American civil war: the first modern war in history (3 Viewers)

[Poppo]

We can consider this war as the "first modern war" for many reasons:

for the first time were used: rifled guns with their new fire power; submarines, armored ships; torpedo boats; the use of railways for a fast troops transportation.

and new tactics like : the use of trenches as a pivot ( general Lee); a new use of cavalry as mounted troops for fast raids in small or big groups (general Forrest) or as a screen to hide the infantry' s movements to the enemy; the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructures, agricultural production, railways etc. ( general Sherman).


But amazingly the silly, stubborn, and blind ww1 generals completely forgot the ACW ' s lessons and sent hundred thousands men to be unusefully massacred in front of machine guns.

 

[Poppo]

I can add that in ACW was new the attempt to destroy or drain the enemy army instead of defending long borders or big cities.( confederate army, general Johnston)

 

[Harper (aka Spitfrnd)]

The Baker Rifle was a rifled musket used extensively in the Napoleonic Wars by British special units like the 95th and 60th Regiments. Rifled muskets were also used by the Americans in the AWI. A few (around a 100) Ferguson breech loading rifles were used in combat by the British in the AWI but never caught on. Were you thinking of breech loading rifles or rifled cannons, neither of which was in common use prior to the ACW?

 

[Scott]

The Crimean War and Franco Austrian War did use new French infantry tactics for riflemen that were available and used in the US. Telegragh, trains and steam engines were used in these conflicts. The French used several Ironclad battery ships. The Franco-Austrian War and the Crimean War showed the need for better care of wounded and prisoners that the forces in the US started to implement.

 

[larso]

"But amazingly the silly, stubborn, and blind ww1 generals completely forgot the ACW ' s lessons and sent hundred thousands men to be unusefully massacred in front of machine guns."

I read an interesting article in one of the military history magazines recently. The focus was on the Russian-Japanese war of 1904/5 (I think?) where many of the elements of WW1 were in evidence. There were many Western observers on hand to see the trench systems and barbed wire etc that the Russians used, being attacked and breached by the Japanese. Sure their casualties were high but they won. So the lesson learned was that on the 'modern' battlefield aggression was the key to victory.

 

[Poppo]

"But amazingly the silly, stubborn, and blind ww1 generals completely forgot the ACW ' s lessons and sent hundred thousands men to be unusefully massacred in front of machine guns."

I read an interesting article in one of the military history magazines recently. The focus was on the Russian-Japanese war of 1904/5 (I think?) where many of the elements of WW1 were in evidence. There were many Western observers on hand to see the trench systems and barbed wire etc that the Russians used, being attacked and breached by the Japanese. Sure their casualties were high but they won. So the lesson learned was that on the 'modern' battlefield aggression was the key to victory.

Yes, in this case the japanese attack against the russian trenches had success.This happened also because the russian army had a very bad organisation and very bad generals ( most of them spending time in bordels just behind the first line); and the moral of the russian troops was low with many desertions and rebellions while the japanese moral was high inspite of the losses; and russians had little and bad quality food.

But in ACW, the best tactic to win the trenches and the high power of fire was the defence and not the attack; and general Longstreet understood this very well. That ' s why he was rightly sceptical about the frontal attack in Gettysburg.

Also true is that some unionist commander had the correct intuition about how to break the trenches ( ex. during the Petersburg siege),many years later perfectly executed by the "wehrmacht" : the "Schwerpunkt", a big concentration of troops launched in an attack of a very limited section of trenches. In Petersburg, this new tactic failed because the attackers moved too slowly and the defenders had the time to organise a counter attack.
In ww2 the tanks solved this problem....

For all these reasons, in my opinion, there was modernity of tactics in ACW, and then in WW2. But in WW1 only mistakes were done by "mediocre" generals.

 

[theBaron]

a new use of cavalry as mounted troops for fast raids in small or big groups (general Forrest) or as a screen to hide the infantry' s movements to the enemy; the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructures, agricultural production, railways etc. ( general Sherman).

Actually, those pre-date the American Civil War. Hussars carried out those tactical duties already in the 18th century, and scorched earth was in use going back to ancient times.

Also, the Prussians were moving troops via rail in their wars in the 1860's as well, although the railways were more extensive by 1870, when the war with France broke out.

Prost!
Brad

 

[TomB]

We can consider this war as the "first modern war" for many reasons:

for the first time were used: rifled guns with their new fire power; submarines, armored ships; torpedo boats; the use of railways for a fast troops transportation.

and new tactics like : the use of trenches as a pivot ( general Lee); a new use of cavalry as mounted troops for fast raids in small or big groups (general Forrest) or as a screen to hide the infantry' s movements to the enemy; the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructures, agricultural production, railways etc. ( general Sherman).


But amazingly the silly, stubborn, and blind ww1 generals completely forgot the ACW ' s lessons and sent hundred thousands men to be unusefully massacred in front of machine guns.

Thank you for posting this Poppo....very interesting point of views expressed by all replies...a mini history lesson for me...TomB

 

[Poppo]

Thank you for posting this Poppo....very interesting point of views expressed by all replies...a mini history lesson for me...TomB

You are welcome Tom !

 

[Poppo]

Actually, those pre-date the American Civil War. Hussars carried out those tactical duties already in the 18th century, and scorched earth was in use going back to ancient times.

Also, the Prussians were moving troops via rail in their wars in the 1860's as well, although the railways were more extensive by 1870, when the war with France broke out.

Prost!
Brad

Well, cavalry raids have been done before, but not in such proportions, not so far, and not sistematically; and cavalry never was used( for what I know) as a veil to hide the infantry' s movements.
The "scorched earth" tactic was done also ex. by the russians to weacken Napoleon' s army in 1812.......But, what I meant is that an ATTACKING army destroyed sistematically all the agriculture,civilian infrastructures of the enemy to let him down.

Prost!

poppo

 

[swalterh]

I think that when we are discussing the American Civil War as the first truly modern war we have to step back and examine the war in its entirety. I believe that it was truly the first modern war in that it brought many of the modern military technologies and concepts into practice on a truly continental level for the first time. It is true that many of the technologies utilized in the Civil War were used in prior conflicts. It is also true that many of the tactics and strategies were utilized prior to the Civil War as well. But, when we look at the progress of the war, we see the development of what started out as a localized, “90 day” affair evolve into the first instance of total war on a continental level where the objective of the North was to completely destroy and subjugate not only the government and military establishment of the Confederacy, but their entire society as well.

The American Civil War firmly established the “American” way of war. That is to seek the complete and utter destruction of one’s opponent. Unconditional Surrender was a notion that was forged at Forts’ Henry and Donelson and the concept was cultivated and executed throughout the American political and military establishment right up through WWII and one might argue the end of the Cold War.

Grant and Sherman truly were the first modern generals. They utilized maneuver on an operational as well as tactical level to accomplish strategic objectives. Sherman’s campaign to capture Atlanta employed three armies in order to out march, if not out fight, the rebels guarding the city. Grant was the first truly strategic general in that he commanded and directed armies in multiple operational theatres towards one strategic object. Not even Napoleon could exercise the level of strategic effectiveness that the Union armies were able to achieve in the final stage of the war. The emperor was entirely dependent upon his own skills and abilities in order to win campaigns because he did not cultivate subordinates who were capable of independent action. The British and their allies were able to pound his Marshals on the Peninsula and the Trachenberg Plan finally brought the Empire to its knees in Germany and France. For the sparing moments of the fighting at Waterloo where the Emperor was taken ill, Marshal Ney arguably squandered the best hopes for a French victory.

In the German Wars of Unification, Moltke only had to be concerned with one key operational theatre in each of his Campaigns thanks to the shrewd diplomatic efforts of Bismarck. It is true that in the Austro-Prussian war, the Prussians were forced to conduct operations against Austria’s German allies, but the lesser German states were effectively subdued with minimal if not bungling effort. Praise should be given to the Hanoverians for their valiant efforts at Langensalza, but the fate of Germany was decided in Bohemia at Koeniggratz between the Austro-Saxons and the Prussian Machine. The contest between the Prussians and the French a few years later was anticlimactic. Again the focus of the conflict was on one operational theatre. The final stage of the war devolved into siege operations around Paris and some mopping up expeditions against scattered and inadequate republican forces. The result of the conflict was the total collapse of the army and Empire of Napoleon III, but the peace settlement saw the withdrawal of the German military, leaving French society and national identity intact with minimal requisition of French territory.

It is interesting that the long range cavalry raids conducted during the Civil War were in effect the precursor to the modern air bombardment campaigns of the Second World War. These raids allowed the Union commanders to strike at the Confederacy’s strategic center of gravity without having to commit entire field armies to the task. In Grant’s writings he repeatedly mentions operational designs against the iron works at Mobile, Alabama and many efforts were made against Richmond and other industrial centers. This illustrates again Grant’s truly modern military perspective by seeking to strike at and destroy the enemy’s military industrial capacity. This concept reached its culmination when the USAAF and RAF launched their air offensives against the production and oil facilities of the Third Reich and then later with the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Japan.

War is not only a contest between military establishments and governments. It is a contest between entire societies of which those institutions are a part. The American Civil War was the first war that saw military operations intentionally wagged against every element of an industrialized, modern society seeking its utter destruction by modern means and concepts. So yes, after all things are considered, the American Civil War was truly the first modern war.

 

[UKReb]

A very fine synopsis swalterh and I fully agree that Grant was a strategical genius. I find it very interesting that over the last two decades modern ACW historians have finally begun to realise what a great strategist the man from Ohio actually was. The usual denigration of Grant based primarily on his sobriquet of "Butcher" after Cold Harbor has always accompanied the deification of Lee as the great tactical strategist who was only worn down by the sheer numbers of the North. However, just recently Grant's tarred reputation has begun to ascend (as highlighted in your summary) whilst Lee's has begun to decline.

I have always been an admirer of the South's struggle for independence and Old Bobby Lee himself but as a serious student of this conflict I have realised for years now that the South could only have "won" the war by not losing it. The North could only win by winning it. Furthermore both generals were indeed aggressive but when you analyze the facts Grant's aggressiveness won the war while Lee's lost it.

I also fervently believe that Lee being a pure bred Virginian only fought for Virginia. He persuaded Davis to retain the Army of Northern Virginia for the most part of the war in Virginia and to back his two invasions of the North which were both disastrous rather than him and indeed Davis looking at the big picture as military strategists. Lee fought the fire in the kitchen whilst the rest of the Confederacy house burnt down around him. Grant's Overland Campaign perfectly demonstrates what Lee- even with a vastly reduced army- could have achieved if he had stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war rather than just the last twelve months.

But finally to summarise Grant's effectiveness as a great military commander ponder this:-

Only three armies surrendered whilst the Civil War raged: Buckner's at Fort Donelson; Pemberton's at Vicksburg and Lee's at Appomattox. They all surrendered to Grant.

Bob

 

[lancer]

A very fine synopsis swalterh and I fully agree that Grant was a strategical genius. I find it very interesting that over the last two decades modern ACW historians have finally begun to realise what a great strategist the man from Ohio actually was. The usual denigration of Grant based primarily on his sobriquet of "Butcher" after Cold Harbor has always accompanied the deification of Lee as the great tactical strategist who was only worn down by the sheer numbers of the North. However, just recently Grant's tarred reputation has begun to ascend (as highlighted in your summary) whilst Lee's has begun to decline.

I have always been an admirer of the South's struggle for independence and Old Bobby Lee himself but as a serious student of this conflict I have realised for years now that the South could only have "won" the war by not losing it. The North could only win by winning it. Furthermore both generals were indeed aggressive but when you analyze the facts Grant's aggressiveness won the war while Lee's lost it.

I also fervently believe that Lee being a pure bred Virginian only fought for Virginia. He persuaded Davis to retain the Army of Northern Virginia for the most part of the war in Virginia and to back his two invasions of the North which were both disastrous rather than him and indeed Davis looking at the big picture as military strategists. Lee fought the fire in the kitchen whilst the rest of the Confederacy house burnt down around him. Grant's Overland Campaign perfectly demonstrates what Lee- even with a vastly reduced army- could have achieved if he had stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war rather than just the last twelve months.

But finally to summarise Grant's effectiveness as a great military commander ponder this:-

Only three armies surrendered whilst the Civil War raged: Buckner's at Fort Donelson; Pemberton's at Vicksburg and Lee's at Appomattox. They all surrendered to Grant.

Bob

Great post, Bob. I read a very influential book (to me, anyway) about 30 years ago, that takes the exact same line of reasoning to the South's loss of the war. Originally published in 1982, and very controversial, as much for it's conclusions as it's premise, it is titled "Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage" by Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson. It is a very interesting read, even if one doesn't agree with the conclusions and how they reach them. -- Al

 

[Poppo]

I think that when we are discussing the American Civil War as the first truly modern war we have to step back and examine the war in its entirety. I believe that it was truly the first modern war in that it brought many of the modern military technologies and concepts into practice on a truly continental level for the first time. It is true that many of the technologies utilized in the Civil War were used in prior conflicts. It is also true that many of the tactics and strategies were utilized prior to the Civil War as well. But, when we look at the progress of the war, we see the development of what started out as a localized, “90 day” affair evolve into the first instance of total war on a continental level where the objective of the North was to completely destroy and subjugate not only the government and military establishment of the Confederacy, but their entire society as well.

The American Civil War firmly established the “American” way of war. That is to seek the complete and utter destruction of one’s opponent. Unconditional Surrender was a notion that was forged at Forts’ Henry and Donelson and the concept was cultivated and executed throughout the American political and military establishment right up through WWII and one might argue the end of the Cold War.

Grant and Sherman truly were the first modern generals. They utilized maneuver on an operational as well as tactical level to accomplish strategic objectives. Sherman’s campaign to capture Atlanta employed three armies in order to out march, if not out fight, the rebels guarding the city. Grant was the first truly strategic general in that he commanded and directed armies in multiple operational theatres towards one strategic object. Not even Napoleon could exercise the level of strategic effectiveness that the Union armies were able to achieve in the final stage of the war. The emperor was entirely dependent upon his own skills and abilities in order to win campaigns because he did not cultivate subordinates who were capable of independent action. The British and their allies were able to pound his Marshals on the Peninsula and the Trachenberg Plan finally brought the Empire to its knees in Germany and France. For the sparing moments of the fighting at Waterloo where the Emperor was taken ill, Marshal Ney arguably squandered the best hopes for a French victory.

In the German Wars of Unification, Moltke only had to be concerned with one key operational theatre in each of his Campaigns thanks to the shrewd diplomatic efforts of Bismarck. It is true that in the Austro-Prussian war, the Prussians were forced to conduct operations against Austria’s German allies, but the lesser German states were effectively subdued with minimal if not bungling effort. Praise should be given to the Hanoverians for their valiant efforts at Langensalza, but the fate of Germany was decided in Bohemia at Koeniggratz between the Austro-Saxons and the Prussian Machine. The contest between the Prussians and the French a few years later was anticlimactic. Again the focus of the conflict was on one operational theatre. The final stage of the war devolved into siege operations around Paris and some mopping up expeditions against scattered and inadequate republican forces. The result of the conflict was the total collapse of the army and Empire of Napoleon III, but the peace settlement saw the withdrawal of the German military, leaving French society and national identity intact with minimal requisition of French territory.

It is interesting that the long range cavalry raids conducted during the Civil War were in effect the precursor to the modern air bombardment campaigns of the Second World War. These raids allowed the Union commanders to strike at the Confederacy’s strategic center of gravity without having to commit entire field armies to the task. In Grant’s writings he repeatedly mentions operational designs against the iron works at Mobile, Alabama and many efforts were made against Richmond and other industrial centers. This illustrates again Grant’s truly modern military perspective by seeking to strike at and destroy the enemy’s military industrial capacity. This concept reached its culmination when the USAAF and RAF launched their air offensives against the production and oil facilities of the Third Reich and then later with the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Japan.

War is not only a contest between military establishments and governments. It is a contest between entire societies of which those institutions are a part. The American Civil War was the first war that saw military operations intentionally wagged against every element of an industrialized, modern society seeking its utter destruction by modern means and concepts. So yes, after all things are considered, the American Civil War was truly the first modern war.

Thank you, I would just add that not only Grant and Sherman had new tactics, but also Lee, Forrest, Longstreet, Beauregard had.

About the" long range cavalry raids", well, the unionists used this tactic only at the end of the war, while it was first conceived and developped by the confederates...

 

[Poppo]

A very fine synopsis swalterh and I fully agree that Grant was a strategical genius. I find it very interesting that over the last two decades modern ACW historians have finally begun to realise what a great strategist the man from Ohio actually was. The usual denigration of Grant based primarily on his sobriquet of "Butcher" after Cold Harbor has always accompanied the deification of Lee as the great tactical strategist who was only worn down by the sheer numbers of the North. However, just recently Grant's tarred reputation has begun to ascend (as highlighted in your summary) whilst Lee's has begun to decline.

I have always been an admirer of the South's struggle for independence and Old Bobby Lee himself but as a serious student of this conflict I have realised for years now that the South could only have "won" the war by not losing it. The North could only win by winning it. Furthermore both generals were indeed aggressive but when you analyze the facts Grant's aggressiveness won the war while Lee's lost it.

I also fervently believe that Lee being a pure bred Virginian only fought for Virginia. He persuaded Davis to retain the Army of Northern Virginia for the most part of the war in Virginia and to back his two invasions of the North which were both disastrous rather than him and indeed Davis looking at the big picture as military strategists. Lee fought the fire in the kitchen whilst the rest of the Confederacy house burnt down around him. Grant's Overland Campaign perfectly demonstrates what Lee- even with a vastly reduced army- could have achieved if he had stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war rather than just the last twelve months.

But finally to summarise Grant's effectiveness as a great military commander ponder this:-

Only three armies surrendered whilst the Civil War raged: Buckner's at Fort Donelson; Pemberton's at Vicksburg and Lee's at Appomattox. They all surrendered to Grant.

Bob

Bob,

it is not only a question of deciding who was the best tactical between Grant and Lee.....The northern army was several times more powerful in number of men , quantity of weapons, horses, boats, supplies, everything...It had one of the strongest industries in the world behind, while the agricultural south had to create an army in a short time without any boat,few weapons, any factory!
it s a miracle due to the braveness, and the fighting ability of southern people that the confederacy could resist during 4 years againts the most powerful army in the world, almost to make them leave the fightings, and inflicting them huge casualties.

 

[UKReb]

Bob,

it is not only a question of deciding who was the best tactical between Grant and Lee.....The northern army was several times more powerful in number of men , quantity of weapons, horses, boats, supplies, everything...It had one of the strongest industries in the world behind, while the agricultural south had to create an army in a short time without any boat,few weapons, any factory!
it s a miracle due to the braveness, and the fighting ability of southern people that the confederacy could resist during 4 years againts the most powerful army in the world, almost to make them leave the fightings, and inflicting them huge casualties.

Poppo

I am the very last person to ever forget or ever decry the physical courage and the magnificent fighting prowess of the Southern soldier. Nor would I ever criticise the moral courage of Lee himself as he was always up for a fight. And I am also fully aware of the infinite power that the North bore down upon the many desperate weaknesses of that brave, romantic and tragically archaic little nation that opposed it.

However, whether a nation has either a small army or a large one it is very important in how that army is used to achieve whatever goals that particular nation sets itself. For the South it was its independence. How one achieves that is by selecting the correct overall strategy, and tactics, be they political or military, should be very much part of that strategy. All I am saying in my previous post is that I don't believe the South ever did have a well thought out military strategy that could win them their independence. Whereas Grant always appeared to have the correct strategy and the relevant tactics that worked for him and finally for the Union.

Bob

 

[Terp152]

AI have always been an admirer of the South's struggle for independence and Old Bobby Lee himself but as a serious student of this conflict I have realised for years now that the South could only have "won" the war by not losing it. The North could only win by winning it. Furthermore both generals were indeed aggressive but when you analyze the facts Grant's aggressiveness won the war while Lee's lost it.

I also fervently believe that Lee being a pure bred Virginian only fought for Virginia. He persuaded Davis to retain the Army of Northern Virginia for the most part of the war in Virginia and to back his two invasions of the North which were both disastrous rather than him and indeed Davis looking at the big picture as military strategists. Lee fought the fire in the kitchen whilst the rest of the Confederacy house burnt down around him. Grant's Overland Campaign perfectly demonstrates what Lee- even with a vastly reduced army- could have achieved if he had stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war rather than just the last twelve months.
Bob

Bob, would you say PGT Beaureguard was an unrecognized visionary for the South? He was forever proposing grand schemes involving the movement of armies from one theater to another. Davis would never take the risk, believing the South only had to "hold on." He thought Europe (mainly Britain) could not afford to lose the cotton needed for the mills, and keep the textile workers from starving.

Quite agree, one of the reasons Lee advanced into Penn was to avoid having to send detachments from his army to the west. But, in defense of Lee's offensive minded operations, I think he realized it would only be a matter of time until defeat if he could not continue to keep the Federal forces off balance. Grant, as you point out, was able to implement a winning strategy.
Chris

 

[Louis Badolato]

Poppo

I am the very last person to ever forget or ever decry the physical courage and the magnificent fighting prowess of the Southern soldier. Nor would I ever criticise the moral courage of Lee himself as he was always up for a fight. And I am also fully aware of the infinite power that the North bore down upon the many desperate weaknesses of that brave, romantic and tragically archaic little nation that opposed it.

However, whether a nation has either a small army or a large one it is very important in how that army is used to achieve whatever goals that particular nation sets itself. For the South it was its independence. How one achieves that is by selecting the correct overall strategy, and tactics, be they political or military, should be very much part of that strategy. All I am saying in my previous post is that I don't believe the South ever did have a well thought out military strategy that could win them their independence. Whereas Grant always appeared to have the correct strategy and the relevant tactics that worked for him and finally for the Union.

Bob

With no intent to cause offense to my dear British friends, I would compare the face off between the Union and the Confederacy to the face off between the 13 American Colonies and Great Britain (of course without the supply lines across the Atlantic Ocean): The Union, like Great Britain, was an industrial powerhouse, with a strong Navy and nearly unlimited supply of men to feed its war machine (the Union via immigration, Great Britain via its Empire, and the other parts of its Island Nation, Ireland, Scotland and Wales). Both the Union and Great Britain had to invade and subjugate a rebellious population, while keeping its focus on an outside power who was willing to assist the rebels for its own purposes (the French for Great Britain, Great Britain for the Union) in order to win. Both the Confederacy and the Colonies lacked industrial capacity and had a very finite population (which was itself somewhat divided on the war) which, was however, well accustomed to use of arms (from hunting and Indian fighting). Both the Confederacy and the Colonies needed only to hold out long enough for public opinion on the other side to turn against the war to succeed.

It would appear to me, that, despite the fact that he was by no means a great fighting general on the level of Lee, Washington understood what he had to do to succeed, and, after some early disasters like the Battle of Long Island, abandoned the big Cities like New York and Boston to British occupation, fought defense battles until the British were worn down and the British public was not longer willing to support the war, and only took the offensive briefly, at the end, with the help of the French, to finish the British off.

Lee, on the other hand, as Bob pointed out, was so concerned with defending Virginia (as Bob so aptly put it, "fighting the fire in the kitchen while the house burned down around him"), he lost sight of the means to overall victory of his cause, and was lured into attacking on occasions like Gettysburg, squandering his irreplaceable troops, and eventually, despite his brilliance as a general and overall leader of men, hastening the Confederate defeat.

 

[Phantom Warrior]

Gettysburg was IMO the pivotal battle of the war and could have been won by the South on the first day with better reconaissance had Jeb Stuart been around. The question is, had Lee won at Gettysburg the first day, could he have caught the Union Army strung out marching to Gettysburg, defeated them and threatened Washington. I have always felt that Lee's attack on the North was an attempt to hit a home run - a decisive strike to win the war before the South's resources were ground down.

Terry

 

[Louis Badolato]

Gettysburg was IMO the pivotal battle of the war and could have been won by the South on the first day with better reconaissance had Jeb Stuart been around. The question is, had Lee won at Gettysburg the first day, could he have caught the Union Army strung out marching to Gettysburg, defeated them and threatened Washington. I have always felt that Lee's attack on the North was an attempt to hit a home run - a decisive strike to win the war before the South's resources were ground down.

Terry

I don't disagree with anything you said, Terry. Here's my slightly different take, however. The home run which would have won the war for the Confederacy was not the Confederate military victory, but rather the morale effect of another substantial Union defeat on the northern public. There were draft riots in New York and other major Northern cities at about this time, and McClellen was running for the presidency on a platform of making peace with the Confederacy.

In my opinion, had Lee listened to Longstreet, moved away from the Gettysburg battlefield (where the Union forces held the best defensible ground, and the Confederate forces had to attack on ground of the Union's choosing) towards Washington, D.C., and forced the Union to attack the Army of Northern Virginia on ground of Lee's choosing, he would have won a substantial victory. Had this occurred, I believe Lincoln would have lost the election and the Union would have sued for peace.

It was Lee's inability to grasp these political factors, and his pride (to the point of hubris) in the abilities of his men (and himself) which in my opinion cost the Confederacy the war.