Gentlemen
I have already posted a comment on Rob's thread and anyone who has read it will know which side of the Haig fence I stand on to which I make no apologies for. Along with the ACW and Custer at the Little Big Horn which I have since discovered is also far too controversial to discuss here on the forum, the Western Front of WW1 is a subject I have studied extensively. Like most British families both sets of my Great Grandfather's and numerous Great Uncles fought and died during that war and I possess their diaries and the letters they sent home-very few mention Haig but all of them portray proud men fighting for a cause they firmly believed in regardless of the mud; blood and slaughter we all know took place during those dreadful four years.
There is a plethora of books both defending and vilifying this most controversial Victorian gentleman and any student of the war on the Western Front will have great difficulty coming to a final conclusion based on Rob's thread title as it will simply depend which author you enjoyed reading or who you personally considered gave the most balanced view. As Lancer has mentioned his view has changed over the years and I am sure that is based on various volumes he has read.
But any serious student of the Somme offensive simply must arrive at the conclusion I have that the whole planning of the campaign was clumsy; ham-fisted and downright amateurish considering we had been fighting for two years. It has been stated and I fully agree with the statement that the problem with Haig and his Chief of Staff in London Sir William Robertson was that although they had got the reasoning of the war right ie that it must be decided on the Western Front, they also believed that they must have a spectacular victory to prove how right they were. But their strategy throughout 1916 to mid 1918 and more importantly their attitude proved totally ineffectual against the hard German professionalism that manifested itself in the form of accurate shell; machine gun and rifle fire. The mass bombardment that was repeatedly used that simply announced to the enemy an imminent Allied offensive was proven again and again almost ad infinitum to be absolutely fruitless and totally ineffective on the German lines. Haig did not possess the necessary breadth of vision or imagination to plan a great campaign and when things went wrong as in any battle they inevitably will he always appeared to be utterly devoid of any imagination to change tactics. He was simply the embodiment of the national character of the time in the old Colonial army tradition.
My final piece of evidence and a challenge to any frogger on this thread is this
In 1926 Haig wrote an article for the London Times on the impact WW1 had made on military tactics:-
"........I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever.
Aeroplanes and tanks are only accessories to the soldier and the horse and I feel sure that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse-the well bred horse- as you have ever done in the past"
![Eek! :eek: :eek:]()
![Eek! :eek: :eek:]()
No doubt this was read and unfortunately believed by the commanders of the Polish Army who put Haig's "words of wisdom" in practice during September 1939.
Reb