American civil war: the first modern war in history (2 Viewers)

[Phantom Warrior]

I don't disagree with anything you said, Terry. Here's my slightly different take, however. The home run which would have won the war for the Confederacy was not the Confederate military victory, but rather the morale effect of another substantial Union defeat on the northern public. There were draft riots in New York and other major Northern cities at about this time, and McClellen was running for the presidency on a platform of making peace with the Confederacy.

In my opinion, had Lee listened to Longstreet, moved away from the Gettysburg battlefield (where the Union forces held the best defensible ground, and the Confederate forces had to attack on ground of the Union's choosing) towards Washington, D.C., and forced the Union to attack the Army of Northern Virginia on ground of Lee's choosing, he would have won a substantial victory. Had this occurred, I believe Lincoln would have lost the election and the Union would have sued for peace.

It was Lee's inability to grasp these political factors, and his pride (to the point of hubris) in the abilities of his men (and himself) which in my opinion cost the Confederacy the war.

Well put. That is what I meant. There was plenty of opposition to the war in the North. Had Lee run amock in the North threatening US cities, even for a short time, the North might have quit the war.

I don't see how a defensive strategy would have helped the South to win. The South lost defensive battles later in the war. The only way to preserve the Confederacy was to finish the demoralization of the North and get them to quit as fast as possible before the South depleted their resources. Imagine Lee winning at Gettysburg and moving on Philadelphia or Baltimore rather than Washington which was very heavily fortified.

Terry

 

[swalterh]

With respects to the arguments highlighting the Gettysburg Campaign, I wish to interject an alternate view.

The Southern Confederacy was by military definition an insurrection or insurgency. According to modern military theory an insurgency is completely dependent upon outside support in order to be successful. By this logic, the Confederacy had to gain recognition and support from a foreign power capable of providing the material means and diplomatic pressure that would enable them to gain independence.

This places Lee’s first invasion of the north, which culminated with the battle of Antietam, as the most pivotal political moment of the war. Prior to this campaign the British government was entertaining serious discussions on whether or not to intervene on the side of the south. On September 17, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was able to achieve an incomplete tactical victory that yielded significant operational and strategic results. When Lee’s army abandoned the Maryland Campaign and retreated back into Virginia, the door was opened politically for President Lincoln to seal the fate of the Southern Confederacy. Not only was the viability of southern arms brought into question amongst the international community, but the very nature of the war was transformed when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. With this federal decree, the Lincoln administration all but ended any hope of British intervention. As we know, the British government officially abandoned their support for the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1833. These restrictions made it all but impossible for a British government to support the Confederacy against a Federal government committed to the eradication of slavery.

Lee must be given credit for prolonging an impossible situation and winning many laurels and glory for the Confederate soldier and etching in legend the unrivaled fighting spirit of the south. But, he and his trusted lieutenants were up against insurmountable odds that could not be effectively overcome with the marginal resources that could be employed by the south alone. The only piece of the puzzle left for Lincoln to fit into place was that of a fighting General who could bring Lee and the rest of the Confederacy to its knees. He finally promoted that General to command of all Federal armies in 1864.

As Clausewitz states, war is a test of not only material strength, but also of will to resist or prosecute the fight. The Confederacy faced an opponent with an insurmountable will with superior military resources. The end result was inevitable unless they could break the will of the north or secure the support of greater resources. Unfortunately for the cause, they failed to accomplish either.

 

[swalterh]

Thank you, I would just add that not only Grant and Sherman had new tactics, but also Lee, Forrest, Longstreet, Beauregard had.

About the" long range cavalry raids", well, the unionists used this tactic only at the end of the war, while it was first conceived and developped by the confederates...

Your point is well taken, the south did launch a long range cavalry raid in June-July 1863 targeting the mid-west in Illinois, Indiana and Ohio led by John Hunt Morgan. As far as I know this was the only significant strategic raid launched by the Confederates on Northern soil. The major raids launched by Stuart in the east and Forrest in the west were more targeted against Union supply depots, transportation facilities and rear areas in Virginia and Tennessee. I wouldn’t consider these “strategic” targets like the raids conducted by northern cavalry detachments against southern industry and agriculture. A famous episode of a strategic raid was conducted in April-May 1863 against Baton Rouge by Col. Grierson and is depicted in the film Horse Soldiers starring John Wayne.

In regards to who was first, let’s not forget that the first significant strategic bombing offensive of WWII was the Battle of Britain launched by the German Luftwaffe. Unfortunately during this operation, the Germans failed to fully realize the full potential of “strategic” air power. The full culmination of a decade’s worth of airpower theory was not fully realized until the Allied air offensives over Europe and Japan in 1942-45.

I would suggest that the Confederate cavalry forces, such as those under Forrest and Stuart, were forced onto the defensive and were more concentrated on counter operations much like the Luftwaffe when forced to defend the skies over Fortress Europe. According to modern military theory, air and armored assets are inherently offensive weapons. In Grant’s memoirs he mentions similar thoughts regarding the use of Cavalry during the Civil War, not only at the tactical level but at the operational and strategic levels as well. He relates his disappointment that in his opinion the mounted arm did not fully realize its potential during the conflict. But, his foresight must be appreciated from a historical perspective as laying the ground work for modern armored and airpower theory and doctrine.

 

[UKReb]

Bob, would you say PGT Beaureguard was an unrecognized visionary for the South? He was forever proposing grand schemes involving the movement of armies from one theater to another. Davis would never take the risk, believing the South only had to "hold on." He thought Europe (mainly Britain) could not afford to lose the cotton needed for the mills, and keep the textile workers from starving.
Chris

Chris

Beauregard is one of the few Confederate generals I have not studied in any real depth-Hero of Fort Sumter, then at First Manassas, Shiloh, Petersburg and fighting Sherman he was everywhere during the war, and became a darling of the South. He was promoted to full general by Davis but then like many other senoir Reb officers fell foul of the president. Which apparently stemmed from the Richmond newspapers naming Beauregard as a rival for the Confederate presidency in the November 1861 election. Beauregard disavowed these rumours but they continued to appear and Davis became suspicious of him believing he was out to get his job. This was the beginning of the feud between the two men that went on until the end of the war and this possibly scotched any chance he had of being recognised as a "true visionary".

Cleburne "The Stonewall of the West" was another candidate who got euchered and ridiculed by Davis and his incompetent cabinet when as early as January 1864 Cleburne advocated arming slaves for Confederate military service, which was finally instituted by Richmond just two months before the war ended. A savage fighter of the Bedford Forrest stamp his death at Franklin was a telling blow for the South.

Bob

 

[lancer]

Chris

Beauregard is one of the few Confederate generals I have not studied in any real depth-Hero of Fort Sumter, then at First Manassas, Shiloh, Petersburg and fighting Sherman he was everywhere during the war, and became a darling of the South. He was promoted to full general by Davis but then like many other senoir Reb officers fell foul of the president. Which apparently stemmed from the Richmond newspapers naming Beauregard as a rival for the Confederate presidency in the November 1861 election. Beauregard disavowed these rumours but they continued to appear and Davis became suspicious of him believing he was out to get his job. This was the beginning of the feud between the two men that went on until the end of the war and this possibly scotched any chance he had of being recognised as a "true visionary".

Cleburne "The Stonewall of the West" was another candidate who got euchered and ridiculed by Davis and his incompetent cabinet when as early as January 1864 Cleburne advocated arming slaves for Confederate military service, which was finally instituted by Richmond just two months before the war ended. A savage fighter of the Bedford Forrest stamp his death at Franklin was a telling blow for the South.

Bob

Cleburne is one of my favorite characters, especially as he pertains to Hood's Tennessee Campaign in November 1864. It is a campaign I find incredibly interesting and tragic. The battle at Franklin is perhaps the biggest military tragedy of the whole war and well worth the time to study. The list of characters is almost endless and the fighting as desperate as any in the war. -- Al

 

[UKReb]

Couldn't agree more Al on no other battlefield would the blood of Southern generals flow as freely as Franklin. In a single hellish hour that easily eclipsed the ferocity of Pickett's charge five Reb generals were killed outright, another would die from his wounds the following day and six others would be wounded or captured. As one Tennesse line officer would relate after the battle:

"The death-angel was there to gather its last harvest of Hood's army"-Never a truer quote

Bob

 

[Terp152]

Couldn't agree more Al on no other battlefield would the blood of Southern generals flow as freely as Franklin. In a single hellish hour that easily eclipsed the ferocity of Pickett's charge five Reb generals were killed outright, another would die from his wounds the following day and six others would be wounded or captured. As one Tennesse line officer would relate after the battle:

"The death-angel was there to gather its last harvest of Hood's army"-Never a truer quote

Bob

One survivor declared "we gave you the best on the ranch." It was the end of the Army of the Tennesse as an effective fighting force.

Many consider Cleburne the best division commander of the South. I don't know if he was better than Hood in that capacity. Each certainly could lay claim to that honor in their respective theaters. Chris

 

[lancer]

One survivor declared "we gave you the best on the ranch." It was the end of the Army of the Tennesse as an effective fighting force.

Many consider Cleburne the best division commander of the South. I don't know if he was better than Hood in that capacity. Each certainly could lay claim to that honor in their respective theaters. Chris

It is interesting how politics played such a big part in Hood's and Cleburne's careers. Hood played the game, knew the right people and got promoted to a position beyond his capacity to perform. Cleburne didn't play the game, supported unpopular position(s) and as a result remained stuck as a division commander when all indications are he should have been at least a corps commander. The ultimate tragedy is, if one reverses the position of these 2 fighting men in November of 1864, the disasterous Tennessee campaign never plays out like it did, and who knows how the Atlanta campaign could have been changed with Cleburne in a position of higher command. I know it is useless to speculate like that, but it is kind of fun and I have always wondered how the Confederates might have benefitted had politics not conspired to keep Cleburne from a position his abilities warrented. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Well put. That is what I meant. There was plenty of opposition to the war in the North. Had Lee run amock in the North threatening US cities, even for a short time, the North might have quit the war.

I don't see how a defensive strategy would have helped the South to win. The South lost defensive battles later in the war. The only way to preserve the Confederacy was to finish the demoralization of the North and get them to quit as fast as possible before the South depleted their resources. Imagine Lee winning at Gettysburg and moving on Philadelphia or Baltimore rather than Washington which was very heavily fortified.

Terry

Its not defensive battles per se, but using defensive tactics to prevent Union victories, that could have won the war for the Confederacy. Had they not taken the offensive, and given the Union the opportunity to win a major battle at Gettysburg, and had the western commanders not tried to protect the major Cities, like Vicksburg, allowing it to be besieged and given the Union another major Victory to assauge public opinion, and instead, fought defensive battles, withdrawn to other defensive positions, and allowed the less skillful Union commanders to beat their armies to death attacking, Lincoln would almost certainly have lost the election to McClellen, and the Confederacy would have almost certainly have obtained its independence.

Imagine if, instead of protecting sacred Virginian soil and the capital at Richmond, and instead of trying to keep Vicksburg from falling, the Confederate commanders shadowed the Union armies, using their cavalry in guerilla style raids to bleed the Union forces, and then goading the Union to attack on ground of Lee's choosing? What if, when Sherman tried his mass raid tactic into the heart of the Confederacy, instead of worrying about protecting Atlanta, the Confederate forces applied the tactics employed bythe Continental Army against the British invasion forces in up state New York culminating in the Battle of Saratoga? If the Confederate forces (which included thousands of woodsmen from Tennessee who were very skilled hunters) just sniped at the Union forces from the surrounding woods, targetting officers, pulling back when the Union tried to counter attack, having their raiding cavalrymen attack the Union camps at night, or shelling the Union camps with horse artillery that would loose a few rounds then limber up and flee, to keep the Union forces up all night, every night, what might have happened?

It was an unpopular war in the big Northern cities, and if you deny Lincoln the opportunity to celebrate any major victories, and instead the papers were full of stories of thousands of deaths to a shadowy opponent, which, when it stood and fought on ground of its choosing, always inflicted an incredibly costly defeat on the attacking Union forces, the Confederacy has at the very least a chance of maintaining its independence, something it lost the minute Lincoln got re-elected.

 

[lancer]

Its not defensive battles per se, but using defensive tactics to prevent Union victories, that could have won the war for the Confederacy. Had they not taken the offensive, and given the Union the opportunity to win a major battle at Gettysburg, and had the western commanders not tried to protect the major Cities, like Vicksburg, allowing it to be besieged and given the Union another major Victory to assauge public opinion, and instead, fought defensive battles, withdrawn to other defensive positions, and allowed the less skillful Union commanders to beat their armies to death attacking, Lincoln would almost certainly have lost the election to McClellen, and the Confederacy would have almost certainly have obtained its independence.

Imagine if, instead of protecting sacred Virginian soil and the capital at Richmond, and instead of trying to keep Vicksburg from falling, the Confederate commanders shadowed the Union armies, using their cavalry in guerilla style raids to bleed the Union forces, and then goading the Union to attack on ground of Lee's choosing? What if, when Sherman tried his mass raid tactic into the heart of the Confederacy, instead of worrying about protecting Atlanta, the Confederate forces applied the tactics employed bythe Continental Army against the British invasion forces in up state New York culminating in the Battle of Saratoga? If the Confederate forces (which included thousands of woodsmen from Tennessee who were very skilled hunters) just sniped at the Union forces from the surrounding woods, targetting officers, pulling back when the Union tried to counter attack, having their raiding cavalrymen attack the Union camps at night, or shelling the Union camps with horse artillery that would loose a few rounds then limber up and flee, to keep the Union forces up all night, every night, what might have happened?

It was an unpopular war in the big Northern cities, and if you deny Lincoln the opportunity to celebrate any major victories, and instead the papers were full of stories of thousands of deaths to a shadowy opponent, which, when it stood and fought on ground of its choosing, always inflicted an incredibly costly defeat on the attacking Union forces, the Confederacy has at the very least a chance of maintaining its independence, something it lost the minute Lincoln got re-elected.

Louis, I think the simple answer to your 'what-if' is West Point. All the top Southern generals, including President Jeff Davis, were products of West Point and therefore proponents of a structured type of warfare and would have been unwilling, or unable, to conduct the type of guerilla war that might have worked. The Mexican War was the training ground and the blue-print for the ACW. It is a matter of doing the job they were trained for and knew how to perform. Does that make sense to anyone? I know it is over-simplified. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Louis, I think the simple answer to your 'what-if' is West Point. All the top Southern generals, including President Jeff Davis, were products of West Point and therefore proponents of a structured type of warfare and would have been unwilling, or unable, to conduct the type of guerilla war that might have worked. The Mexican War was the training ground and the blue-print for the ACW. It is a matter of doing the job they were trained for and knew how to perform. Does that make sense to anyone? I know it is over-simplified. -- Al

It actually makes perfect sense. The highest commanders were trained in pre-modern war organized tactics, and that is the type of war they understood. Many of the brigadier and major generals, who rose from the ranks to become commanders of irregular cavalry employed the far more effective guerilla tactics, and even Longstreet recognized the advantages of defensive tactics in "modern" warfare, but the highest commenders never grasped these concepts, or refused to employ them.

I have said before, that, in my opinion Lee might have been the greatest ever Napoleonic style general, and when faced with incompetent northern generals like Burnside and Hooker, who made frontal attacks on dug in positions, or failed to protect their own flanks, where the effectiveness of these tactics were actually increased by the greater effective range of rifles as opposed to smooth bore muskets, he had his greatest victories. However, I don't believe Lee ever fully grasped modern "total war" in the way Longstreet, Grant and Sherman did. Had Longstreet been in command at Gettysburg, and left the field after the first day, marching towards Washington and forcing the Union army to give chase and attack him on ground of his choosing, how might the war have ended?

 

[theBaron]

I think that when we are discussing the American Civil War as the first truly modern war we have to step back and examine the war in its entirety. I believe that it was truly the first modern war in that it brought many of the modern military technologies and concepts into practice on a truly continental level for the first time. It is true that many of the technologies utilized in the Civil War were used in prior conflicts. It is also true that many of the tactics and strategies were utilized prior to the Civil War as well. But, when we look at the progress of the war, we see the development of what started out as a localized, “90 day” affair evolve into the first instance of total war on a continental level where the objective of the North was to completely destroy and subjugate not only the government and military establishment of the Confederacy, but their entire society as well.

The American Civil War firmly established the “American” way of war. That is to seek the complete and utter destruction of one’s opponent. Unconditional Surrender was a notion that was forged at Forts’ Henry and Donelson and the concept was cultivated and executed throughout the American political and military establishment right up through WWII and one might argue the end of the Cold War.

Grant and Sherman truly were the first modern generals. They utilized maneuver on an operational as well as tactical level to accomplish strategic objectives. Sherman’s campaign to capture Atlanta employed three armies in order to out march, if not out fight, the rebels guarding the city. Grant was the first truly strategic general in that he commanded and directed armies in multiple operational theatres towards one strategic object. Not even Napoleon could exercise the level of strategic effectiveness that the Union armies were able to achieve in the final stage of the war. The emperor was entirely dependent upon his own skills and abilities in order to win campaigns because he did not cultivate subordinates who were capable of independent action. The British and their allies were able to pound his Marshals on the Peninsula and the Trachenberg Plan finally brought the Empire to its knees in Germany and France. For the sparing moments of the fighting at Waterloo where the Emperor was taken ill, Marshal Ney arguably squandered the best hopes for a French victory.

In the German Wars of Unification, Moltke only had to be concerned with one key operational theatre in each of his Campaigns thanks to the shrewd diplomatic efforts of Bismarck. It is true that in the Austro-Prussian war, the Prussians were forced to conduct operations against Austria’s German allies, but the lesser German states were effectively subdued with minimal if not bungling effort. Praise should be given to the Hanoverians for their valiant efforts at Langensalza, but the fate of Germany was decided in Bohemia at Koeniggratz between the Austro-Saxons and the Prussian Machine. The contest between the Prussians and the French a few years later was anticlimactic. Again the focus of the conflict was on one operational theatre. The final stage of the war devolved into siege operations around Paris and some mopping up expeditions against scattered and inadequate republican forces. The result of the conflict was the total collapse of the army and Empire of Napoleon III, but the peace settlement saw the withdrawal of the German military, leaving French society and national identity intact with minimal requisition of French territory.

It is interesting that the long range cavalry raids conducted during the Civil War were in effect the precursor to the modern air bombardment campaigns of the Second World War. These raids allowed the Union commanders to strike at the Confederacy’s strategic center of gravity without having to commit entire field armies to the task. In Grant’s writings he repeatedly mentions operational designs against the iron works at Mobile, Alabama and many efforts were made against Richmond and other industrial centers. This illustrates again Grant’s truly modern military perspective by seeking to strike at and destroy the enemy’s military industrial capacity. This concept reached its culmination when the USAAF and RAF launched their air offensives against the production and oil facilities of the Third Reich and then later with the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Japan.

War is not only a contest between military establishments and governments. It is a contest between entire societies of which those institutions are a part. The American Civil War was the first war that saw military operations intentionally wagged against every element of an industrialized, modern society seeking its utter destruction by modern means and concepts. So yes, after all things are considered, the American Civil War was truly the first modern war.

Well put, and you express better the nature of the "firsts" reflected in the conflict.

Prost!
Brad

 

[UKReb]

Louis/Al

Darn interesting discussion going on between you two-Reminds me of the "good" old days on the forum.

Concur with both of your comments and I believe Terry misunderstood my original post when he couldn't see that a defensive strategy could have helped the South-Louis I think your post expanded on my quote admirably.

Lee at Gaines Mill, Fraysers Farm, Malvern Hill and Gettysburg as examples resorted to desperate, stand-up, head on battles that resulted in horrendous losses for the Confederacy. Lee appeared to never fully understand the revolution that the "Minie ball" had brought to battle tactics, consequently, he lost the South thousands of irreplaceable Reb soldiers by insisting with these offensive tactics. This apparent fixation was Lee's fatal flaw as well as suffering from Virginia myopia that deprived other vital areas of the South of the troops necessary for their defense. I firmly believe that Lee's massive casualties throughout 1862/63 made possible Grant's successful 1864 campaign which he executed in less than twelve months.

Now having said the above I hasten to add that Lee was also the tactical victor in several outstanding battles in 1862/63 helped no doubt because of the incompetent opposition but crucially in my opinion-was that one his Corps commanders always seemed to completely understand Lee's complex battle plans and his ambiguous or discretionary orders. After Chancellorsville history tells us what happened.

As an aside with Al's excellent West Point schooling and tactics comment-McClellan (second in the class of'46 and speaking fluent French) was assigned as US military observer of the European armies during the Crimean War? I have often wondered whether what he observed at Sevastopol and the Crimea as a whole affected his actions whilst in command of the Army of the Potomac some years later. Although he wrote a manual on Cavalry Tactics and introduced his famous saddle to the US after noting a similar design ridden by Russian Hussars I have never been able to ascertain if he noted the emergence of the rifled musket during that war. If he did maybe just maybe that's why he preferred training his army rather than leading it into battle. Just a thought!

Bob.

 

[lancer]

I know and understand the critique of Lee and his tactics. I agree with a large portion of them. What I don't really see is what viable option the South really had for winning the war if their armies did not go on the offensive and try to defeat the Northern armies in the field. All the commanders of the major Southern armies were aggressive, offensively oriented generals by training and nature. 5 of 6 commanders, Lee, A.S. Johnston, P.G.T. Beauregard, Bragg, and Hood, all favored the attack. Only J.E. Johnston seemed to favor defensive battle and even he denied this when accused of it by Jeff Davis and others. To expect these aggresive military commanders to go on a defensive strategy is just unrealistic, especially when the defense was seen as a precursor to surrender. Remember, also, that these men learned their trade in the Mexican War where the offensive paid brilliant and obvious devidends. I don't see how a defensive war could win for the South when such things as homefront moral, and the need for overseas recognition come into play. There is also the all important factor of the naval blockade in play when talking of a longer, defensive style of war. I'm not at all convinced Southern moral (military or civilian) and especially logistics could have held up under a long war.
While an offensive war proved to be a loser, a defensive one held just as many dangers to Southern hopes. How, for instance, does the South stand on the defensive in the expansive and crucial western theater? The land area to cover was huge. What do they defend and what do they abandon? It's just my opinion, but I do not believe the South had a realistic chance to win the war to start with, and sitting back on the defensive was not going to win anymore than the ill-fated offensive strategy was. I do believe that the only chance the South had was being aggressive and defeating the Northern armies in the field. That the South failed to achieve their goal was due to many factors, but to simply blame the offensive strategy ignores all the other factors that lead to defeat. Lee and all the other generals who went on the offensive for the South were taking their best shot at winning. It was just too great a task. -- Al

 

[Phantom Warrior]

I know and understand the critique of Lee and his tactics. I agree with a large portion of them. What I don't really see is what viable option the South really had for winning the war if their armies did not go on the offensive and try to defeat the Northern armies in the field. All the commanders of the major Southern armies were aggressive, offensively oriented generals by training and nature. 5 of 6 commanders, Lee, A.S. Johnston, P.G.T. Beauregard, Bragg, and Hood, all favored the attack. Only J.E. Johnston seemed to favor defensive battle and even he denied this when accused of it by Jeff Davis and others. To expect these aggresive military commanders to go on a defensive strategy is just unrealistic, especially when the defense was seen as a precursor to surrender. Remember, also, that these men learned their trade in the Mexican War where the offensive paid brilliant and obvious devidends. I don't see how a defensive war could win for the South when such things as homefront moral, and the need for overseas recognition come into play. There is also the all important factor of the naval blockade in play when talking of a longer, defensive style of war. I'm not at all convinced Southern moral (military or civilian) and especially logistics could have held up under a long war.
While an offensive war proved to be a loser, a defensive one held just as many dangers to Southern hopes. How, for instance, does the South stand on the defensive in the expansive and crucial western theater? The land area to cover was huge. What do they defend and what do they abandon? It's just my opinion, but I do not believe the South had a realistic chance to win the war to start with, and sitting back on the defensive was not going to win anymore than the ill-fated offensive strategy was. I do believe that the only chance the South had was being aggressive and defeating the Northern armies in the field. That the South failed to achieve their goal was due to many factors, but to simply blame the offensive strategy ignores all the other factors that lead to defeat. Lee and all the other generals who went on the offensive for the South were taking their best shot at winning. It was just too great a task. -- Al

**** Al - you stole my response. ^&grin But that is how I see it too.

It might be clearer to separate the issue into strategic and tactical components. First, I do not agree that the Civil War was similar to the American Revolution on a strategic basis. The colonists knew they were weaker than the British and had to fight a hit and run war and not defend the cities or get into pitched European style battles with the British. It was accepted that Revolutionary soldiers were not highly trained like British soldiers.The British and Revolutionaries and their civilian supporters were intermingled throughout the colonies, not separated like the North and South so there was no concept of the British invading Colonist territory. These concepts were widely accepted by the Revolutionaries and there was no hit to morale when Washington ceded the cities to the British and avoided pitched battles.

The North and South had distinct territories with Virginia being one of the most divided States in the War. The capitol of the South was Richmond. After getting Virginia to join the South, how could they think of going on the defensive and not defend Richmond? Adding Al's point about offensive South Generals and strategically, a defensive war becomes even less acceptable. The Generals and the South public did not believe they could not fight pitched battles against the Union and in fact beat them handily in the first several battles. The belief was the Southern soldier was man for man superior to the Union soldier. In this atmosphere, letting the Union invade the South and occupy Richmond could have destroyed morale and caused rifts in the Confederacy.

Finally there is the casualty problem. Most Civil War casualties were from sickness and disease - not wounds. Sitting in place defensively would have depleted the Confederate armies just as badly as battles. The South had to go on the offensive to win the war as quickly as possible and hopefully before the Union Army got it's act together.

The strategic error was fighting battles toe to toe and sustaining casualties they could not afford or replace. An acceptable strategy was to invade the Union, conduct guerrilla warfare on a large unit/scale basis there, destroy morale but avoid battles which would result in high casualties. Make the war so unpopular, the Union would quit.

On a Tactical level it was key to limit casualties. With the improved weapons this meant less attacking entrenched positions and more defensive fighting in strong positions of their own choosing. The battles the South won in the early part of the war were battles usually lost by the North after attacking Confederate positions. The worst battles the South fought were generally battles where they attacked prepared Union positions and/or through difficult terrain. But the South did not adopt such a tactical strategy and paid for it in a war of attrition.

Terry

 

[swalterh]

It is interesting how politics played such a big part in Hood's and Cleburne's careers. Hood played the game, knew the right people and got promoted to a position beyond his capacity to perform. Cleburne didn't play the game, supported unpopular position(s) and as a result remained stuck as a division commander when all indications are he should have been at least a corps commander. The ultimate tragedy is, if one reverses the position of these 2 fighting men in November of 1864, the disasterous Tennessee campaign never plays out like it did, and who knows how the Atlanta campaign could have been changed with Cleburne in a position of higher command. I know it is useless to speculate like that, but it is kind of fun and I have always wondered how the Confederates might have benefitted had politics not conspired to keep Cleburne from a position his abilities warrented. -- Al

The unfortunate reality for all soldiers is that their profession is merely an extension of the political entity in which they serve. The officers of any military organization who understand and accept this fact are usually the ones who reach higher command. The argument you presented regarding Cleburne could invariably be made for countless individuals throughout all of history. But, I agree wholeheartedly that Cleburne was one of the best the south had in the western theatre and that he fully deserves the sobriquet of “Stonewall” of the west.

 

[Northgate Woods]

Gentlemen,
Many, many thanks for a very interesting thread. Points and views put back and forth without arguement. I have learnt a lot and enjoyed all the input from all concerned. Keep up the great work.
Cheers Howard

 

[swalterh]

Reading some of the recent posts, I think that there’s a misconception that during the American Revolution the Americans fought the British exclusively from concealed positions in woodland terrain and utilized guerrilla type tactics in all of their major victories. Let’s remember that the Continental army was a modern (for the day), conventionally trained force following the winter encampment at Valley Forge in 1777-78. They received this training from former Prussian Officer Baron von Steuben. Let’s not forget that at the time, the Prussian army was considered the model for all European forces of the time. During the later part of the war the Continentals were more than capable of standing toe to toe with the best the British had.

The next point that I will make is that during the decisive battles of the war, at Saratoga and Yorktown, the critical episodes of both battles were bayonet attacks on prepared works in which the Americans (and French at Yorktown) overwhelmed the defenders and secured the position. This is not an illustration of guerrilla tactics, but that of the conventional shock tactics employed by any major power of the era.

 

[swalterh]

Referring back to my post about the importance of the Antietam Campaign, I will again contend that it was imperative for the south to either gain international recognition, or strike a decisive blow against a key federal army by capturing or destroying a significant enough portion of it that would convince the northern public to abandon the effort. I believe that Lee and Jackson understood this fact and were continuously frustrated at not being able to achieve this end. Instead of criticizing the Rebel Generals in the East for being too aggressive, I would postulate a different view, which is they weren’t aggressive enough.

Lee’s failure in the Seven Days to press McClellan and destroy a significant portion of the Union army under his command and allowing it to survive and fight another day was a major disappointment. Jackson and Longstreet succeeded in putting the federal army under John Pope to route at 2nd Manassas, but again were unable to knock out a significant portion of the federal force during the pursuit. Lee had another opportunity to inflict major damage on the Army of the Potomac during its withdrawal from Fredericksburg after the disastrous assaults on Marie’s Heights, but elected not to risk a major follow-up operation because of the danger posed by the federal artillery positioned across the river on the Stafford heights.

There’s a saying that in war, if you are not willing to risk everything, you’ve already lost. At least two of the federal commanders understood this and when they got their chance put their attitude and resources to the task. This eventually led to the Union victory. Lee and his lieutenants were masterful tractions and operational planners, but couldn’t organize and execute the knockout blow that was necessary in order for the Confederacy to achieve their strategic objectives.

 

[Phantom Warrior]

Reading some of the recent posts, I think that there’s a misconception that during the American Revolution the Americans fought the British exclusively from concealed positions in woodland terrain and utilized guerrilla type tactics in all of their major victories. Let’s remember that the Continental army was a modern (for the day), conventionally trained force following the winter encampment at Valley Forge in 1777-78. They received this training from former Prussian Officer Baron von Steuben. Let’s not forget that at the time, the Prussian army was considered the model for all European forces of the time. During the later part of the war the Continentals were more than capable of standing toe to toe with the best the British had.

The next point that I will make is that during the decisive battles of the war, at Saratoga and Yorktown, the critical episodes of both battles were bayonet attacks on prepared works in which the Americans (and French at Yorktown) overwhelmed the defenders and secured the position. This is not an illustration of guerrilla tactics, but that of the conventional shock tactics employed by any major power of the era.

I don't think anyone in this discussion thinks the Continental Army fought exclusively as guerrillas - as the war went on, the battles increasingly became European style. And a bayonet charge was still an acceptable attack against muskets, but not in the Civil war against rifled muskets,, artillery and entrenched positions as the casualties were too high and the success rate too low.

Terry