The Civil War Thread (4 Viewers)

[chiefs70]

Not to hijack the thread but I've been to Pea Ridge and it is a fascinating and much overlooked battle/battleground. It is one of the best preserved battlefields in America and is a fantastic place to visit if you are in the area.

 

[maddadicus]

Being convinced that he was always outnumbered, despite all intelligence to the contrary, is just further evidence of "the Little Napoleon's" incompetence. As far as Lee is concerned, I don't think he was gambling - he knew he was up against incompetents and he exploited that advantage. Lee was talented enough that a young Erwin Rommel studied his tactics. As great a general as Lee was, even considering the incredibly poor quality of Union Generals for the first couple of years of the war, he faced virtually insurmountable odds. The Union had all the railroads, an unlimited supply of men (the Union never had more than 10% of its male population in arms at any point during the War), all the industry, virtually the entire Navy. The fact that Lee kept the South in the war as long as he did, and even had a chance of winning, is a testament to his greatness as a general.

Unfortunately for Lee, he gambled once, and crapped out, at Gettysburg. Pickett's Charge was an insane gamble built on an over-estimation of his men's capabilities. If you've been kicking the heck out of players who are incredible poorly coached, that doesn't make your players superstars, or prove that the other players lack talent. It makes the other players poorly coached, nothing more, nothing less. By letting himself believe that his men would always win, and were just so much better than Union troops that they could overcome all odds and take Cemetary Ridge, just because they had not lost in the past, Lee himself made a huge coaching mistake, and it cost him the whole shooting match. That doesn't take away from the fact that he was a great General, but it does mean he made one fatal mistake and went down in history as one of the greatest generals to lose a war.

My take on Robert Lee was that he was one part of a magnificent 2 headed monster with Stonewall being the other half..Lee was the master carpenter with Jackson as the sledge hammer. I felt that without Jackson, Lee was never the great general that history portrays him..Look at Lee's decisions after the loss of Stonewall..When left to his own council ,the Army of Northern Virginia was never really a factor ,for the remainder of the war...Michael

 

[UKReb]

My take on Robert Lee was that he was one part of a magnificent 2 headed monster with Stonewall being the other half..Lee was the master carpenter with Jackson as the sledge hammer. I felt that without Jackson, Lee was never the great general that history portrays him..Look at Lee's decisions after the loss of Stonewall..When left to his own council ,the Army of Northern Virginia was never really a factor ,for the remainder of the war...Michael

Can't argue with that Michael, however, the mighty Confederate duo didn't always pull it off; just take Antietam; Lee and Jackson's lines on that third day were spread periously thin and Lee had no more reserves to combat Burnside (who was finally over his bridge) and about to strike the Confederate right.
A very anxious time for Lee until the timely and providential arrival of AP Hill and his Division from Harper's Ferry. Hill and his men arrived in the best American tradition, like the cavalry, and quite literally saved the day for "the magnificent two headed monster" from a situation that had every possibilty of being turned into a Confederate rout.
Reb

 

[Captain]

Well Gentlemen I'm finally going to dive into this thread. Let me first introduce myself by saying that I am a devout Southerner, A Camp Lt. Commander of the Sons Of Confederate Veterans, A long time enthusiast of the War of Northern Aggression, a commanding officer in a four (full size) gun Confederate artillery reenacting unit and, a born and bred Virginian. That being said, I shall permit you to draw your own conclusions as to where my sympathies lay.
Now to Sharpsburg; UK Reb, dont forget, A.P.Hill and his boys belonged to Jackson, and were acting on his orders. But that was not the first time on that terrible day that the Gray line had been pierced. It was at least the third but still they held their ground.

 

[Captain]

I would like to bring up one other point here that has been either overlooked or I missed reading. In order for the South to have won the war, they did not have to "conquer" the North. They merely had to be permitted to leave the union. To do that they had to make the U.S. lose its desire to continue the struggle. That was still a possibility in my mind until the later part of 1864. Remember there were large peace and draft riots in most of the major Northern cities. According to Jubal Early that is one of the reasons that Grant and Lincoln continuely lied about there losses, especially in the 1864 "overland campaign". If the Northern people would have known the actual losses in federal troops the peace fires would have really been fueled. Also if Davis was half the politician that Lincoln was there may have been a different outcome as well.
Let me qualify something here before ya'll think I'm a fanatical secesionist. It seems to me that all great countries have to be forged in blood. The USA certainly has been. I am proud to be an American and issues such as how big a Government should be which was the issue in 1861 is still an issue today. I am glad to live in a country where I can openly question my Government and its history.

 

[Tex]

Here's a question that always confused me

I seem to recall that in the Texas Treaty of Annexation, Texas was granted the ability to secede if it wanted to. If this were the case, why was Texas re-admitted to the union after the Civil War? He we been independent for the past 140 years and just not known it?

 

[Captain]

It's my understanding that the founding documents for the country granted the right to secede to all the states. I think it was Mass. that had considered secesion in the 1830s maybe.

 

[jazzeum]

The answer is that it unilaterally does not not. Here's an interesting article about the ability to secede.

 

[Shiloh]

Hi Brad a very interesting article. One of the best papers I have seen. It is all based on an 1868 Supreme Court decision that was definitely influenced by the war; it was not interrupted that way before then. I actually thought the writer did a very good job of discussing the pros and cons and even pointed out the facts of when the constitution was violated. But the sad thing is it could be interrupted differently in 2008 or later if the case was reopened. Just as they are now discussing the 2nd amendment right to bear arms.

 

[Capitolron]

If the Supreme Court drops the current view of the Second Amendment - Talk about a Civil War !

 

[Tex]

A good article! Thanks for posting that. I had never heard about Texas vs. White.

 

[Peter Reuss]

I would like to bring up one other point here that has been either overlooked or I missed reading. In order for the South to have won the war, they did not have to "conquer" the North. They merely had to be permitted to leave the union. To do that they had to make the U.S. lose its desire to continue the struggle. That was still a possibility in my mind until the later part of 1864. Remember there were large peace and draft riots in most of the major Northern cities. According to Jubal Early that is one of the reasons that Grant and Lincoln continuously lied about there losses, especially in the 1864 "overland campaign". If the Northern people would have known the actual losses in federal troops the peace fires would have really been fueled. Also if Davis was half the politician that Lincoln was there may have been a different outcome as well.

Which raises the question...was Gettysburg (or any invasion of the north) necessary? If the goal was to make the north get fed up with war and give up, wouldn't it have been better to just let the Union batter itself against the Confederate defenses over and over again, sustaining large losses and accomplishing nothing? It seems to me that by invading the north they ran the risk of galvanizing sentiment against the 'invaders.'

The problems remained in the Confederate losses in the western theater. If someone could have held Sherman at bay (and away from Atlanta), would Lincoln have been re-elected?

This is where politics and war mixed...since the end of the war for the Confederacy didn't need to be a military one.

 

[Shiloh]

The south had to attempt something to relieve the pressure in the Western Theater. Tennessee and Corinth Miss (major rail hub) gone, Vicksburg under seige. The Confederate states were about to be torn in two. A series of non-effective leaders and ghastly blunders had cost the Confederates their second largest agriculture state, a major east west railroad and one of the souths largest war production cities. To loose the Miss River would surely spell doom. In my opinion the invasion had 2 goals a quick decisive blow to turn Northern public opinion against the war and barring that to draw Grants army back North for defense. My question is why wasn't a more effective CSA Western commander ever found? The top Confederate leadership in the West were as inept as the Union Leadership in the East. That would make a lively debate who stunk the worse and why?

 

[UKReb]

My question is why wasn't a more effective CSA Western commander ever found? The top Confederate leadership in the West were as inept as the Union Leadership in the East. That would make a lively debate who stunk the worse and why?

Gary, Peter and myself started to discuss this on Peter's post East vs West and I agree it's a very good debating point and I believe you can start right at the top with Jeff Davis.
His selection of Generals apart from Lee was appalling. In the fall of 1861 he ignited a firestorm of resentment when he sent to the Confederate Congress his first ranking of five full generals. Earlier that year Congress had passed a law that named a full general as the highest rank in the army; an individual's previously held rank in the US Army was to be used as the criterion for placement in the Confederate Army.
Davis's list named Samuel Cooper as senior, followed by Albert S Johnston, Robert E Lee, Joseph E Johnston, and Beauregard. In assigning the ranking, Davis completely ignored the guidelines set by Congress. As a result Joe Johnston was so enraged he couldn't speak for two days; he felt he had been insulted and his military ability questioned, he was the only man in the Confederate army to have held a permanent brigadiers rank in the US Army and had no doubt that his name should-by his military record and supported by Confederate law-be at the top of the Davis's list but despite the protests Davis did not change the ranking. This incident started the rot between the two men and neither man ever trusted the other again which led to dire consequences for the Confederacy especially in the Western theatre.

In the West Davis relied heavily on Albert S Johnston to command the whole army, Davis had served with Johnston in the Mexican War and admired him almost to the point of hero worship. Johnston did his best but was not the military genius that Davis believed him to be, during the winter of 61-62 Johnston's front in the west rapidly collapsed-fall of Nashville and the surrender of Fort Donelson fueled a public outcry in Richmond-who after the victory in the East at First Manassas expected the same results in the West. Davis realised he had to do something to "retrieve our waning fortunes in the West" then came the battle of Shiloh; the first reports back to Richmond was of a resounding Confederate victory albeit tempered with news of the death of Johnston. Davis, although extremely saddened by his hero's death, believed this was the turning point of Confederate fortune in the West; but as we all know Beauregard (another Davis appointment) did not follow up the assault on the second day and dropped the ball which he continued to regularly do so for the rest of the war.
The above is only my opinion but is why I believe JD is a good starting point for a debate on Gary's comments because the candidates for "worst stinker in the West" just keep getting worse after that.
Reb

 

[Shiloh]

I can not for the life of me figure out why Albert S Johnston did not attempt to attack Grant at Fort Donelson. Fort Henry had been taken the previous week he knew the Union was there in force and yet sat 60 miles away at Nashville while Grant's troops attacked the Fort for 3 days. 15000 troops lost while he did nothing and then abandoned Nashville without taking supplies or destroying the foundries and stores. It was a mistake that would be replayed over and over again in the west. The Union forces would show up seige the fortifications and eventually the Rebels would surrender or retreat. Not once was the hammer and anvil approach attempted by the Confederates. An army cannot stay when confronted by an entrenched enemy with another force approaching. That is a called between a rock and a hard place, fighting on two fronts at the same time while your back is against a river and yet Grant's forces did this at Ft Donelson, Corinth, Vicksburg, and Atlanta and pulled it off everytime. Bragg tried it at Chatanooga and failed because Grant did react correctly. Some people say A.S. Johnston was the best commander on either side I totally disagree he made bad decisions and paid with his life. The best General on either side was Grant. In my opinion.

 

[Capitolron]

I have always believed that the Confederate Commanders in the West lacked AGGRESSION. Grant was the definition of aggression - "hit them with everything you got" type command.

Lee - IMHO - had the smarts to take advantage of the aggressive nature of his Generals in his command.

 

[Saber]

I'm not sure any general could have won a decisive victory in the West. Lee afterall won a series of victories in the East but to no avail. With each victory the Souths ability to carry on was diminished in the strategic sense. As was pointed out on another thread the idea of one big battle to decide everything had proved to be wrong. I think the Southern generals should have studied Washington more than Napoleon(sorry Ron). IMHO every year they kept their force in the field and DENIED the enemy his chance for a conclusive demoralizing victory was the key to success. Britain didn't so much as lose the AWI as give up.

Any opinions as to what happens if the summer of 63' finds Meade chasing Lee through the charred remains of PA? (think Sherman) Wasn't PA a breadbasket state for the Union? If the Winter of 63-64 finds the North a little cold and hungry maybe Lincolns prospects for reelection aren't so great the following year. Draft riots in New York etc.
War tends to lose its luster when its your home thats being burned down and your cities and towns being destroyed. Granted, this usually does not work as often the populations will to resist can grow but that is usually when someone is trying to dominate you, not what the South was trying to do. Perhaps our good friends up North might have decided it wasn't worth the effort to hold onto the South?

Well, we are all friends now.

 

[UKReb]

I'm not sure any general could have won a decisive victory in the West. Lee afterall won a series of victories in the East but to no avail. With each victory the Souths ability to carry on was diminished in the strategic sense. As was pointed out on another thread the idea of one big battle to decide everything had proved to be wrong. I think the Southern generals should have studied Washington more than Napoleon(sorry Ron). IMHO every year they kept their force in the field and DENIED the enemy his chance for a conclusive demoralizing victory was the key to success. Britain didn't so much as lose the AWI as give up.

Any opinions as to what happens if the summer of 63' finds Meade chasing Lee through the charred remains of PA? (think Sherman) Wasn't PA a breadbasket state for the Union? If the Winter of 63-64 finds the North a little cold and hungry maybe Lincolns prospects for reelection aren't so great the following year. Draft riots in New York etc.
War tends to lose its luster when its your home thats being burned down and your cities and towns being destroyed. Granted, this usually does not work as often the populations will to resist can grow but that is usually when someone is trying to dominate you, not what the South was trying to do. Perhaps our good friends up North might have decided it wasn't worth the effort to hold onto the South?

Well, we are all friends now.

I believe you are correct when you state that no general could have won a decisive victory in the West. But how about an Admiral?

The Union domination and final victory in the West began with Halleck recognising that the common denominator for a strategic Western victory were the waterways. The control of the Tennessee & Cumberland Rivers led to the Union successes in the Trans/Mississippi theatre. Grant also understood this when he told Lincoln that he needed an admiral rather than a general to gain overall victory. But a fully effective Confederate Navy including a fleet of powerful river gun-boats never seriously crossed the radar screen of Davis or his Administration even though the Mississippi was a blaringly obvious division of the two halves of the Confederate States. A missed opportunity of stemming if not completely eliminating the Reb rot in the West!

.......the charred remains of PA! That was the strategy for wearing down the North favoured by Jackson- and a full 2 years before Sherman so effectively used it in the South- but in 1862 this was still a "gentleman's war" and Jackson's theory of hitting Northern cities/ransack/burn and run which would have brought the war to the backyards of Northern civilians instead of Virginians would not be tolerated by the Confederate government.

Instead they concentrated on military offensives and when necesssary defensives in the East-but if one is super critical about the results of Lee's victories at The Seven Days; 2nd Manassas; Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and put them into a strategic perspective, one could then ask-Did he ever rout the AOP?-No; Did he ever utterly destroy the AOP?-No; Was he ever in a position to follow up these victories and seriously attack Washington?-No. What they did do however, was boost Southern morale (which was sorely needed with the West going down the tube) and it definitely lowered Northern morale and the mere threat to Washington was enough to send Northern officials- including half of Lincoln's administration- into blind panic.

Subsequently the ultimate failure of the Confederacy can be attributed to it's inability to translate tactical success into strategic victory (very similar to the Germans who in two World Wars were masters of operational tactics but suffered strategic incompetence). As good as Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were they were never sufficiently better than the Army of the Potomac to deliver that killer punch which was imperative for the strategy the Confederacy adopted to be successful.

A final comment on Well we are all friends now:- as a Brit and a little unfair for me to judge I have no doubt you're right and will take your word on it. However, what I will say is that I have majored on this war as my main discipline for more years than I care to remember and it is my opinion that no other war in history has generated more "What ifs" than the Civil War has. And those questions continue unabated today as they have done for the past 150 years.

Reb

 

[Peter Reuss]

I

.......the charred remains of PA! That was the strategy for wearing down the North favoured by Jackson- and a full 2 years before Sherman so effectively used it in the South- but in 1862 this was still a "gentleman's war" and Jackson's theory of hitting Northern cities/ransack/burn and run which would have brought the war to the backyards of Northern civilians instead of Virginians would not be tolerated by the Confederate government.

Instead they concentrated on military offensives and when necesssary defensives in the East-but if one is super critical about the results of Lee's victories at The Seven Days; 2nd Manassas; Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and put them into a strategic perspective, one could then ask-Did he ever rout the AOP?-No; Did he ever utterly destroy the AOP?-No; Was he ever in a position to follow up these victories and seriously attack Washington?-No. What they did do however, was boost Southern morale (which was sorely needed with the West going down the tube) and it definitely lowered Northern morale and the mere threat to Washington was enough to send Northern officials- including half of Lincoln's administration- into blind panic.

Subsequently the ultimate failure of the Confederacy can be attributed to it's inability to translate tactical success into strategic victory (very similar to the Germans who in two World Wars were masters of operational tactics but suffered strategic incompetence). As good as Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were they were never sufficiently better than the Army of the Potomac to deliver that killer punch which was imperative for the strategy the Confederacy adopted to be successful.

Reb

I'm in the middle of reading Crucible of War by Fred Anderson. It's about the 7 Years War, but this commentary on George Washington I think applies here:

Washington had grasped the most significant lessons that the wilderness war had to offer: that to win campaigns, or presumably even the war itself, one need not necessarily with battles; that, indeed, to win a battle at the wrong time or in the wrong way could lead to failure in the larger realm of conflict. Any number of tactical defeats could be compensated for by merely retaining discipline and maintaining one's force in the field longer than one's enemy.


While this of course applies not only to the French & Indian War and American Revolution, are there not aspects of this which apply to Lee as well? He won battles, but in doing so lost troops he could not replace. So winning battles, while good for morale, in the end did not save the Confederacy. The Union was allowed to retain discipline and keep a force in the field for a longer period of time, winning them the war.

 

[UKReb]

I'm in the middle of reading Crucible of War by Fred Anderson. It's about the 7 Years War, but this commentary on George Washington I think applies here:

Washington had grasped the most significant lessons that the wilderness war had to offer: that to win campaigns, or presumably even the war itself, one need not necessarily with battles; that, indeed, to win a battle at the wrong time or in the wrong way could lead to failure in the larger realm of conflict. Any number of tactical defeats could be compensated for by merely retaining discipline and maintaining one's force in the field longer than one's enemy.


While this of course applies not only to the French & Indian War and American Revolution, are there not aspects of this which apply to Lee as well? He won battles, but in doing so lost troops he could not replace. So winning battles, while good for morale, in the end did not save the Confederacy. The Union was allowed to retain discipline and keep a force in the field for a longer period of time, winning them the war.

Interesting analogy but needs some scrutiny before aspects are applied to Lee.
Washington suffered severe set-backs in the New York and Long Island campaigns which made him realise that the American Revolution would be a long and arduous slog.
He reasoned correctly that winning the war would require the resolve to wear down the enemy into believing that the war was no longer worth the effort. His strategy ultimately boiled down to maintaining and keeping the Continental Army in the field and use it to harass/disrupt British supply lines. The strategy for the patriots worked extremely well and was ably executed with relish by Washington's outstanding lieutenant Nathaniel Greene who battered and exhausted the British army long before the French fleet bottled up Cornwallis in Yorktown.

Now can we relate that strategy to Lee in the Civil War? not really, because Lee's enemy did not have the severe handicaps that Washington's did.
Britain during the Revolution was fighting a war with France and Spain and only had a quarter of it's army committed to the Colonial war and those poor guys were fighting a war at the end of a 3000 mile supply line.

Studying both generals I have no doubt that Washington would have fought a different war than Lee did. I cannot see Washington getting embroiled in the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg (although I am sure he would have been cock-a-hoop to have had the number of men Lee had in both of those campaigns) However, like Lee he knew very well that the morale of his troops definitely required some victories. but he would have fought the war based primarily on public opinion rather than bleed his army to death and although Lee had the same idea of swinging public opinion he went about it the wrong way with a series of full scale offensive battles and ultimately lost the war.
Finally as I'm writing this I find I'm asking myself the question:- Would Washington have taken up arms against the Union? The principal founding father I have read about tells me he would have fought like a demon to keep Virginia within the Union.
Reb