaigns in the low countries that you need to jump with weapons. They paid dearly for this in the low countries and, especially, so in Crete. They did however fight with their usual tenacity and courage.

I think Malta even had it fallen would not have been a deal breaker in terms of the outcome of the battle in Africa. The British still controlled the western side from Gibraltar and had strong air and naval units whilst the Germans had no naval presence so, the same problems of supply would have been in place. Again the allies would have just landed in Africa nearer to Gibraltar and the final outcome would have still been the same. It would have just been longer and more costly
Mitch

 

[swalterh]

I thought Crete actually took the allies of guard? The problem for the German Fallschirmjagers was they did not learn from the early campaigns in the low countries that you need to jump with weapons. They paid dearly for this in the low countries and, especially, so in Crete. They did however fight with their usual tenacity and courage.

I think Malta even had it fallen would not have been a deal breaker in terms of the outcome of the battle in Africa. The British still controlled the western side from Gibraltar and had strong air and naval units whilst the Germans had no naval presence so, the same problems of supply would have been in place. Again the allies would have just landed in Africa nearer to Gibraltar and the final outcome would have still been the same. It would have just been longer and more costly
Mitch

So, basically you're saying that the Germans had little to no chance of winning in Africa?

If this is the case, I would tend to agree with this conclusion. I reiterate the fact that the Mediterranean Theatre was a secondary front (side show) for the German High Command. They just weren't willing to devote an overabundance of time and resources to execute their operations against the British in N. Africa. IMO this was due in large part to the unattractive colonial nature of the Anglo-Italian operations in the African Campaign and to the OKW’s per-occupation with their perceived "primary" enemy on the Eastern Front.

 

[Mitch]

Ideologically the Russian front was important but, it does not mean the desert was a side show in anyway. The discussion has shown that the importance of this theatre was for some belatedly realised. Its just another shot in the foot that the Germans did in WWII that played a part in their final defeat.

The Victory here and overall was as much aided by the germans as it was in the myriad of countries they took on during WWII. on equal terms they were capable of beating any force in front of them and, often did even when it was completely unequal.
Mitch

So, basically you're saying that the Germans had little to no chance of winning in Africa?

If this is the case, I would tend to agree with this conclusion. I reiterate the fact that the Mediterranean Theatre was a secondary front (side show) for the German High Command. They just weren't willing to devote an overabundance of time and resources to execute their operations against the British in N. Africa. IMO this was due in large part to the unattractive colonial nature of the Anglo-Italian operations in the African Campaign and to the OKW’s per-occupation with their perceived "primary" enemy on the Eastern Front.

 

[swalterh]

Ideologically the Russian front was important but, it does not mean the desert was a side show in anyway. The discussion has shown that the importance of this theatre was for some belatedly realised. Its just another shot in the foot that the Germans did in WWII that played a part in their final defeat.

The Victory here and overall was as much aided by the germans as it was in the myriad of countries they took on during WWII. on equal terms they were capable of beating any force in front of them and, often did even when it was completely unequal.
Mitch

The Eastern Front was not only important from an ideological stand point, it was also important from a pure military stand point as well.

I think most would agree that had the Germans knocked the Soviets out of the war the entire conflict would have been much different. The same can not be said of a German victory in Africa. Any German victory in N. Africa would have been a limited one. In this respect IMO the Mediterranean Theatre will always be considered a side show from the German perspective.

The operations in this theatre were not however viewed in this light from the British and Commonwealth perspective as has been discussed before. The Suez Canal was the main artery that connected Britain with all of her overseas possessions in the Eastern Hemisphere. It could not be surrendered at any cost. Once German preparations for Operation Sea Lion were abandoned the British were able to divert the majority of their resources to the Mediterranean. They also committed large portions of Commonwealth troops to the theatre as well.

The Germans committed the bulk of their material resources, air power assets, manpower, most experienced combat formations and command talent to the Eastern Front. In the initial stages of the Campaign in Africa the German combat forces were structured around a single division. This gradually increased as the campaign continued. But, the campaign in Africa was strictly an exercise in economy of force. Rommel was sent there to hold off the British and assist the Italians while the mass of German combat power was concentrated at the decisive point (i.e. Eastern Front).

He was not instructed to engage in an escalating campaign to drive the British out of the region. Through his continued success chasing the British through the desert, Rommel exceeded the scope of his operational mission. By not sticking to the directives of higher head quarters, Rommel ended up operating at the extreme limits of his supply line. The ensuing situation led to a severe defeat for the DAK at El Alamein and eventually resulted in the Axis forces being driven out of N. Africa completely.

I do agree that the German ground forces were in most cases superior to the allied formations they faced. It is interesting to speculate on what might have been had the German commitment been greater to the campaign in N. Africa. IMO it is also interesting to speculate on the eventual outcome of the campaign against the Soviets had the Germans retained those resources sent to Africa for use on the Eastern Front.

 

[Poppo]

The Eastern Front was not only important from an ideological stand point, it was also important from a pure military stand point as well.

I think most would agree that had the Germans knocked the Soviets out of the war the entire conflict would have been much different. The same can not be said of a German victory in Africa. Any German victory in N. Africa would have been a limited one. In this respect IMO the Mediterranean Theatre will always be considered a side show from the German perspective.

The operations in this theatre were not however viewed in this light from the British and Commonwealth perspective as has been discussed before. The Suez Canal was the main artery that connected Britain with all of her overseas possessions in the Eastern Hemisphere. It could not be surrendered at any cost. Once German preparations for Operation Sea Lion were abandoned the British were able to divert the majority of their resources to the Mediterranean. They also committed large portions of Commonwealth troops to the theatre as well.

The Germans committed the bulk of their material resources, air power assets, manpower, most experienced combat formations and command talent to the Eastern Front. In the initial stages of the Campaign in Africa the German combat forces were structured around a single division. This gradually increased as the campaign continued. But, the campaign in Africa was strictly an exercise in economy of force. Rommel was sent there to hold off the British and assist the Italians while the mass of German combat power was concentrated at the decisive point (i.e. Eastern Front).

He was not instructed to engage in an escalating campaign to drive the British out of the region. Through his continued success chasing the British through the desert, Rommel exceeded the scope of his operational mission. By not sticking to the directives of higher head quarters, Rommel ended up operating at the extreme limits of his supply line. The ensuing situation led to a severe defeat for the DAK at El Alamein and eventually resulted in the Axis forces being driven out of N. Africa completely.

I do agree that the German ground forces were in most cases superior to the allied formations they faced. It is interesting to speculate on what might have been had the German commitment been greater to the campaign in N. Africa. IMO it is also interesting to speculate on the eventual outcome of the campaign against the Soviets had the Germans retained those resources sent to Africa for use on the Eastern Front.

For sure the german problem was to have opened too many different fronts in ww2, and not to have enough men and materials to keep them. Since the beginning of operation "Barbarossa", the germans had to choose if to attack Leningrad, or Kiev, or Moscow as they hadn' t forces enough to do this at the same time with success!
About your saying if the afrika korps had been used instead to win in the eastern front....Well, honestly it is very hard to say.

But, if Hitler had made a strategic common agreement with the japanese instead of making each their own world war, in this case the siberians wouldn' t have been sent to defend Moscow during winter 41 and Moscow would for sure have been conquerred by Hitler' s troops. It is unbeliavable that the 2 biggest allies of the axes didn' t coordinate their strategies in a world war!!

 

[Mitch]

It is arguable that had afrika been won by the DAK and germans that Germany would have been fighting a one front war as the effect upon Britain would have been catastrophic. It would have substantially weakened the far east troops and allowed the Japanese to run riot making that theatre a whole harder ball game.

As I said the Germans self inflicted wounds upon themselves countless times but, not evacuating the bulk of an experienced fighting armie from their was a massive blunder. Not sure what they would have done to assist in the eastern front because the germans had mauled savagely the Russians with significantly smaller forces their war losing blunder was not to direct and focus the attack upon Moscow and destroying or capturing the capital. This would have either made the Russians sue for peace or, push them so far back into the ural areas

This would have allowed Germany time to gain all the resources from the expanse they had won and rebuild their units and defence lines.

One more armie in theatre would not really have achived this as the self inflicted goal was the lure of raw materials and defeating the enemy on mass as they has drew their attention away from the importance of their capital. Never a truer word was spoken from Hitler when he said you only had to kick in the door and the whole rotten lot would fall.

The loss of Moscow would have ended the Russian front as a major operation of combat
Mitch

 

[RPZ]

The british command knew by "Ultra" decoding system the day and all the details about the german operation, and they decided to resist. This was the best decision ( the intelligence service was in my opinion the best secret service in ww2,and abwher the worst!!), in fact the german losses let them leave the further projects to attack Cyprus and Malta. If Malta was taken, maybe the north african battle would have had a different issue...

Yes, I forgot about ultra again.

 

[RPZ]

It is arguable that had afrika been won by the DAK and germans that Germany would have been fighting a one front war as the effect upon Britain would have been catastrophic. ...ETC ....
Mitch

I would agree here, though Hitler's greatest misdirections really started with invading Poland. Had he instead built the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine up to much greater strength and bided his time, a springtime 1940 or perhaps '41 offensive right through to the far east would have crushed Russia quickly.

Instead he repeated the error(s) of Napoleon - and his troops paid the same price.

 

[swalterh]

I agree that a German victory in Africa would have been catastrophic to the British cause, but I don’t believe it would have been fatal. In addition to the home islands, the British had a large empire from which to draw men and material. They also had other combat forces stationed in the area that weren’t directly attached to 8th Army. Again, I believe that any German victory in the Mediterranean would have been limited or short lived. The British possessed the ability to eventually reconstitute a significant combat force capable of opposing the Axis forces in this region if 8th Army suffered any type of significant defeat.

If the Germans had gotten past the British in Egypt, the sheer logistical task of transporting heavy armored formations from Egypt through the Middle East to strike at the Soviet Union from the south would have been monumental. Plus, what kind of local support would the Germans have experienced had they defeated the British in Africa? The Egyptians were already growing tired of British rule. The task of administering and occupying new colonial possessions would have proven a difficult challenge that in all likelihood would have hampered any movements towards the Soviet Union’s southern border.

The existence of the Ultra program was a great asset to the Allies, but in this particular theatre it was not decisive. The Allied political decision to protect the code breaking capability prohibited commanders from fully exploiting decoded transcriptions. Ultra was instrumental in the anti-U-boat operations that turned the tide in the Atlantic.

As I’ve stated before, the Germans just weren’t willing to commit large ammounts of resources to a conflict that they largely viewed as colonial in nature. Between the Germans and Italians the Axis had little to no capability to compete with the Royal Navy on the surface. I realize that the Italians possessed a respectable fleet that enjoyed some success, but in all honesty it could not withstand the resources capable of being fielded by the allies. The only hope for sustained Axis success was to maintain control of the skies. This proved impossible because the threat of the allied air offensives forced the Luftwaffe to draw more and more air assets away from other fronts to defend the skies over the Reich.

In the end, I believe that the Germans overcommitted themselves to the Mediterranean and squandered valuable resources that could have contributed to their efforts on the Eastern Front. The problems created by a disjointed command and control system also served to significantly hamper Axis operations in the Mediterranean. The Axis didn’t have any equivalent organization to the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. Because of this, the Axis had little hope of sustaining any type of meaningful offensive success in the region. The multitude of internal frictions created from joint operations prevented the Germans and Italians from being able to overcome the external frictions generated by the geography, climate and their enemies.