Gettysburg / Gods and Generals (1 Viewer)

In the Gettysburg movie, I always liked the comments made by the guy who was elected to speak for the 2nd Maine mutineers. Something about instructions on the sole of a boot. Incompetent Generalship was, I think, a persistent weakness in the Union Army of the Potomac. Politics and the proximity to Washington probably contributed to it, but the Army of Northern Virginia was in the same position and had strong generalship.
Yet, it seems to have been generally the reverse in the western theatre. It leaves me thinking that good generals are not made by circumstances, so much as their natural abilities. Lee & Jackson, happened to be in Virginia, Grant & Sherman happened to be in the west.
It also occurred to me that in 20 years active duty, I probably spoke with, or was spoken to, by a general for less then 2 minutes. It made me think 'what do I know about generalship?' and 'what do generals know about the bottom ranks?'.
 
AS GRANT AND SHERMAN MUST HAVE WANTED TO SAY BUT WERE HELD BACK BECAUSE THEY WERE TRYING TO BE GENTLEMEN LIKE........

SO....I'LL DO IT FOR THEM.........

THERES NOTHIN LIKE WHOOPIN SOMEONES AS@ IF THEY HAVE BEEN A PAIN IN ONE ALL ALONG!!!!!!!


WELLINGTON

LOL :D. Just seen this. Nice one Wellington. :).
I find it curious and facinating that the Brit word seems to have been taken up by a lot of N. Americans, while the N. American word seems to be used more and more by Brits. Must be a result of globalization, I guess.
:):)
 
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In the Gettysburg movie, I always liked the comments made by the guy who was elected to speak for the 2nd Maine mutineers. Something about instructions on the sole of a boot. Incompetent Generalship was, I think, a persistent weakness in the Union Army of the Potomac. Politics and the proximity to Washington probably contributed to it, but the Army of Northern Virginia was in the same position and had strong generalship.
Yet, it seems to have been generally the reverse in the western theatre. It leaves me thinking that good generals are not made by circumstances, so much as their natural abilities. Lee & Jackson, happened to be in Virginia, Grant & Sherman happened to be in the west.
It also occurred to me that in 20 years active duty, I probably spoke with, or was spoken to, by a general for less then 2 minutes. It made me think 'what do I know about generalship?' and 'what do generals know about the bottom ranks?'.

There were a number of very good Union Generals in the East, but the Union order of leadership revolved arround a central ,often weaker skilled Army commander ,with the corps commanders totally submitted to his general plan........The Confederates often treated their Corps as small ,independent army groups, with General Lee more an advisor / suggester of basic strategy..and the Corp Generals given free rein to make it work...Reynolds, Hancock, and others, had they been given the Army of Potomac top spot, would have been an equal to most any of the Souths equivelents...Michael
 
There were a number of very good Union Generals in the East, but the Union order of leadership revolved arround a central ,often weaker skilled Army commander ,with the corps commanders totally submitted to his general plan........The Confederates often treated their Corps as small ,independent army groups, with General Lee more an advisor / suggester of basic strategy..and the Corp Generals given free rein to make it work...Reynolds, Hancock, and others, had they been given the Army of Potomac top spot, would have been an equal to most any of the Souths equivelents...Michael

Excellent evaluation Michael and not only do I agree but the evidence to support your statement on very good Union Generals in the East was vividly displayed at Gettysburg.

A number of Meade's prinicple lieutenants rose to the occassion during those 3 days. Buford's "must hold the high-ground" decision and before his death Reynolds decisive action in selecting Gettysburg as a good place to make a fight. Abner Doubleday, leading the First Corps on July 1st had his best day of the war. Hancock of the Second Corps was an inspirational fighting general on the second and third days. George Sykes of the Fifth Corps and Gouverneur Warren of the engineers responded decisively to crises on the second day. John Sedgewick, while not called on to fight, force-marched his Sixth Corps so as to be there if needed. Artillerist Henry Hunt, granted the command independence by Meade that Hooker had earlier withheld, proved to be a dominating presence on this battle-field. Finally the initiative displayed by the Union cavalry commanders such as David Gregg and George Custer which completely nullified the Reb cavalry on that final day.

Of couse there were the usual painful exceptions such as Howard, Sickles and Slocum but the fact of the matter is that Meade and his Officer Corps, unexpectedly, against all the odds and for the very first time, thoroughly outgeneraled Robert E Lee and his lieutenants at Gettysburg
 
Lee, also showed , at Gettysburg that he might not have been that great strategic genius, attributed to him, all these years. Without Jackson, smashing the Union flank at Chancelorville , or A.P.Hill rapid marching to save him at Antietam, after Lee put his Army's back against a impassible river, there might never had been this Lee legend. Lee was a great inspirational presence with Jackson as his warror type co-commander. And when Lee finally was left to his own devices at Gettysburg, and never having been that, in your face leader, left his Corp commanders to guess his intent or question his purpose, and thus they failed to execute any of Lee's orders ,in just about every phase of that battle..Michael
 
I think your forgetting Lee's great victories for the remaining years of the war-Wilderness,Spotsylvania(sometimes considerd inconclusive),Cold Harbor,Crater. (During these battles Lee was outnumberd more than half to one)

The only major victories Grant won were very late in the war when the confederacy was hopelessly outnumbered and Grant just kept pouring men in to his ranks.

I do admire many Union commanders like Reynolds,Mcpherson,Hancock,and Kearney. However, We do not know how they would have performed if they were given top command

Maddicus,
Does Lee's defeat at Gettysburg not make him a stategic Genius? He won many more brilliant victories than he ever did defeats. Because Napoleon lost at waterloo should we consider him an incompatent? Plainly speaking I do not believe one battle should be used to define his whole military career.:)
 
Maddicus,
Does Lee's defeat at Gettysburg not make him a stategic Genius? He won many more brilliant victories than he ever did defeats. Because Napoleon lost at waterloo should we consider him an incompatent? Plainly speaking I do not believe one battle should be used to define his whole military career.:)

Both Lee and Napoleon were military strategic geniuses but unfortunately both defeats proved to be absolutely decisive.

Napoleons nemesis at Waterloo consisted of Rain, Mud, Ney's lack of foresight and the arrival of Blucher.

Lee's nemesis at Gettysburg was the incompetence of Ewell, Hill and Stuart and Lee's inability to get his Generals to co-ordinate their divisions (I got an idea that it had something to do with plantation aristocracy as there was a hell of a lot of in-fighting amongst the higher echelons of the Confederate army). Because of their incompetence on the first two days Lee refused to listen to Longstreet and insisted that the third day will be fought as he wanted it, the failure of his key subordinates to follow his orders on the first two days resulted in him making his disastrous decision to attack the Union centre.

For someone who had studied Napoloeon's campaigns as a cadet at West Point Lee should really have studied Waterloo more thoroughly.
 
Lee won in spirit. The same way Napoleon won. They lost. But they had the love and admiration of their men. Lee surrendered with style and poise. Lee chose to side with his home (Virginia, ever been? Lovely place.)not a very aggressive federal government.
 
Both Lee and Napoleon were military strategic geniuses but unfortunately both defeats proved to be absolutely decisive.

Napoleons nemesis at Waterloo consisted of Rain, Mud, Ney's lack of foresight and the arrival of Blucher.

Lee's nemesis at Gettysburg was the incompetence of Ewell, Hill and Stuart and Lee's inability to get his Generals to co-ordinate their divisions (I got an idea that it had something to do with plantation aristocracy as there was a hell of a lot of in-fighting amongst the higher echelons of the Confederate army). Because of their incompetence on the first two days Lee refused to listen to Longstreet and insisted that the third day will be fought as he wanted it, the failure of his key subordinates to follow his orders on the first two days resulted in him making his disastrous decision to attack the Union centre.

For someone who had studied Napoloeon's campaigns as a cadet at West Point Lee should really have studied Waterloo more thoroughly.


I agree with many things said here - Although I think Lee was looking to hard for that "Big Victory" and felt that his number being even with the Union at Gettysburg would give him that Victory. His battle plan was very complex for that battlefield and his decision to fight OFFENSIVE instead of DEFENSIVE was his downfall. IMO.
 
I agree with many things said here - Although I think Lee was looking to hard for that "Big Victory" and felt that his number being even with the Union at Gettysburg would give him that Victory. His battle plan was very complex for that battlefield and his decision to fight OFFENSIVE instead of DEFENSIVE was his downfall. IMO.

His number was not equal to the union which had between 90-110 thousand

the confederacy had 60-75 thousand and a lack of inteligence because of Stuart

Le could not have kept fighting on the defensive as illustrated by Grant's Virginia Campaign
 
His number was not equal to the union which had between 90-110 thousand

the confederacy had 60-75 thousand and a lack of inteligence because of Stuart

Le could not have kept fighting on the defensive as illustrated by Grant's Virginia Campaign

I think you've mis-construed Capitolron's post. Because of Lee's lack of intelligence he firmly believed the Army of the Potomac was strung out all the way back to Washington therefore leading him to assume his 70,000 men was about on equal par with the Union Corps that were currently on the field (however, superior numbers of the enemy had never phased him before)

Stuart's incompetent glory ride not only robbed Lee of his eyes but more importantly robbed him of the key part of his campaign plan- His choice to select the best area the Confederate army would fight on. Longstreets plan after the first day was to get between the Union army and Washington, select that prize field in the "defensive" mode and let Meade attack them. The Union army being entrenched on Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill plus by completely ignoring Longstreet's advice forced Lee to fight a 3 day offensive battle instead of a defensive one that was originally planned.

If I'm wrong I'm sure ron will put me right!
 
His number was not equal to the union which had between 90-110 thousand

the confederacy had 60-75 thousand and a lack of inteligence because of Stuart

Le could not have kept fighting on the defensive as illustrated by Grant's Virginia Campaign


Youre right the numbers were not equal but, I should have said close - actually I believe at the time of the first day of battle the numbers were even closer than the 100 K - you mentioned.

On the defense strategy - you are very wrong - young man. If Lee had followed Longstreets advice and had the Union attack him in a fortified position instead of a "Pickets Charge" to a Union Fortified Position - I believe (and many other historians as well) the outcome would have been very different. Lee was pushing a bad battle plan that led to his defeat.

Sorry - but, those are the facts.

As for NAPOLEON at Waterloo (mentioned by others) the weather did have a great deal to do with the bad result - that battle could been fought another day - but, like Lee - Napoleon wanted to have a quick victory over the British - instead of fighting another day or even week.

Ron
 
Lee could not have kept fighting on the defensive as illustrated by Grant's Virginia Campaign

After another Fredericksburg or two I suspect that zeal for the war in the north would have waned - especially if fought on northern soil.

Meade would never have undertaken the aggressive, 'hit 'em again and again' tactics of Grant. One loss and he'd have pulled back to lick his wounds (much as he did at Gettysburg after winning instead of pursuing a retreating Lee). Put 6 months between each battle (especially if they were losses for the north) and the north would have given up before Lee was decimated.
 
"On the defense strategy - you are very wrong - young man. If Lee had followed Longstreets advice and had the Union attack him in a fortified position instead of a "Pickets Charge" to a Union Fortified Position - I believe (and many other historians as well) the outcome would have been very different. Lee was pushing a bad battle plan that led to his defeat.
Sorry - but, those are the facts."/Quote


Ron- You misinterpreted my post. I was talking about the war in general not Lee's decision to launch the fateful assult.

During Grant's overland campaign he lost several battles and suffered the most amount of casualties for a campaign previousl seen. Yes, Northern support for the war did drop drasticlly after these battles but was replenished by the capture of Atlanta.
 
RE Lee

We are talking about Gettysburg here - not the entire war. I would think that you would agree that the Battle Plan for Gettysburg that Lee drew up was bad. Right?

Ron
 
I may be drifting off track here, but not all great generals are necessarily military genious's. I read something once that made sense to me, that pointed out some common characteristics of successfull generals, in long drawn out wars. The two I remember were:

Good Health
Unusually calm under great & continual stress

To this I will add, something also often noted: The ability to order men to their death, over & over.

One of Grant's greatest qualities, I thought, was his ability to disregard losses and defeats and focus on the goal of winning the war. I have often read that the Army of the Potomac underwent a significant change in morale/attitude when after losing Their first battle under Grant, they did not retreat, but recieved orders to advance or attack again the next day.

I love the story of Sherman coming upon Grant at night sitting by a fire after their defeat on the first day of Shiloh. Sherman came up and saw that Grant had tear tracks on his face & said something about it being too bad they had lost. Grant replied something like: 'Yeah, but we'll lick'em tommorrow'. I don't know if this is true but it illustrates the point about Grant's character accurately I believe.

Some generals have only one battle in them & then are essentially used up, even if they win. I think the Union commander at the battle of Pea Ridge is an example of this. He had enough to hold things together for one day, but knew he could not sustain the effort mentally or physically.

Grant is probably my favorite Civil War general. The story about him wandering around the union army one night on horseback completely sloshed & his staff riding all over the place trying to find him is hysterical. :D

He eventually fell off his horse & slept it off somewhere among his camped out army. It is said however that he never did it when actually in presence of the enemy, and only on breaks in the action.
 
I still believe that with the death of Jackson, Robert Lee was not the complete General.....His " victories " after Gettysburg were no more than killing matches ,with Union troops wave attacking fortified defensive positions, that was forced on Lee, as he was continually outflanked by Grant all the way back to Richmond. And if they were wins, why was Lee unable to stop Meade / Grant in the overall scheme of things..? Michael
 
One of the problems with all who read Civil War history (including myself) is the use, over and over and over, of the word IF. IFJackson had not gone riding after Chansellorsville, IF Longstreet had order Pickett up earlier, IF Stuart hadn't gone for a pony ride in Pennsylvania, etc.
The fact of the matter is that Grant ground down Lee and the ANV, Sherman burned a path through Georgia and the Carolinas, Picketts men failed because the Union held the ridge, Sheridan reconquered the Valley., etc. And all the IF's never happened except in books by Turtledove and Gingrich.
And therefore, the Union once again (or maybe for the first time) became the United States.
Steve
 
One of the problems with all who read Civil War history (including myself) is the use, over and over and over, of the word IF. IFJackson had not gone riding after Chansellorsville, IF Longstreet had order Pickett up earlier, IF Stuart hadn't gone for a pony ride in Pennsylvania, etc.
The fact of the matter is that Grant ground down Lee and the ANV, Sherman burned a path through Georgia and the Carolinas, Picketts men failed because the Union held the ridge, Sheridan reconquered the Valley., etc. And all the IF's never happened except in books by Turtledove and Gingrich.
And therefore, the Union once again (or maybe for the first time) became the United States.
Steve

"IF" is not a problem Steve, that's the fun part of history, it would be a dull world for us arm-chair generals if we never discussed "ifs" and "whys?"

In the heat of those civil-war battles with up to 80% of the field of fire obliterated and masked by black-powder smoke the conjecture IF becomes IMO more like the adverb HOW?. How did anyone see further than 10 feet in front of him to write an accurate field report that formed the basis of most of the civil war history books we read today.
 
And if they were wins, why was Lee unable to stop Meade / Grant in the overall scheme of things..? Michael

Because Grant was able to eisily replace his casualties and supples while Lee could not reinforce his weary troops. By the time of the surrendur Lee had only 20,00 troops and they had not eaten a thing for two days.
 

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