swalterh
Corporal
- Joined
- Apr 23, 2012
- Messages
- 433
I wonder if we divided the air campaigns into battles whether it would be possible to assess the value of strategic bombing more accurately. For example, the RAF might have a clearer history if we could compare the success of the Battle of the Ruhr with the Battle of Berlin and so on. I have not read widely on the American efforts but I assume that they would likewise benefit.
Effects of US Strategic Bombing Offensive:
Air Operations before long-range escort (i.e. P-51 Mustang) = Bad
Air Operations after arrival of P-51 Mustang = Good
Targeting War Industry = Bad
Targeting Oil Production = Good
Once air superiority was established, Allied fighters were released from their escort missions to hunt down trains, motor vehicles and airfields. This had a very negative affect on the Wehrmacht’s ability to properly prepare for the eventual cross channel invasion. It would have been kind of hard to invade the continent without Air Superiority. Those pesky Luftwaffe fighters could have posed a big problem if they would have had trained pilots to fly them in June 1944.
Once the Beachhead was established, the allied TAF’s (Tactical Air Forces) made mincemeat out of German ground forces. Pretty much every major US ground offensive was preceded by aerial bombardment (even though Gen. Bradley was livid about the fratricidal shorts preceding Operation Cobra). Patton’s Third Army was escorted across Europe under the umbrella of the XIX Tactical Air Command which provided the close air support and air interdiction needed to clear the way for rapid movement. The German surprise attack in the Ardennes was accomplished due in large part to poor flying weather. Once the skies cleared the Battle of the Bulge wound down fairly quickly and the advance into Germany was underway.
The long and short of air operations is:
-Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.
-Airpower is an inherently strategic force.
-Airpower is primarily an offensive weapon.
-In essence, airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.
-Airpower produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension--time.
-Airpower can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously.
-Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
-Technology and airpower are integrally and synergistically related.