UKReb
Command Sergeant Major
- Joined
- Aug 31, 2007
- Messages
- 2,436
Being convinced that he was always outnumbered, despite all intelligence to the contrary, is just further evidence of "the Little Napoleon's" incompetence. As far as Lee is concerned, I don't think he was gambling - he knew he was up against incompetents and he exploited that advantage. Lee was talented enough that a young Erwin Rommel studied his tactics. As great a general as Lee was, even considering the incredibly poor quality of Union Generals for the first couple of years of the war, he faced virtually insurmountable odds. The Union had all the railroads, an unlimited supply of men (the Union never had more than 10% of its male population in arms at any point during the War), all the industry, virtually the entire Navy. The fact that Lee kept the South in the war as long as he did, and even had a chance of winning, is a testament to his greatness as a general.
Unfortunately for Lee, he gambled once, and crapped out, at Gettysburg. Pickett's Charge was an insane gamble built on an over-estimation of his men's capabilities. If you've been kicking the heck out of players who are incredible poorly coached, that doesn't make your players superstars, or prove that the other players lack talent. It makes the other players poorly coached, nothing more, nothing less. By letting himself believe that his men would always win, and were just so much better than Union troops that they could overcome all odds and take Cemetary Ridge, just because they had not lost in the past, Lee himself made a huge coaching mistake, and it cost him the whole shooting match. That doesn't take away from the fact that he was a great General, but it does mean he made one fatal mistake and went down in history as one of the greatest generals to lose a war.
Politely passing over another of Randy's "cute" squirrel shots I'd like to bring the thread back to an interesting point Peter & Louis have raised. A similar issue was posted on another forum by maddadicus which petered out after my reply so I'll have another go here.
Lee's performance on the third day of Gettysburg is still hotly debated by military historians today. Having studied the battle for more years than I care to remember here's my 10 cents worth. Louis's elucid coaching assessment of Lee I cannot argue with, however what is missing from his comment is the dreadful performances from his experienced Officer Corps. Lee was indeeed careless at Gettysburg, his orders were vague, he suggested when he should have commanded and he sacrificed a whole infantry division when he should have realised the battle was most probably already lost, but for 3 whole days he was let down by his "star player subordinates".
Stuart and his cavalry's absence left Lee completely blind in enemy territory for almost a week.
Ambrose Powell Hill III Corps Commander was for all practical purposes AWOL-due to sickness- during the 3 days of battle.
Ewell who had taken over Jackson's II Corps and can be generously described as unimaginative thereafter threw away the victory of July 1st by not pursuing the fleeing Federals up Cemetery and Culp's hill and capturing the high ground. Jackson would not have waited for Lee's order to execute the military obvious.
And Longstreet after Lee refused his idea of a left flank manouevre acted like a petulant child on the third day with an almost fait accompli attitude that Pickett's charge had failed before it began.
Yet when Armistead breached the angle with his and the remnants of Garnett and Kemper's brigades there was just a slim chance with supporting brigades that the result could have been different. Historians write of The Hundred Days of Napoleon but they could quite easily write of The Hundred Seconds of the Confederacy because for two minutes-quite literally- with Armistead over the wall and the 71st Pennsylvanian running and the 72nd frozen, the road lay open all the way to Washington.
But the Confederate High Command appeared paralysed. Lee gave no orders whatsoever, Pickett left it awfully late to request support, and when he did Longstreet, although Early, Posey and Rodes had brigades all ready to advance, only offered Wilcox's beaten and tired brigade resting in the peach orchard and then left it to Pickett to order Wilcox to advance if required. All too late! Back at the wall during the now furious hand to hand fighting the Virginians kept looking behind them fully expecting the whole of Lee's army to be charging up the ridge in support. I can imagine a fighting man's spririt to be completely broken when they realised they were very much on their own and when the cry went up "Armistead is down" it was all over.
Did all the Reb generals just have a bad hair day? Who knows? But Lee recovered enough to perform brilliantly at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor and Longstreet's daring action won Chickamauga. Louis mentions that Lee believed his army invincible, that's true, they were when fighting on their home turf-Virginia- I believe their lies part of the answer, Lee underestimated the fighting resolve of the Union soldier when suddenly he found himself fighting to protect his home and his family from the invading Rebs.
Almost every great commander in history, even while making skillful and correct decisions while on campaign, at some inopportune time meets with disappointment and/or defeat. And so it was with Lee at Gettysburg. Adversity is the true test of an individuals spirit and the depth of a person's genius, and the personal disppointment brought about by the failure in Pennsylvania surely plagued Lee to the end of his life. But despite this outcome, the best soldier on the North American continent demonstrated anew in 1864 why any hope for the Confederacy had been and always would be on the shoulders of the one man General Winfield Scott had called "the very best soldier I ever saw in the field" Robert Edward Lee.
Reb