Korsun Pocket (1 Viewer)

[redhugh]

In January 1944, the German forces of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South including General Otto Wöhler's 8th Army had fallen back to the Panther-Wotan Line, a defensive position along the Dnieper river in Ukraine.
Two corps, the XI under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the XLII Army Corps under Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached Corps Detachment B from the 8th Army were holding a salient into the Soviet lines extending some 100 kilometers to the Dnieper river settlement of Kanev, with the town of Korsun roughly in the center of the salient, west of Cherkassy.

An airfield at Korsun also provided the possibility that any units that might become trapped could be re-supplied by air. Despite this, Field Marshal Von Manstein, commander of Army Group South, had requested repeatedly that the two Corps be allowed to withdraw from the salient in order to straighten the German line. However Hitler refused, ordering that the salient be held, despite the risk of encirclement. He proposed that once the Russian offensive had been halted, it would be used as a springboard for an offensive to recapture Kiev.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 2

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov realized the potential for destroying Wöhler’s 8th Army with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus’ encircled 6th Army. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around a cauldron and then destroy the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units. The Ukrainian Front Group, led by Generals Konev and Vatutin were tasked to attack the flanks of the salient, from the southeast and northwest. Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of the 1st and 6th Tank and 40th Armies, while Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front consisted of the 5th Tank and 4th and 53rd Armies. The 27th and 52nd Armies would press the northern and eastern faces of the salient along the Dnepr river positions.
The Pocket Closes
On 18 January, Manstein was proven prescient when General Nikolai Vatutin’s 1st and General Konev’s 2nd Ukrainian Fronts attacked the edges of the salient and surrounded the two German corps. The link-up on 28 January of 20th Guards Tank Brigade with 6th Guards Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front at the village of Zvenyhorodka completed the encirclement and created the cauldron or Kessel that became known as the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket. Stalin expected and was promised a second Stalingrad; Konev wired: "There is no need to worry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not escape."Trapped in the pocket were under 60,000 men, a total of six German divisions at approximately 55% of their authorized strength, along with a number of smaller combat units. Among the trapped German forces were the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, with the attached SS Sturmbrigade Wallonien (SS Assault Brigade Wallonien), the Estonian SS Battalion Narwa, and "several thousand" Russian auxiliaries. The trapped forces were designated Gruppe Stemmermann and the commander of XI Corps, General Wilhelm Stemmermann was placed in command. Wiking had 30 operational Panzer III/IV tanks and assault guns and 6 in repair.The division further had 47 artillery pieces, including 12 self-propelled guns.
The fate of 57,000 German soldiers trapped in the 'Korsun Pocket' now hung in the balance.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 3

Following the closure of the pocket, command of the entire force passed to General Wilhelm Stemmerman and the force within became known as Group Stemmerman Tanks and halftracks of 1st Panzer Division begin movements towards the pocket, early February 1944
Manstein moved quickly, and by early February the III and XLVII Panzerkorps were assembled for a relief effort. However, Hitler intervened and ordered the rescue attempt to be transformed into an impossible effort to counter-encircle the two Soviet fronts.
General Hermann Breith, commander of III Panzerkorps insisted that both the relief formations should unite and attempt to force a corridor to the trapped Gruppe Stemmermann. Manstein initially sided with Hitler, although in deceptive fashion, and the attack was to be an attempt to encircle the massive Red Army force. The XLVII Panzerkorps attack by the 11th Panzer Division quickly stalled. The veteran division had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns, therefore its contribution was limited.[15] Realizing the encirclement was going to fail, Manstein ordered III Panzerkorps to attempt to relieve the beleaguered Gruppe Stemmermann.
Excerpts from the diary kept by the commander of 42nd Corps up to the time of the breakout
1 February Daily losses 300 men. Fighter protection inadequate. Ammunition and fuel running low.
2 February Air supply improving. Radio message from Eighth Army: "Withdrawal of north front approved. Prepare for main effort on eastern flank of south front. Vormann [general commanding XLVIII Panzer Corps] is continuing the relief attack from the south. Breith [general commanding III Panzer Corps] will attack 3 February from southwest."
3 February Air supply continues to improve. Unfortunately several transport aircraft with wounded aboard were shot down on the return flight. Have requested that air evacuations be made at night only unless adequate fighter protection can be provided. Message from Army: "To strengthen southern sector, occupy proposed line without further delaying action at intermediate positions."
4 February Made a determined effort to take Boguslav. Commander of Task Force B seriously wounded. Now all the division commanders are artillerymen, including the present SS big shot. The north front is tottering. Russian tanks today captured a medium battery of Task Force B that was firing from every barrel without being able to score a single hit. Evidently we have too few experienced gunners. By nightfall our line is restored. Daily ammunition expenditure of the corps 200 tons. Casualties still 300 per day. This cannot go on much longer. Have requested 2,000 replacements, also 120 tons additional ammunition per day.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 4

The Pocket Moves South
General Stemmerman quickly realized the seriousness of the situation. Only quick and decisive action could save the situation from becoming a major disaster. The forces in the pocket would have to be rescued soon, but first the pocket would have to hold firm. The establishment of new fronts was initiated at possible breakout points, mostly along the southern edge of the pocket. The pocket was extended to the south by 11th Corps, with the objective of capturing the key villages of Shenderovka, Novaya-Buda and Komarovka. The focal point of all activity was Korsun, which lay in the centre of the pocket and provided the pocket's only airfield. Here supplies were flown in and casualties flown out, by up to 70 aircraft per day, as the weather permitted. It was the only contact that the German forces had with the outside of the pocket, with the exception of radio communications. Korsun, had to be kept out of the range of the Russian artillery,despite heavy losses in defensive engagements.


9 February Generals Zhukov, Konev, and Vatutin have sent an emissary, a Russian lieutenant colonel, who arrived with driver, interpreter, and bugler at the position of Task Force B to present surrender terms for Stemmermann and myself. He is treated to champagne and cigarettes, receives no reply. Ultimatum remains unanswered.
Forces for breakout dwindle from day to day. Inquiry from Army High Command about Leon Degrelle, commander of Brigade Wallonien. He is a young man, Belgian; I saw him a few days ago among his men. They are likeable fellows, but apparently too soft for this business.
10 February: My old division commander of 1940, General von Seydlitz [Ed.: Captured at Stalingrad by the Russians. Thereafter leader of the National Committee "Free Germany" composed of German officers in Russian hands.] today sent me a long letter delivered by aircraft: He thinks I should act like Yorck during the campaign of 1812 and go over to the Russians with my entire command. I did not answer.
Army inquires whether breakout in direction Morentsy still feasible, or whether the operation should rather be directed via Dzhurzhentsy-Pochapintsy toward Lisyanka. Reply to Army: "Lisyanka preferable if Breith [III Panzer Corps] can reach it. Situation on east front critical. Several enemy penetrations. For the past forty-eight hours XI Corps unable to establish new defense line. Troops badly depleted and battle-weary. XLII Corps front intact. We are attacking south of Steblev. Serious danger if east front cannot be brought to a halt. XLII Corps will break through in direction Lisyanka. The troops are well in hand. Early advance of Breith toward Lisyanka decisive."
Reply from Army: "Thanks for comprehensive information. In full accord concerning new direction of breakout. Breith will attack 11 February in direction of Lisyanka. Will do all we can. Good luck."
Seydlitz today sent me fifty German prisoners with letters to their commanders; in addition they are supposed to persuade their comrades to go over to the enemy. I cannot understand Seydlitz. Although the events at Stalingrad must have changed him completely, I am unable to see how he can now work as a sort of G-2 for Zhukov.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 5

The Pocket is Reduced

On the 12th of February, Korsun was abandoned, along with its precious airfield. Almost 3000 wounded men were left behind there with medics to await capture by the Russians. No further supplies were received or wounded airlifted out after this date. On the 13th, inside the pocket, the 105th Regiment took 240 prisoners and destroyed 21 tanks in an assault on the village of Komarovka, but suffered heavy losses maintaining control of the town. On 14 February elements of XLII Corps succeeded in taking Khilki and Komarovkatwo to three miles west of Shenderovka, and thus reached a favorable jump-off line for the final break-through. It was high time indeed: The gradual restricting of the pocket had resulted in a dangerous massing of troops. The entire German-held area was now within range of the Soviet artillery; volume and intensity of enemy fire seemed to be merely a question of how much ammunition the Russians were willing to expend. It was feared that at any moment German casualties might amount to an unbearable level. The Russians themselves, however, were hampered by snowstorms and poor road conditions and could not use their artillery to full advantage. Thus the German troops inside the pocket were able to rally for their last effort.
The 3rd Panzer Corps is Halted
On the 15th of February, Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Corps made one last push from their bridgehead on the Gniloy Tikich, to capture Hill 239, northwest of the river. The area of the hill was held by elements from the 6th Tank and 27th Armies. But by this time the Russians had prepared strong defensive positions and were continually being reinforced. Despite their best efforts the tanks of the 1st and 17th Panzer Divisions were unable to capture the hill, their advance grinding to halt along a line formed by the towns of Lysianka, Oktyabr and Chishintsy, about 12km short of the objective.
This meant that the men trapped in the pocket would have to fight their way out against Russian infantry supported by armour, in that was holding off the 3rd Panzer Corps efforts to break through. well prepared positions. The Russians occupied two sets of positions, the inner ring facing Group Stemmerman and an outer ring
On the same day 8th Army issued new orders to the forces trapped in the pocket, 'Group Stemmerman must perform a breakthrough as far as Zhurzintsy/Hill 239 by its own effort. There it will link up with the 3rd Panzer Corps.'
However the message did not clarify that Hill 239 was still in Russian hands.
Stemmerman concluded from the message that friendly forces held the hill. He immediately began preparations for the breakout. Stemmerman would remain with the rearguard troops and General Lieb would lead the breakout. Once it began, however, there would be little communication between units. Local commanders retained strong discipline among individual units.


13 February Another message from General von Seydlitz, this time addressed to the commander of the 198th Division. Not bad: they think we are stronger than we really are. The letter was attached as usual to a black, red, and white pennant [German colors] and dropped from a plane. These people never fail to find my headquarters.
Breakout further delayed because of heavy enemy attacks against XI Corps' east front. Radio message to Army: "Concentration for breakout prevented by heavy Russian flank attacks and final mopping up at Shenderovka. Will shorten east front, involving evacuation of Korsun, during night of 13-14 February. Forces thereby released will not be available for breakout before 15 February. Intend to continue attack throughout 14 February. Breakthrough of Breith's armored force toward Petrovskoye indispensable to success."

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 6

Time magazine Feb 21 1944
The Red Army tightened its coils around charred, desolate Korsun early this week choked the town off. In the surrounding area, the remnants of ten German divisions still fought, still hoped. But hope was running low. They were pressed in so tightly that all their airfields were under artillery fire. German transports with food and ammunition occasionally broke through with dropped deliveries, but Russian fighter pilots intercepted most of the lumbering air freighters and shot them down.
To the southeast, on the soggy approaches to Nikopol, five other divisions were Still desperately fighting their way down to the Black Sea. They were harried by the low-flying Stormoviks and pursued through the thick, black mud by Russian mobile columns. For many a German soldier the icy Dnieper was the end.
Other German defeats in other areas impended:
> At Krivoi Rog, where the Red Army was closing in on the last great Nazi hedgehog in the Dnieper loop.
> South of captured Shepetovka, where the Reds were now only 55 miles from the German "escape road" from Odessa to Warsaw. A five-day offensive netted the Russians a 41-mile advance, 800 towns and villages, including Luga.
> In the north, where the Russians were only 40 miles from Pskov, the main support of the German defense system in the region.
More painful to the Germans than all this promise of trouble was the loss of the great captured empire which was to feed Germany's factories and her people. Gone were the oil of the Caucasus, the wheat of the Ukraine, the coal of the Donets basin. Now, at Nikopol, the Germans lost more than half of the manganese used by their industry. When the iron of Kirvoi Rog is lost, Hitler's fond dream of military and economic self-sufficiency in Russia would come to an end.

15 February
Our pocket is now so small that I can practically look over the entire front from my command post, when it is not snowing. Enemy aircraft are hard at work; lucky for us it is snowing most of the time. I was once more at Khilki to reconnoiter the terrain selected for the breakout. Then issued final order. Since this morning there is trouble at the SS Division. The Walloons and the Germania Regiment are getting fidgety. They must hold only until tomorrow night.
Final instructions from Stemmermann: We are to jump off on 16 February at 2300, with Task Force B. 72d Division, and SS Panzer Division Wiking from Khilki-Komarovka across the line Dzhurzhentsy-Hill 239 to Lisyanka; 57th and 88th Divisions will cover the flanks and the rear.
With me, at my command post, are the three division commanders with whom I am supposed to perform the miracle tomorrow. One of them is doing this for the first time, the two others are old hands.
I left no doubt in their minds that, in my opinion, this is going to be one giant snafu, and that they should not get rattled, no matter what happens. You need a guardian angel to bring you through this kind of thing.
Have given my second mount to my G-3. His Panje horse will be used by the G-2.
16 February Ample supply of ammunition dropped in aerial delivery containers as late as last night. In this respect we are now well off? if we can take it along.
After consulting Stemmermann I decided to hand over to the Russians some 2,000 wounded together with medical personnel and one doctor from each division. This is a bitter decision, but to take them along would mean their certain death.
Saw Stemmermann once more to say good-bye. My orderly takes my diary; he is a crafty fellow and will get it through somehow.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 7

BREAKOUT ORDER OF XLII CORPS
On the evening of 15 February, at his command post at Shenderovka, the commander of XLII Corps had issued verbal and written instructions to his division commanders. The breakout order for XLII Corps read, in part, as follows:
For days the enemy has been attacking continuously along our entire defense perimeter, with tanks and infantry, in an attempt to split up the pocket and destroy our forces.
At 2300, on 16 February, Task Force B. 72d Division, and 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking will attack in a southwesterly direction from the line Khilki-Komarovka, break the enemy's resistance by a bayonet assault, and throw him back in continuous attack toward the southwest, in order to reach Lisyanka and there to join forces with elements of III Panzer Corps. Compass number 22 [Ed.: The magnetic compass carried by the German soldier had 32 consecutively numbered gradations. Number 22 equals an azimuth of about 236°.] indicates the general direction of the attack. This direction is to be made known to each individual soldier. The password is: "Freedom" [Freiheit].
For the attack and breakout each division will be organized in five successive waves, as follows: First wave: one infantry regiment reinforced by one battery of light artillery (at least eight horses per gun, plus spare teams) and one engineer company. Second wave: antitank and assault gun units. Third wave: remainder of infantry (minus one battalion), engineers, and light artillery. Fourth wave: all our wounded that are fit to be transported, accompanied by one infantry battalion. Fifth wave: supply and service units.
The rear guard, under the direct command of General Stemmermann, will be formed by the 57th and 88th Divisions, which will protect the rear and the flanks of the forces launching the breakout attack. By 2300 on 16 February, the rear guard divisions will withdraw from their present locations to a previously determined defense line; further withdrawals will be ordered by General Stemmermann, depending on the progress of the breakout.
The entire medium artillery and certain specifically designated units of light artillery will support the attack. They will open fire at 2300 on 16 February, making effective use of their maximum range. Subsequently, all artillery pieces are to be destroyed in accordance with special instructions.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 8

THE BREAKOUT
During the operation that was to follow, two separate phases could be clearly distinguished. At first everything went according to plan. In the proper sequence and under perfect control, the troops moved into position at night, despite the most difficult road and weather conditions. As they were compressed into a narrow area, unit after unit had to be channeled across the only existing bridge at Shenderovka which was under heavy enemy fire.
The bayonet assault started on schedule. The complete surprise of the enemy demonstrated that the attack had been properly timed. Without much action, and suffering but few casualties, the German breakout force penetrated the enemy lines and in a relatively short time reached the vicinity of Lisyanka. On the opposite front of the pocket the rear guards held fast and thus assured the success of the initial breakout.
The second phase, the evacuation of the remaining pocket force, rapidly deteriorated into a wild surge toward the west. Following closely behind the successful spearhead, altogether about 30,000 men broke through the Russian lines in front of the pocket. At daybreak, however, they ran into an unsuspected enemy front of antitank guns, tanks, and artillery, located on the line Dzhurzhentsy-Pochapintsy.
General Konev, now realizing that the Germans were escaping, was enraged and then resolved to keep his promise to Stalin not to let any “Hitlerites” or “Fascists” escape annihilation. Soviet intelligence, however, at this stage vastly overestimated the armored strength of III Panzerkorps, and Konev therefore proceeded in force. At this time the 20th Tank Corps brought its brigade of the new Joseph Stalin-2’s to the Korsun battlefield.[50] Konev ordered all available armor and artillery to attack the escaping units, cut them into isolated groups and then destroy them piecemeal.[51] The two blocking Soviet infantry divisions, 206th Rifle and 5th Guards Airborne, had been smashed by the German assault forces; without infantry support Soviet tanks then fired into the escaping formations from a distance. Sensing that no anti-tank weapons were in the field, T-34s commenced to wade into unprotected support troops, headquarters units, stragglers and red-cross identified medical columns with their wounded charges.[
Under massed enemy fire, enemy tank attacks, and infantry counterthrusts, the German force was split into numerous small groups, each attempting on its own to get through to the west wherever there might be a possibility. Their guns, tank destroyers, and heavy weapons, which up to now had been dragged along laboriously through snowdrifts and over broken terrain, had to be left behind and were destroyed after the last round of ammunition had been fired. Here too, as the last vehicles were blown up, the wounded taken along at the insistence of their comrades had to be left to their fate.
Meanwhile a new complication arose that was to have disastrous consequences. Subjected to heavy enemy fire, counterthrusts, and armored attacks, the great mass of German troops breaking out of the pocket had deviated from their original direction of attack. No longer did they advance according to plan toward the area northwest of Pochapintsy. Instead of approaching the forward rescue position established by III Panzer Corps, they passed by at a considerable distance farther south. Here, their advance to the west was blocked by the course of the Gniloy Tikich, the enemy holding the near bank of the river. There were no crossings, nor had III Panzer Corps established any bridgeheads, since a link-up in that area had not been foreseen.

 

[redhugh]

Re: Korsun Pocket 9

The Gniloy Tikich River
By late morning, the escaping troops of Group Stemmerman had reached the bank of the Gniloy Tikich River. The early thaw had raised the level of the river and increased its flow into a roaring torrent, which now blocked their way. The waterway was 30 yards wide and about six feet deep. There was no bridge to be seen and crossing it seemed impossible.
Unknown to the group, about a mile to the northwest, the 1st Panzer division had a bridge under their control and the engineers of the Jena Armoured Engineer Battalion had also erected a smaller footbridge.
As the first arrivals milled around the river, the first T-34's appeared in the distance. Firing high-explosive shells and ricocheting airbursts, they caused panic. For many, the choice was clear. They would either have to brave the strong current or die where they stood.
Whole groups of men jumped in and began to try to cross. Many were swept away by the current, or dragged under by the weight of their uniforms and drowned. Men began to strip in order to improve their chances of survival. However those who reached the other side were suffering terribly from the cold, the temperature that morning was -5°C. The men still had over a mile to walk through the snow before they reached the safety of the German lines.

The crossings continued throughout the day. Rear guard units of the Group pulled out successfully and made the crossing. By the end of the 16th, most of the fighting at the river had ended and the majority of the survivors from the pocket were across. The German lines had been straightened and nearly 35,000 of the original 56,000 men were saved. Over 10,000 men were killed and another 17,000 captured.

While the Russians had not succeeded in destroying the two Corps trapped in the pocket, they had successfully neutralized the fighting ability of over six German divisions. Most of the men rescued had no weapons and all their heavy equipment had been abandoned. German forces had lost their foothold along the Dnepr. Their absence had an immediate effect upon the defensive effort of Army Group South which was trying to counter heavy Russian attacks aimed at a break-through in the Uman area. The Russian forces would regroup and prepare for a new offensive during the summer. Operation Bagration, against German Army Group Centre, Soon the entire southern sector was split wide open and the German Sixth and Eighth Armies were pushed across the Yuzhny Bug (Ukrainian Bug River) into Romania

 

[Phantom Warrior]

Very nice. Now I'm jealous. You have the new JS-2 and some of the old K&C Russian pieces.

Good mix of K&C, HB and Figarti along with the buildings and rubble.

Terry

 

[UKReb]

Absolutely beautiful work-Has to be amongst the very best WWII dioramic scenes I have seen put together. Stunning museum quality-a triumph!

Reb

 

[panda1gen]

Absolutely beautiful work-Has to be the very best WWII dioramic scenes I have seen put together. Stunning museum quality-a triumph!

Reb

Brilliant stuff, it takes a lot of work to put something like that together, thanks for posting.

 

[Rob]

Stunning work,really first class,wonderful scenes and great info,congratulations mate you must be very proud of this.

Rob

 

[wwiibuff]

Wow! That's one huge diorama and a massive collection of great pieces. That must have taken quite a while to put together. Great stuff. Thanks for posting.

 

[jazzeum]

I haven't read the text yet, which I'm going to print out, but this is extremely well done. You get a feel for the coldness of winter. Makes you want to slide deeper into the covers

 

[wayne556517]

Thats brilliant mate be one of the best dio,s/story,s ive seen on the forum good to see the mixture of company,s they all go great together thanks for posting great effort.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Very very well done!

 

[Cyber Field Marshall]

Excellent diodrama! You have a marvellous collection ( and very expensive ) and you've put a wide variety of pieces from many companies together exquisitely. I have enjoyed your latest work. Thanks for sharing, your passion for the history of the Eastern Front is awesome. I hope other manufacturers and collectors see this display and are inspired to create more pieces for this theatre and that more people will appreciate them and purchase them for their collection. Keep up the good work.

 

[mestell]

Great story, absolutely fantastic photography. I got cold viewing it.
Mike

 

[The Lt.]

You lads from across the pond really know how to tell a story not only in words but as your figures bring it to life.....The Lt.