American civil war: the first modern war in history (1 Viewer)

[Warrior]

I disagree, humanity and the understanding of human history is not restricted by such boundaries. To say that you have to live in a country to understand its history is like saying you have to experience an event to understand its history. Were you alive during the American Civil War Brad?

Not trying to speak for Brad, but what I think he meant is the war to this day is still divisive within the United States and in order to truly understand that, you have to live here.

I see it quite a bit myself as I do a lot of traveling within the United States, specifically to VA and PA for seven toy soldier shows and five wargaming shows, the things I hear and see at these shows speaks volumes in regards to the still present divisiveness.

Again, I don't want this thread going in a different direction as the conversation has been excellent, don't want it ruined by it being hijacked from it's intended subject matter.

Carry on.

 

[jazzeum]

George summed it up correctly but let's move on or discuss elsewhere. Don't want to detract from this thread.

 

[jazzeum]

George McClellan is a controversial figure and the conventional wisdom is that he had a case of the slows. History, as it's been written so far, views him rather unfavorably and a recent book about Antietam continues this view. However, is it justified? There seems to be an ongoing re-appraisal of that view and Dimitri Rotov at Civil War Bookshelf is a huge critic of that view, of mindlessly accepting the conventional wisdom.

Here's an interesting article by Ethan Rafuse, Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/2012summer/Rafuse.pdf

After you read the article, I would be interested to hear your thoughts.

 

[OzDigger]

Not trying to speak for Brad, but what I think he meant is the war to this day is still divisive within the United States and in order to truly understand that, you have to live here.

I see it quite a bit myself as I do a lot of traveling within the United States, specifically to VA and PA for seven toy soldier shows and five wargaming shows, the things I hear and see at these shows speaks volumes in regards to the still present divisiveness.

Again, I don't want this thread going in a different direction as the conversation has been excellent, don't want it ruined by it being hijacked from it's intended subject matter.

Carry on.

George, Brad, et al

sorry if I caused any discomfort, Brad's response did seem somewhat dismissive imo, but I'm over it, please do carry on.

 

[jazzeum]

Matt,

Apologies if it seemed that way.

Brad

 

[OzDigger]

Matt,

Apologies if it seemed that way.

Brad

Brad, thank you, not a problem mate.

 

[Warrior]

Matt,

Apologies if it seemed that way.

Brad

Ditto, no offense intended, was trying to offer clarification as to Brads comments, sorry for any confusion.........

 

[Poppo]

Thank you Louis ( I totally agree with you) and Swalterh for your lessons {bravo}}{bravo}}{bravo}}

 

[swalterh]

With the wonderful benefit of hindsight I believe there to be a flaw in your above hypothesis and that is Johnston, Bragg and Beauregard and their numerous shortcomings especially their lack of vision. Those three and their direct subordinates have always reminded me of a coven of old Southern ladies bickering over the correct recipe for fried chicken. The virtually unbroken string of miltary failures in the West proved categorically that there was never a commander of the Western theatre who was fully competent to command an army.

Using your time-line I would agree that if Jackson and I would add Longstreet- were in sole command of the Army of Northern Virginia-they were both more than capable of handling Burnside-who had Washington breathing down his neck for him to attack-and likewise his eventual replacement Hooker. But with using hindsight again and knowing that Lee was first a Virginian and second a Confederate would he have had the temerity to place either Jackson or Longstreet in command of the Western theatre?. And if he had would either of them have been able to amalgamate the warring factions- that always seemed to affect the western officer corps- into an effective fighting force? Furthermore with Lee's "single theatre" mind set would he have practiced the necessary inter-war transfers of Confederate troops which we now know was the worst nightmare of Grant and Sherman as they planned their simultaneous 1864 campaigns? Apologies Shane as I guess that's more questions than answers.

Bob

Bob,
You pose many interesting questions to ponder. The remarks you have made regarding the personality conflicts between the rebel generals in the west are noted. Taking this situation into account, would it be feasible in your estimation that Lee would entrust Jackson with the defense of Virginia and then move his headquarters to the western theatre and offer similar direction over the western forces under Johnston as Grant provided Meade during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns?

 

[swalterh]

Shane, good "what if" hypothsis. Even if Lee had been a Commander-in-Chief earlier in the war, Davis would have had to been willing to shift major forces between theaters, which he only did at Chickamauga. Would Johnston ever gone over to the offensive strategy you postulate? He hadn't done so since the Peninsula campaign, which is why Davis removed him. Had he moved as you suggest, Lincoln would have replaced Rosecrans, which he was on the verge of doing before Chickamauga for inaction, in order to combine armies against Johnston. Finding a competent southern commander in the west, willing to execute an offensive strategy, proved to be an insolvable dilemma. Both Longstreet and Hardee declined the command. Even if the scenario played out as you propose, with the western army positioned between Grant and Rosecrans, the Confederates would have had to defeat Union forces in successive battles. Highly doubtful, it didn't happen at Chickamauga. Davis said after the war he didn't place Forrest in command of an army because he considered him a "raider." Even with Lee in command, all commanders had to be approved by the president.

BTW, I have walked the Gettysburg battlefield from the point of Pickett's departure to the copse of trees (you earlier asked). The Union position was not quite the "fortress" you mention, as evidenced by the fact the Confederates did penetrate their lines. Nonetheless, Longstreet's judgement was proven correct.

And, as Al mentioned, I look fwd to reading the many thoughtful entries posted on your excellent thread each morning. Chris

Chris,
You also bring into question the quality of southern leadership in the west. The command situation in this theatre certainly was a vexing problem for the confederate war effort. As you have mentioned, President Davis’ meddling didn’t do much to rectify the situation and probably for all intents and purposes made the situation worse. Let’s say for the sake of argument that Lee’s personality and character were able to win over the Confederate President’s approval to entrust the general with total control of all military appointments, promotions and troop movements. Given this amount of authority, do you believe that Lee possessed the ability to conceptualize, formulate and execute a true strategic plan that would involve all of the Confederate armies working together towards that end?

 

[lancer]

Interesting questions, gentlemen. Now I ponder this in relation to these questions; Would a man of Lee's well known modesty and, for lack of a better phrase, lack of self-promotion, even have accepted such an overall command position had it been offered? As suggested, it might/would have required Lee leaving the defense of his beloved Virginia to someone other than himself. Given the personal agony that resigning his US commision caused him, and being that said resignation was only because he couldn't bring himself to take up arms against Virginia, I have real doubts that such a man of honor and devotion to his home state, would actually have left it to someone else. He might well have turned down any such supreme command position, thinking himself unworthy, as well as wanting to honor his duty to Virginia. -- Al

 

[Terp152]

Chris,
You also bring into question the quality of southern leadership in the west. The command situation in this theatre certainly was a vexing problem for the confederate war effort. As you have mentioned, President Davis’ meddling didn’t do much to rectify the situation and probably for all intents and purposes made the situation worse. Let’s say for the sake of argument that Lee’s personality and character were able to win over the Confederate President’s approval to entrust the general with total control of all military appointments, promotions and troop movements. Given this amount of authority, do you believe that Lee possessed the ability to conceptualize, formulate and execute a true strategic plan that would involve all of the Confederate armies working together towards that end?

Shane, tough question. I don't think Lee showed much interest in other theaters. As mentioned, part of his rationale for the invasion to PA was to forestall detachments to the west. For all his brilliance as a tactician and operational level commander he did not display much strategic vision, IMO. I think the skills shown as an army commander would not necessarily transfer to the commander-in-chief level. And even if given the authority, would it have mattered given the lack of resources possessed by the South? As stated in earlier posts, no one could make Johnston take the offensive and Lee would not have been either. Removing Johnston was problematic, who else to command if not the disastrous Hood? So finally, no I don't think he showed attributes that would have enabled him to emmulate Grant's role and would not have affected the outcome even if promoted to that level of command. Chris

 

[swalterh]

George McClellan is a controversial figure and the conventional wisdom is that he had a case of the slows. History, as it's been written so far, views him rather unfavorably and a recent book about Antietam continues this view. However, is it justified? There seems to be an ongoing re-appraisal of that view and Dimitri Rotov at Civil War Bookshelf is a huge critic of that view, of mindlessly accepting the conventional wisdom.

Here's an interesting article by Ethan Rafuse, Professor of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/2012summer/Rafuse.pdf

After you read the article, I would be interested to hear your thoughts.

Following the defeat at 1st Bull Run the Union army was in desperate need of training and re-organization. President Lincoln promoted General McClellan to the top position. He possessed superb organizational and management skills. McClellan did an excellent job of training and organizing the army, but when it came time to utilize it against the enemy he did not possess the necessary attributes to bring victory on the battlefield. Following the lackluster tactical direction of the army at Antietam, Lincoln was eventually compelled to remove McClellan due to his inadequacies in conducting combat operations and continued to search for a fighting general. The Union army experienced many setbacks with multiple commanders until Lincoln decided to promote General Grant to command all federal forces. Grant turned out to be the right man for the job and eventually was able to gain the military victories needed to win the war.

When training and organization were necessary, McClellan was the right man to entrust with the power and responsibility of commanding the army, but when it came time to fight he couldn’t measure up to the task. After removing McClellan, Lincoln continuously gave new individuals an opportunity until he settled on the man who could gain the successes required for the federal government to accomplish its war aims. This example highlights how as situations change, organizations must be willing to shift the power and authority to the individual or group that is most capable of accomplishing the tasks necessary in order for the organization to move closer to its objectives.

 

[swalterh]

Interesting questions, gentlemen. Now I ponder this in relation to these questions; Would a man of Lee's well known modesty and, for lack of a better phrase, lack of self-promotion, even have accepted such an overall command position had it been offered? As suggested, it might/would have required Lee leaving the defense of his beloved Virginia to someone other than himself. Given the personal agony that resigning his US commision caused him, and being that said resignation was only because he couldn't bring himself to take up arms against Virginia, I have real doubts that such a man of honor and devotion to his home state, would actually have left it to someone else. He might well have turned down any such supreme command position, thinking himself unworthy, as well as wanting to honor his duty to Virginia. -- Al

Shane, tough question. I don't think Lee showed much interest in other theaters. As mentioned, part of his rationale for the invasion to PA was to forestall detachments to the west. For all his brilliance as a tactician and operational level commander he did not display much strategic vision, IMO. I think the skills shown as an army commander would not necessarily transfer to the commander-in-chief level. And even if given the authority, would it have mattered given the lack of resources possessed by the South? As stated in earlier posts, no one could make Johnston take the offensive and Lee would not have been either. Removing Johnston was problematic, who else to command if not the disastrous Hood? So finally, no I don't think he showed attributes that would have enabled him to emmulate Grant's role and would not have affected the outcome even if promoted to that level of command. Chris

Chris and Al,
You both make compelling arguments. It seems that the feasibility of a Confederate strategy being successfully implemented would have experienced significant frictions even if the Confederate government had managed to formulate a more centralized command structure for the entire defense establishment.

 

[lancer]

This whole question of Confederate high command problems in the Western theater is crucial as it actually cost the South the war. I find it incredible that as many problems that were extant, ie., manpower inferiority, huge area to defend, no coherent strategy, and continual defeat, that one of the biggest problems was the inability of the general officers to work together on a professional level. They were fighting themselves as much as they were the enemy. The problems between the Davis/Bragg cabal and the other corps and division commanders beggers belief. The problems became so bad there was a virtual mutiny that lead to reassignments, demotions, and denial of deserved promotion. Bragg was so devisive a figure it is amazing to me the even as good as friends as they were, that Davis continued to support him as long as he did. Bragg certainly did nothing of a military value to justify the support. -- Al

 

[Poppo]

Chris,
You also bring into question the quality of southern leadership in the west. The command situation in this theatre certainly was a vexing problem for the confederate war effort. As you have mentioned, President Davis’ meddling didn’t do much to rectify the situation and probably for all intents and purposes made the situation worse. Let’s say for the sake of argument that Lee’s personality and character were able to win over the Confederate President’s approval to entrust the general with total control of all military appointments, promotions and troop movements. Given this amount of authority, do you believe that Lee possessed the ability to conceptualize, formulate and execute a true strategic plan that would involve all of the Confederate armies working together towards that end?

In my opinion, in the west Johnston was the best confederate general to lead the army in this theatre( he would have saved the troops in Vicksburg from Grant' s attack!)...Unfortunately, president Davies was a man who followed his sense of friendship and empathy more than an objective evaluation of his generals,so he in different occasions chose the wrong general for the situation ( other example he gave general Hood the western' s army leadership)....I write this post as you haven' t mentioned president Davies responsabilities in this war( the biggest one: he didn' t unify the command till the end, as it has been already said), do you agree?



ps: now i go to sleep it is 4.38 am here!!! good night!

 

[swalterh]

This whole question of Confederate high command problems in the Western theater is crucial as it actually cost the South the war. I find it incredible that as many problems that were extant, ie., manpower inferiority, huge area to defend, no coherent strategy, and continual defeat, that one of the biggest problems was the inability of the general officers to work together on a professional level. They were fighting themselves as much as they were the enemy. The problems between the Davis/Bragg cabal and the other corps and division commanders beggers belief. The problems became so bad there was a virtual mutiny that lead to reassignments, demotions, and denial of deserved promotion. Bragg was so devisive a figure it is amazing to me the even as good as friends as they were, that Davis continued to support him as long as he did. Bragg certainly did nothing of a military value to justify the support. -- Al

In the “Old Army” before the war Bragg was simultaneously serving as a company commander and commissary officer for the post. Due to the lack of supplies at the post he filed a complaint against himself because as company commander he did not have enough supplies for his men. He retorted in defense of his position as commissary officer. He continued this argument with himself until supplies finally arrived at the post and were distributed to his company.

So yes, Braxton Bragg could be a divisive figure.

 

[lancer]

In the “Old Army” before the war Bragg was simultaneously serving as a company commander and commissary officer for the post. Due to the lack of supplies at the post he filed a complaint against himself because as company commander he did not have enough supplies for his men. He retorted in defense of his position as commissary officer. He continued this argument with himself until supplies finally arrived at the post and were distributed to his company.

So yes, Braxton Bragg could be a divisive figure.

I wonder what would have happened if he had court-martialed himself and was found guilty by himself.:rolleyes2:^&grin -- Al

 

[swalterh]

In my opinion, in the west Johnston was the best confederate general to lead the army in this theatre( he would have saved the troops in Vicksburg from Grant' s attack!)...Unfortunately, president Davies was a man who followed his sense of friendship and empathy more than an objective evaluation of his generals,so he in different occasions chose the wrong general for the situation ( other example he gave general Hood the western' s army leadership)....I write this post as you haven' t mentioned president Davies responsabilities in this war( the biggest one: he didn' t unify the command till the end, as it has been already said), do you agree?



ps: now i go to sleep it is 4.38 am here!!! good night!

Yes, I agree that Davis’ inability to adequately manage and evaluate his generals on a professional basis severely impaired Confederate combat operations in the western theatre.

 

[Poppo]

I wanted to ask if some of you know something more about the civil war in the far west: Texas,Arizona territories,New mexico' s, .....I know that in Arizona indians fought with the confederates, I find this interesting....And skirmishes in empty territories took place...