American civil war: the first modern war in history (1 Viewer)

[UKReb]

As Longstreet wrote in "Lee in Pennsylvania" (published 1879):

"When I overtook General Lee, at five o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." I replied: "If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him - a good reason, in my judgment, for not doing so." I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade, and put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select.

My italics.

Bob

 

[jazzeum]

OK, so it appears that we are building a pretty strong consensus centered on the idea that the Confederates didn’t possess the ability to cripple the North’s means to wage war so they had to break the Yankees will. We are coming up with numerous thoughts and theories on how this may have been accomplished and all of them have their strengths. Rather than go round and round about the “what if's” and/or would’ve, could’ve, should’ve of this battle or that campaign because as we all recognize these aspects of the Civil War will continue to dominate discussions until the end of time. Instead, I’d like to postulate another line of thought for discussion. What if Davis and his administration put together a command structure similar to that of the North in 1864-65? Just think if Robert E. Lee was placed at the head of the entire Confederate defense establishment. The first question that comes to my mind is who he selects to take over command of the Army of Northern Virginia. A lot of this depends on timing so let’s say this reorganization occurs sometime in 1862, let’s say after the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, and Antietam. I think the next question is what, if any adjustments does he make to the overall strategy of the war and how does he go about addressing the fiasco in the west?

Any takers?

The conversation seems to have settled back to the routine Gettsyburg discussion of what if this, what if that, etc., etc.

However, what of Shane's question, which tries to take it in a different direction?

 

[lancer]

As Longstreet wrote in "Lee in Pennsylvania" (published 1879):

"When I overtook General Lee, at five o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." I replied: "If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him - a good reason, in my judgment, for not doing so." I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade, and put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select.

My italics.

Bob

Bob, what other sources are there available that support Longstreet's claims about his conversations with Lee in regards to the campaign? The dangers of accepting Longstreet's words at face value are obvious, given that Longstreet had to justify his own performance at Gettysburg. Longstreet may not have liked the plan of invasion or the battle site from the start, but his statement smacks of self-serving interest, to a degree. The date of publication, long after any possibility that Lee could refute it, makes me think it is a self-defense in the face of all the blame for the loss being directed at him, post-war. -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Bob, what other sources are there available that support Longstreet's claims about his conversations with Lee in regards to the campaign? The dangers of accepting Longstreet's words at face value are obvious, given that Longstreet had to justify his own performance at Gettysburg. Longstreet may not have liked the plan of invasion or the battle site from the start, but his statement smacks of self-serving interest, to a degree. The date of publication, long after any possibility that Lee could refute it, makes me think it is a self-defense in the face of all the blame for the loss being directed at him, post-war. -- Al

I certainly can't speak to contemporaneous sources, but I can provide some circumstantial evidence. I went to Gettysburg, and I stood at the point from which Pickett's charge was launched, and looked up at the Union position at the Angle on Cemetary Ridge, and thought to myself (admittedly a person without an iota of command experience) no attack up this half-mile long wide open ridge into the teeth of position defended by batteries of cannon and rifles could ever succeed. While I personally have no military experience, the Battlefield Guide who took me and my son Alec on the tour of the Battlefield, a retired Army Colonel and a Vietnam veteran, in telling us the story, made the same observation. Taking his much more experienced viewpoint, and ignoring mine, one would have to imagine the even more experienced Longstreet would have made some similar observation to Lee in the course of the Battle.

Plus, his actions in the battle, which certainly did not reflect his usual levels of enthusiasm and alacrity in carrying out Lee's orders (if I recall correctly he refused to give the order himself when Pickett asked him for permission to advance, he remained silent), would provide further indication that he was not fully sold on Lee's tactics.

 

[Warrior]

I went to Gettysburg, and I stood at the point from which Pickett's charge was launched, and looked up at the Union position at the Angle on Cemetary Ridge, and thought to myself (admittedly a person without an iota of command experience) no attack up this half-mile long wide open ridge into the teeth of position defended by batteries of cannon and rifles could ever succeed. While I personally have no military experience, the Battlefield Guide who took me and my son Alec on the tour of the Battlefield, a retired Army Colonel and a Vietnam veteran, in telling us the story, made the same observation.

As we approach the 150th anniversary of this battle, more and more information comes out about it, such as the following.

One of the theories being floated is Lee's actual plan was to attack the Union lines not at the famous copse of trees at the angle, but at Zieglers Grove which sat on the Brian (or Bryan) Farm slightly north of the angle; while this attack took place, Ewell was also to attack the Union positions along Culps Hill, ie, hit the Union lines almost at the front and the rear at the same time.

The attacks were not coordinated, Ewell attacked sooner than he should have and was not successful, then Lee's attack went off and hit the Union lines at essentially the wrong spot and the rest is history.

To me, this makes more sense than the actual attack across open ground essentially being hit on three sides, frontal, left flank and right flank, the perfect killing zone.

Regardless of all the ifs, ands, buts, woulda, coulda, shouldas, the Confederates lost the battle and as a result, the war, end of story.


s

 

[lancer]

I certainly can't speak to contemporaneous sources, but I can provide some circumstantial evidence. I went to Gettysburg, and I stood at the point from which Pickett's charge was launched, and looked up at the Union position at the Angle on Cemetary Ridge, and thought to myself (admittedly a person without an iota of command experience) no attack up this half-mile long wide open ridge into the teeth of position defended by batteries of cannon and rifles could ever succeed. While I personally have no military experience, the Battlefield Guide who took me and my son Alec on the tour of the Battlefield, a retired Army Colonel and a Vietnam veteran, in telling us the story, made the same observation. Taking his much more experienced viewpoint, and ignoring mine, one would have to imagine the even more experienced Longstreet would have made some similar observation to Lee in the course of the Battle.

Plus, his actions in the battle, which certainly did not reflect his usual levels of enthusiasm and alacrity in carrying out Lee's orders (if I recall correctly he refused to give the order himself when Pickett asked him for permission to advance, he remained silent), would provide further indication that he was not fully sold on Lee's tactics.

Little question that Longstreet was not sold on the battle being fought at Gettysburg. Longstreet's less than stellar performance and petulance towards carrying out orders proves that. Whatever Longstreet's objections and bad feelings about the battle, he owed it to Lee and the Confederacy to do his best in the performance of his duties, and there is little doubt he did not do his best, either on day 2 or day 3 where his planning and preparations for the attack were inadequate. Lee wasn't at his best at Gettysburg but he certainly wasn't helped by Longstreet, on whom he greatly depended. -- Al

 

[Phantom Warrior]

As we approach the 150th anniversary of this battle, more and more information comes out about it, such as the following.

One of the theories being floated is Lee's actual plan was to attack the Union lines not at the famous copse of trees at the angle, but at Zieglers Grove which sat on the Brian (or Bryan) Farm slightly north of the angle; while this attack took place, Ewell was also to attack the Union positions along Culps Hill, ie, hit the Union lines almost at the front and the rear at the same time.

The attacks were not coordinated, Ewell attacked sooner than he should have and was not successful, then Lee's attack went off and hit the Union lines at essentially the wrong spot and the rest is history.

To me, this makes more sense than the actual attack across open ground essentially being hit on three sides, frontal, left flank and right flank, the perfect killing zone.

Regardless of all the ifs, ands, buts, woulda, coulda, shouldas, the Confederates lost the battle and as a result, the war, end of story.


s

And don't forget that Stuart's cavalry was to attack the rear and baggae area of the Union line but was blocked and driven off by an outnumbered Custer who charged Stuart's cavalry.

Terry

 

[lancer]

And don't forget that Stuart's cavalry was to attack the rear and baggae

area of the Union line but was blocked and driven off by an outnumbered Custer who charged Stuart's cavalry.

Terry

Not to mention Stuart's big failure to keep Lee apprised of the location and movements of that pesky Union Army. This was Stuart's primary mission, along with masking Lee's movements, and he failed at it, leaving Lee in an almost impossible situation about engaging the foe and executing his invasion plan. Pretty tough to run a successful invasion if you don't know where the enemy is or what he might be doing. -- Al

 

[swalterh]

Ah, Gettysburg seems to be everyone’s favorite topic. Despite the many eloquent arguments to the contrary, I’m sorry to say that the South had absolutely no chance of winning at Gettysburg. The first day rubbish is just that. John Buford’s commitment to wear out the Confederates by gradually yielding ground before retreating back through the town paid off. Ewell’s forces were spent and had he ordered the attack on Cemetery and Culp’s hills who is to say the rebels would’ve succeeded. They would’ve been attacking uphill against fresh Union troops in prepared positions at night. At the time the attack would’ve taken place the northerners were under the direction of probably the best Corps commander in the Army of the Potomac (Hancock) and had a superior artillery arm that could’ve blasted Ewell’s exhausted formations as they headed up the slope.

Regarding the last two days, has anyone actually gotten out of the car and walked around the battlefield? The union position on the heights was a natural fortress. The federal troops had plenty of cover and concealment. The confederates were always attacking up hill. As a former college football player I was in pretty good shape and I can tell you that it doesn’t take long trudging along the ground the confederates were forced to traverse before you get worn out. Add a 10 lbs. gun and however much equipment and you begin to see my point. There are limits to human endurance and the psychological and physiological impact of combat drain away energy very quickly. The period of time the confederate troops could maintain combat effectiveness in a sustained encounter would have been severely reduced by the terrain.

The real kicker is that the union had plenty of troops and guns to man these impregnable positions. Not to mention the federals had the advantage of interior lines which enabled them to mass their combat power at any severely threatened point in the line. Meade did a masterful job of shifting the bulk of his forces from one vulnerable position to another.

Has anyone been around the south side of Big Round Top? If you have you have probably seen the unit markers of almost an entire corps (VIth) that was not engaged in the battle. So much for Longstreet’s flank attack on July 3rd, would’ve run smack into John Sedgwick. Elashia Hunt Rose and his 2nd Rhode Island were held in reserve, that’s right in reserve i.e. hanging out soaking up the July sunshine.

The real debate about Gettysburg shouldn’t be whether or not the South could’ve won. Instead we should be debating about why wasn’t Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia completely routed or destroyed at Gettysburg. Meade had an entire Corps to throw at Lee to follow up the repulse of Pickett’s Charge. So why did he pass on this golden opportunity? The Civil War in the east could’ve ended at Gettysburg with a decisive Union thrust. But, alas it was not to be. And so the debate continues…

 

[swalterh]

Gentlemen, I would like to express my esteemed pleasure and gratitude to be taking part in this discussion with all of you. Hopefully it has been as enjoyable for all of you as it has for me. There have been an incredible amount of excellent posts that have contributed to an enthralling and entertaining debate.

Cheers.

 

[swalterh]

OK, so it appears that we are building a pretty strong consensus centered on the idea that the Confederates didn’t possess the ability to cripple the North’s means to wage war so they had to break the Yankees will. We are coming up with numerous thoughts and theories on how this may have been accomplished and all of them have their strengths. Rather than go round and round about the “what if's” and/or would’ve, could’ve, should’ve of this battle or that campaign because as we all recognize these aspects of the Civil War will continue to dominate discussions until the end of time. Instead, I’d like to postulate another line of thought for discussion. What if Davis and his administration put together a command structure similar to that of the North in 1864-65? Just think if Robert E. Lee was placed at the head of the entire Confederate defense establishment. The first question that comes to my mind is who he selects to take over command of the Army of Northern Virginia. A lot of this depends on timing so let’s say this reorganization occurs sometime in 1862, let’s say after the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, and Antietam. I think the next question is what, if any adjustments does he make to the overall strategy of the war and how does he go about addressing the fiasco in the west?

Any takers?

OK, I'll try to get the ball rolling on this one.

Let’s consider that upon assumption of command of all Confederate forces Lee places Jackson in command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Jackson is by far the most aggressive option and is also a sound political choice due to his popularity and the fact that he hails from Virginia. I will postulate that Jackson retains Longstreet in command of his corps and promotes Ewell to take over formal responsibility for Jackson’s former command with AP Hill exercising temporary direction over the corps while Ewell recovers from his wounds. I say Ewell because of the close professional relationship that developed between himself and Jackson during the Valley Campaign and Hill being placed in temporary command because of his proven fighting prowess. These arrangements would leave the Army of Northern Virginia in more than capable hands to face any potential threat posed by the Army of the Potomac under its new commander Ambrose Burnside. Picture Jackson vs. Burnside along the Rappahannock, could spell bad news for the boys in blue.

As far as the western theatre I believe that Lee institutes an operational plan designed at recapturing the major cities of New Orleans and Nashville. I will venture that Lee attempts to unite the disjointed Confederate forces under J.E. Johnston and organizes the army into two wings commanded by Bragg and Beauregard. I would speculate that Lee would direct Johnston to concentrate the majority of his force somewhere between Grant and Rosecrans along the northern Mississippi-Alabama border in order to take advantage of the central position. This would best enable the confederate western army to strike at which ever federal force became more menacing while delaying the other federal army with a screening force. I believe that Lee would encourage Johnston to strike at Nashville and split the two federal forces if the federal commanders presented the opportunity by remaining inactive (Rosecrans was notoriously docile and Grant was dealing with internal command problems). Once the situation became stabilized, I think it perfectly feasible that Lee would direct Nathan B. Forrest to organize an expedition against New Orleans in an attempt to regain the city.

 

[Louis Badolato]

Gentlemen, I would like to express my esteemed pleasure and gratitude to be taking part in this discussion with all of you. Hopefully it has been as enjoyable for all of you as it has for me. There have been an incredible amount of excellent posts that have contributed to an enthralling and entertaining debate.

Cheers.

It has been my pleasure to participate in the conversation as well. I, a person whose interest in military history is focused on this hobby, learn more about military history in a day's good discussion on this forum than I ever did in school.

With regard to the question of why the Army of Northern Virginia was not wiped out after Gettysburg raised in your previous post, I asked the same question of the Battlefield Guide leading my son and I on a tour of that hallowed ground, and he explained to me that Meade did give pursuit, after taking care of the combined 30,000 or so casualties on the field. He pinned Lee's forces against a river engorged by recent storms, but, as Lee's forces were very well dug in, in effect laid siege for several days, while he probed for a weak spot and planned an attack. Unfortunately for Meade, on the night before his attack was planned, the river receded, and Lee's Army forded it and escaped. According to the Battlefield Guide, had the river remained unfordable for one more day, many of the questions we have been positing would have been answered: we would have seen either a disaster for the Union when it attacked Lee in a dug in position, or the end of the Army of Virginia (I suspect the latter, after the casualties Lee sustained only 13 days earlier at Gettysburg).

 

[UKReb]

OK, I'll try to get the ball rolling on this one.

Let’s consider that upon assumption of command of all Confederate forces Lee places Jackson in command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Jackson is by far the most aggressive option and is also a sound political choice due to his popularity and the fact that he hails from Virginia. I will postulate that Jackson retains Longstreet in command of his corps and promotes Ewell to take over formal responsibility for Jackson’s former command with AP Hill exercising temporary direction over the corps while Ewell recovers from his wounds. I say Ewell because of the close professional relationship that developed between himself and Jackson during the Valley Campaign and Hill being placed in temporary command because of his proven fighting prowess. These arrangements would leave the Army of Northern Virginia in more than capable hands to face any potential threat posed by the Army of the Potomac under its new commander Ambrose Burnside. Picture Jackson vs. Burnside along the Rappahannock, could spell bad news for the boys in blue.

As far as the western theatre I believe that Lee institutes an operational plan designed at recapturing the major cities of New Orleans and Nashville. I will venture that Lee attempts to unite the disjointed Confederate forces under J.E. Johnston and organizes the army into two wings commanded by Bragg and Beauregard. I would speculate that Lee would direct Johnston to concentrate the majority of his force somewhere between Grant and Rosecrans along the northern Mississippi-Alabama border in order to take advantage of the central position. This would best enable the confederate western army to strike at which ever federal force became more menacing while delaying the other federal army with a screening force. I believe that Lee would encourage Johnston to strike at Nashville and split the two federal forces if the federal commanders presented the opportunity by remaining inactive (Rosecrans was notoriously docile and Grant was dealing with internal command problems). Once the situation became stabilized, I think it perfectly feasible that Lee would direct Nathan B. Forrest to organize an expedition against New Orleans in an attempt to regain the city.

With the wonderful benefit of hindsight I believe there to be a flaw in your above hypothesis and that is Johnston, Bragg and Beauregard and their numerous shortcomings especially their lack of vision. Those three and their direct subordinates have always reminded me of a coven of old Southern ladies bickering over the correct recipe for fried chicken. The virtually unbroken string of miltary failures in the West proved categorically that there was never a commander of the Western theatre who was fully competent to command an army.

Using your time-line I would agree that if Jackson and I would add Longstreet- were in sole command of the Army of Northern Virginia-they were both more than capable of handling Burnside-who had Washington breathing down his neck for him to attack-and likewise his eventual replacement Hooker. But with using hindsight again and knowing that Lee was first a Virginian and second a Confederate would he have had the temerity to place either Jackson or Longstreet in command of the Western theatre?. And if he had would either of them have been able to amalgamate the warring factions- that always seemed to affect the western officer corps- into an effective fighting force? Furthermore with Lee's "single theatre" mind set would he have practiced the necessary inter-war transfers of Confederate troops which we now know was the worst nightmare of Grant and Sherman as they planned their simultaneous 1864 campaigns? Apologies Shane as I guess that's more questions than answers.

Bob

 

[lancer]

I agree with everyone else as to how much fun being able to participate in this discussion is. I actually get up looking forward to any new postings that have appeared since I turned in. Most enjoyment I have had from the forum in a long while. Thanks, everyone. {bravo}} -- Al

 

[OzDigger]

I'm pleased to see that the fanaticism has gone or at least diminished and look forward to reading more meaningful military history discussions like this on the forum.

 

[jazzeum]

I'm pleased to see that the fanaticism has gone or at least diminished and look forward to reading more meaningful military history discussions like this on the forum.

The Civil War (and the historical periods both before and after) was and still is divisive but I wouldn't expect someone from another country to understand that more than I understand Australian history. As one of our most famous novelists William Faulkner famously said "the past is not dead. Actually it's not even past." Recently someone at the Southern Heritage Preservation Group posted on Facebook that "Every Yankee Grave is a testament to Confederate marksmanship." After they got excoriated, they removed the post, although that passes for typical fare with them. This is not to jump all over them (because they do a good enough job shooting themselves in the foot without anyone's help) but to show that the Civil War is not a subject that can always be discussed dispassionately. If you would like to read more, see http://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/confederate-marksmanship/

 

[Warrior]

Recently someone at the Southern Heritage Preservation Group posted on Facebook that "Every Yankee Grave is a testament to Confederate marksmanship." After they got excoriated, they removed the post, although that passes for typical fare with them.

I find that comment both pathetic and sad at the same time.

Americans killing Americans as a source of pride?

Wow.

That's all I'll say on the subject, I don't want to hijack this great thread and turn it into another circular who started the war/why was the war fought debate.

Swalterh nails it for me in the sense that the South had virtually no shot of winning at Gettysburg, spin it anyway you want, blame it on whatever you want to, float any "what if" theory you want to come up with, it simply wasn't going to happen.

As he stated so well, having walked nearly every inch of that battlefield, the impression I've come away with is the Confederates were attacking uphill virtually the whole time against superior numbers in fixed positions in most cases with strong artillery support, a recipe for disaster.

The fact that Hood, Barksdale and Wright had the success they had is a testiment to the troops under their command.

 

[Terp152]

OK, I'll try to get the ball rolling on this one.

Let’s consider that upon assumption of command of all Confederate forces Lee places Jackson in command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Jackson is by far the most aggressive option and is also a sound political choice due to his popularity and the fact that he hails from Virginia. I will postulate that Jackson retains Longstreet in command of his corps and promotes Ewell to take over formal responsibility for Jackson’s former command with AP Hill exercising temporary direction over the corps while Ewell recovers from his wounds. I say Ewell because of the close professional relationship that developed between himself and Jackson during the Valley Campaign and Hill being placed in temporary command because of his proven fighting prowess. These arrangements would leave the Army of Northern Virginia in more than capable hands to face any potential threat posed by the Army of the Potomac under its new commander Ambrose Burnside. Picture Jackson vs. Burnside along the Rappahannock, could spell bad news for the boys in blue.

As far as the western theatre I believe that Lee institutes an operational plan designed at recapturing the major cities of New Orleans and Nashville. I will venture that Lee attempts to unite the disjointed Confederate forces under J.E. Johnston and organizes the army into two wings commanded by Bragg and Beauregard. I would speculate that Lee would direct Johnston to concentrate the majority of his force somewhere between Grant and Rosecrans along the northern Mississippi-Alabama border in order to take advantage of the central position. This would best enable the confederate western army to strike at which ever federal force became more menacing while delaying the other federal army with a screening force. I believe that Lee would encourage Johnston to strike at Nashville and split the two federal forces if the federal commanders presented the opportunity by remaining inactive (Rosecrans was notoriously docile and Grant was dealing with internal command problems). Once the situation became stabilized, I think it perfectly feasible that Lee would direct Nathan B. Forrest to organize an expedition against New Orleans in an attempt to regain the city.

Shane, good "what if" hypothsis. Even if Lee had been a Commander-in-Chief earlier in the war, Davis would have had to been willing to shift major forces between theaters, which he only did at Chickamauga. Would Johnston ever gone over to the offensive strategy you postulate? He hadn't done so since the Peninsula campaign, which is why Davis removed him. Had he moved as you suggest, Lincoln would have replaced Rosecrans, which he was on the verge of doing before Chickamauga for inaction, in order to combine armies against Johnston. Finding a competent southern commander in the west, willing to execute an offensive strategy, proved to be an insolvable dilemma. Both Longstreet and Hardee declined the command. Even if the scenario played out as you propose, with the western army positioned between Grant and Rosecrans, the Confederates would have had to defeat Union forces in successive battles. Highly doubtful, it didn't happen at Chickamauga. Davis said after the war he didn't place Forrest in command of an army because he considered him a "raider." Even with Lee in command, all commanders had to be approved by the president.

BTW, I have walked the Gettysburg battlefield from the point of Pickett's departure to the copse of trees (you earlier asked). The Union position was not quite the "fortress" you mention, as evidenced by the fact the Confederates did penetrate their lines. Nonetheless, Longstreet's judgement was proven correct.

And, as Al mentioned, I look fwd to reading the many thoughtful entries posted on your excellent thread each morning. Chris

 

[OzDigger]

The Civil War (and the historical periods both before and after) was and still is divisive but I wouldn't expect someone from another country to understand that more than I understand Australian history. As one of our most famous novelists William Faulkner famously said "the past is not dead. Actually it's not even past." Recently someone at the Southern Heritage Preservation Group posted on Facebook that "Every Yankee Grave is a testament to Confederate marksmanship." After they got excoriated, they removed the post, although that passes for typical fare with them. This is not to jump all over them (because they do a good enough job shooting themselves in the foot without anyone's help) but to show that the Civil War is not a subject that can always be discussed dispassionately. If you would like to read more, see http://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/confederate-marksmanship/

I disagree, humanity and the understanding of human history is not restricted by such boundaries. To say that you have to live in a country to understand its history is like saying you have to experience an event to understand its history. Were you alive during the American Civil War Brad?

 

[OzDigger]

I'm pleased to see that the fanaticism has gone or at least diminished and look forward to reading more meaningful military history discussions like this on the forum.

To clarify, I was not restricting fanaticism or diminished fanaticism to members discussing the American Civil War, it occurs in most forums and life in general.