American civil war: the first modern war in history (2 Viewers)

[swalterh]

When discussing the advantages and disadvantages of offensive or defensive strategy and tactics during the war, let’s consider that in modern military thinking there are four levels of warfare. These are strategic, operational, tactical and technical. The Strategic level encompasses the big picture or national objectives. The operational level encompasses a particular theatre or campaign. The tactical level encompasses specific movements when in close proximity to the enemy i.e. when they are actually fighting in a battle. The technical level describes the actions of the individual soldier or weapon’s system crew such as the manual of arms, loading an artillery piece, bayonet exercises, ect…

For the south, they were not seeking the total defeat or destruction of the federal government of the United States, nor did they wish to conquer the northern states. Their national objective was to win independence, maintain territorial integrity and be left alone. This places them firmly on the strategic defensive.
The north however, sought the complete destruction of the Confederate government and subjugation of all territories in rebellion against the United States. This places them firmly on the strategic offense.

For the most part the south was on the operational defensive for the majority of the war. Most of the action occurred on southern soil and many of the campaigns were northern operations against territorial objectives (such as Vicksburg and Richmond) in which the southern armies were reacting to their opponents.

Tactically the south preferred the offense and this is where the majority of the debate exists when criticizing confederate generals in regards to using up their manpower resources. Battles such as Shiloh, the Seven Days, Chancellorsville, Murfreesboro (Stones River), and Hood’s offensive battles around Atlanta were all very costly in terms of casualties and occurred when the southern forces were on the operational defense, but elected to go over to the tactical offense in order to keep their enemy off balance and force him to abandon his offensive movements. This of course met with mixed results. In the case of the Seven Days and Chancellorsville, this tendency worked out well for the Confederates. In both cases the Union army abandoned its efforts against Richmond, thereby opening the door for Lee to seize the initiative and go over to the operational offensive by invading northern territory.

The real failure of the Confederate war effort is that no one person or group within the top echelons of leadership was able to effectively conceptualize, organize or execute a definitive plan that would enable the southern armies to operate in conjunction with one another to achieve the strategic objective of independence. The north struggled early in the war to find the right generals and command structure that would enable them to prosecute their war aims. But, eventually Lincoln found the minds and personalities that were capable of formulating and executing the plan that would eventually bring the rebellious states back into the union and under terms more desirable to the anti-slavery political elements in the north.

 

[swalterh]

I don't think anyone in this discussion thinks the Continental Army fought exclusively as guerrillas - as the war went on, the battles increasingly became European style. And a bayonet charge was still an acceptable attack against muskets, but not in the Civil war against rifled muskets,, artillery and entrenched positions as the casualties were too high and the success rate too low.

Terry

I believe that the bayonet charge was and still remains a perfectly acceptable and effective offensive maneuver. There are many reasons that contribute to a particular frontal assault succeeding or failing. In 1866, the war between Austria and Prussia saw the Austrian shock tactics shudder against a more sophisticated foe that was tactically and technically organized and trained to capitalize on their technologically superior weapon the needle-gun. Conversely in 1870, the war between France and Germany saw the resurgence of the frontal assault, this time by the Prussians. The chassepot outclassed the needle gun in both range and accuracy leaving the Prussian commanders little choice, but to close on the French positions as quickly as possible or wait until the Prussian artillery blasted the French infantry before moving in to deliver the knockout blow.

The final battles of the Civil War saw numerous successful bayonet attacks. The final assault at Petersburg that broke the Confederate lines and sent them reeling through the streets of Richmond and Petersburg was in the words of Grant, a general assault along the entire Union line. The battle of Nashville, which followed Franklin, culminated with a direct attack against the Confederate works. The major feature of both of these actions was the follow up operations once the enemy had been displaced. The battle at Nashville saw one of the most effective uses of cavalry in the pursuit role of the entire war. Grant almost fired Thomas before the battle because he was growing impatient with his subordinate’s reluctance to attack. Thomas stalled his attack while he stockpiled horsemen in his rear areas. Once the Confederate works had been overwhelmed Thomas unleashed his mounted arm to ride down the enemy.

I suppose the true tragedy of the American Civil War from a European or Commonwealth perspective is that there are so many lessons that could have been taken from the Civil War that weren’t heeded by the leading commanders during the First World War. Is it any wonder that once the American Expeditionary Force went operational it took less than six months to end hostilities when the European allies had been struggling against the same opponent for three years? It seems that the Civil War served as somewhat of a dress rehearsal that prepared the United States military for its eventual successes on the global stage.

Shane

 

[Louis Badolato]

Referring back to my post about the importance of the Antietam Campaign, I will again contend that it was imperative for the south to either gain international recognition, or strike a decisive blow against a key federal army by capturing or destroying a significant enough portion of it that would convince the northern public to abandon the effort. I believe that Lee and Jackson understood this fact and were continuously frustrated at not being able to achieve this end. Instead of criticizing the Rebel Generals in the East for being too aggressive, I would postulate a different view, which is they weren’t aggressive enough.

Lee’s failure in the Seven Days to press McClellan and destroy a significant portion of the Union army under his command and allowing it to survive and fight another day was a major disappointment. Jackson and Longstreet succeeded in putting the federal army under John Pope to route at 2nd Manassas, but again were unable to knock out a significant portion of the federal force during the pursuit. Lee had another opportunity to inflict major damage on the Army of the Potomac during its withdrawal from Fredericksburg after the disastrous assaults on Marie’s Heights, but elected not to risk a major follow-up operation because of the danger posed by the federal artillery positioned across the river on the Stafford heights.

There’s a saying that in war, if you are not willing to risk everything, you’ve already lost. At least two of the federal commanders understood this and when they got their chance put their attitude and resources to the task. This eventually led to the Union victory. Lee and his lieutenants were masterful tractions and operational planners, but couldn’t organize and execute the knockout blow that was necessary in order for the Confederacy to achieve their strategic objectives.

I think you are overlooking one very important fact: the Union had an inexhaustable supply of troops (due in large part to Irish immigration), and at no point in the entire war did the Union have more than 10% of its available manpower in arms. The Confederate forces could never have destroyed enough of the Union forces to make a dent in their manpower. The loss of Confederate manpower, was, on the other hand irreplaceable. Every time Lee or his fellow Confederate generals took 10,000 casualties in a slogging match, that was a Division lost he simply could not replace. The Union could afford to lose 100,000 men for every 10,000 the Confederates lost, so inflicting casualties was not going to win the war. Lee needed to inflict enough defeats on the Union that the northern public, the majority of which were never in support of the war, would turn on Lincoln and vote him out of office. He had one and only one real opportunity to do that: after the first day at Gettysburg. If he listens to Longstreet, the South has a chance to win the war. He didn't, and theis fate was sealed.

 

[Terp152]

Wonderful thread and have enjoyed reading all the entries. Have to disagree Louis, while the Union had considerably more resources, including the manpower you mention, the North could not bear the slaughter of 1864. Lincoln fully expected to lose the election until victories by Sherman revived national morale. Indeed Davis hoped the very continuation of the war would result in Lincoln's election loss and the emergence of a new gov't ready to negotiate an end and Confederate recognition. The question was how to achieve that end. Lee fully understood the weaknesses of the opposing commanders and exploited those with his offensive tactics. Had he not, the overwhelming Federal superiority would have deafted the Confederates. Grant likewise understood this and implemented a successful strategy. The Union army was bled "white" as it was and suffered a degradation of combat effectiveness, witness Ream's Station. The quality of recruits entering the army in 1864, draftees in large numbers, greatly declined and showed the advantage of a superior population size was disappearing.

I would point out a defensive strategy was used in the west by Joe Johnston with disastrous results. Would it have been different in the Virginia theater once competent commanders were in place with the Union army? Chris

 

[swalterh]

I think you are overlooking one very important fact: the Union had an inexhaustable supply of troops (due in large part to Irish immigration), and at no point in the entire war did the Union have more than 10% of its available manpower in arms. The Confederate forces could never have destroyed enough of the Union forces to make a dent in their manpower. The loss of Confederate manpower, was, on the other hand irreplaceable. Every time Lee or his fellow Confederate generals took 10,000 casualties in a slogging match, that was a Division lost he simply could not replace. The Union could afford to lose 100,000 men for every 10,000 the Confederates lost, so inflicting casualties was not going to win the war. Lee needed to inflict enough defeats on the Union that the northern public, the majority of which were never in support of the war, would turn on Lincoln and vote him out of office. He had one and only one real opportunity to do that: after the first day at Gettysburg. If he listens to Longstreet, the South has a chance to win the war. He didn't, and theis fate was sealed.

Yes, you are correct that the north possessed superior manpower resources than the Confederates. I am suggesting that a blow destroying a major portion of a federal army would not serve as an end in and of itself, but such an accomplishment would serve as a means to severely disable the will of the northern public to support the Lincoln administration’s prosecution of hostilities. You are suggesting that a certain number of victories would serve to disable the northern will to continue the fight. I believe we are proposing similar ideas about the need for the Confederates to destroy the Northern people’s will. We are merely relating different ways in which this could have been accomplished. It is perfectly feasible that either or any combination of the two might have done the trick. But, the position in my post was not meant to suggest that the south could win a war of attrition, and therefore the advantage in numbers to the north has not been overlooked.

The idea of war is to destroy the enemy’s ability and/or willingness to continue. I think that conventional wisdom assumes that the Confederacy did not possess the capability to destroy the North’s ability, so the Confederate commanders and policy makers were forced to come up with methods for destroying their opponents’ will. The would’ve, could’ve, should’ve surrounding one particular battle or campaign cannot make up for the complete failure of the Confederate government to formulate a proper diplomatic and military strategy and command structure that would have enabled them to succeed.

Lee’s focus was on his army and theatre of responsibility, making him IMHO a lesser general than his eventual conqueror. Grant understood and executed operations on a strategic level. One of the failures of the Confederate system is that they possessed no organized command structure with significant authority above army level. This unfortunate fact left the armies operating independently and competing for resources and talent. A major drawback to the Confederate cause was the incessant hording of talent by Lee for his Army of Northern Virginia and his and President Davis’ continued banishment of undesirables to other theatres.

I agree that Longstreet was one of the more capable strategic thinkers the Confederates had and probably would have experienced more personal and professional success had he remained in federal service with a command under his friend Grant. Had Lee heeded Longstreet’s advice the Pennsylvania campaign would definitely have turned out differently. Another issue at Gettysburg was that Lee failed to adjust his fighting style following the loss of his best offensively minded subordinate. Before Gettysburg the Army of Northern Virginia was divided into two Corps that were under the direction of highly capable and trustworthy subordinates. During the battle of Gettysburg, the army was divided into three corps and the two under Ewell and Hill never experienced the level of leadership commensurate with their fighting abilities. Lee, who continued to command as though Jackson’s abilities were still on hand, experienced significant disappointment on the fields and rolling hills of south central Pennsylvania.

 

[jazzeum]

In any discussion like this -- why the South lost, the North won, what could have been done differently etc. -- you can't look at these events in a vaccum without taking into account the social/economical/political factors.


The South lost the war the day it declared war because it could never be sure about the slaves again. That was the end of slavery and the ante-bellum economy (as opposed to the post war economy). Read Mary Chestnut's diary.


The Confiscation Acts and the Emancipation Proclamation harnessed the power of the slaves to the Union side. Whenever slaves had the chance to desert they did so, even before the EP, self-emancipation. The EP enabled the Union to use Black people to their benefit. As Lincoln said in his letter to Albert Hodges in 1864, he laid his hand on the colored element. The USCT was an important part of the Army. Moreover, it transformed the war from preservation of the Union to one of abolition. Incidentally, to say the North didn't support the War doesn't jive with the facts.

Economically, the South was destroyed the day it declared war.

 

[swalterh]

The Confiscation Acts and the Emancipation Proclamation harnessed the power of the slaves to the Union side. Whenever slaves had the chance to desert they did so, even before the EP, self-emancipation.

Economically, the South was destroyed the day it declared war.

Gotta love good ole Benjamin "the Beast/Spoons" Butler.

 

[jazzeum]

Gotta love good ole Benjamin "the Beast/Spoons" Butler.

View attachment 117810

But for his inspiration at Fort Monroe and his order in New Orleans, he would be a relative unknown.

 

[swalterh]

OK, so it appears that we are building a pretty strong consensus centered on the idea that the Confederates didn’t possess the ability to cripple the North’s means to wage war so they had to break the Yankees will. We are coming up with numerous thoughts and theories on how this may have been accomplished and all of them have their strengths. Rather than go round and round about the “what if's” and/or would’ve, could’ve, should’ve of this battle or that campaign because as we all recognize these aspects of the Civil War will continue to dominate discussions until the end of time. Instead, I’d like to postulate another line of thought for discussion. What if Davis and his administration put together a command structure similar to that of the North in 1864-65? Just think if Robert E. Lee was placed at the head of the entire Confederate defense establishment. The first question that comes to my mind is who he selects to take over command of the Army of Northern Virginia. A lot of this depends on timing so let’s say this reorganization occurs sometime in 1862, let’s say after the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, and Antietam. I think the next question is what, if any adjustments does he make to the overall strategy of the war and how does he go about addressing the fiasco in the west?

Any takers?

 

[swalterh]

A very fine synopsis swalterh and I fully agree that Grant was a strategical genius. I find it very interesting that over the last two decades modern ACW historians have finally begun to realise what a great strategist the man from Ohio actually was. The usual denigration of Grant based primarily on his sobriquet of "Butcher" after Cold Harbor has always accompanied the deification of Lee as the great tactical strategist who was only worn down by the sheer numbers of the North. However, just recently Grant's tarred reputation has begun to ascend (as highlighted in your summary) whilst Lee's has begun to decline.

I have always been an admirer of the South's struggle for independence and Old Bobby Lee himself but as a serious student of this conflict I have realised for years now that the South could only have "won" the war by not losing it. The North could only win by winning it. Furthermore both generals were indeed aggressive but when you analyze the facts Grant's aggressiveness won the war while Lee's lost it.

I also fervently believe that Lee being a pure bred Virginian only fought for Virginia. He persuaded Davis to retain the Army of Northern Virginia for the most part of the war in Virginia and to back his two invasions of the North which were both disastrous rather than him and indeed Davis looking at the big picture as military strategists. Lee fought the fire in the kitchen whilst the rest of the Confederacy house burnt down around him. Grant's Overland Campaign perfectly demonstrates what Lee- even with a vastly reduced army- could have achieved if he had stayed on the strategic and tactical defensive throughout the war rather than just the last twelve months.

But finally to summarise Grant's effectiveness as a great military commander ponder this:-

Only three armies surrendered whilst the Civil War raged: Buckner's at Fort Donelson; Pemberton's at Vicksburg and Lee's at Appomattox. They all surrendered to Grant.

Bob

Bob,

This is an excellent post. You touch on many of the big issues that often times get overlooked. The standard Civil War debates on leadership get mired in the Grant vs. Lee argument. I find it difficult to accurately compare the two generals, especially when considering their head to head encounters. Lee was an army commander and Grant was in charge of all Union land forces. Grant at all times had to keep the big picture in his consciousness, while Lee merely had to concentrate on his own section of responsibility. The argument made for Lee during this period is that the majority of the encounters during this phase were tactical victories for the Confederates, yet operationally they were being continuously pushed back on the Richmond defenses by the Army of the Potomac’s flank marches. On the strategic level the whole time Grant is smashing at Lee during the overland campaign, Sherman is carving up the Confederacy in the west. For every soldier used for the defense of Richmond, that was one less soldier being used to defend the Rebel heartland. I think it unfair to compare the two when Lee only had control of his operational theatre and could not directly influence how the other Confederate commanders operated.

I find it interesting that you brought up butcher in your post. Unfortunately Grant gets this unsatisfactory moniker because of the high casualties. In reality the overland campaign of 1864 was very much an operation centered on maneuver. The entire idea was to move by the left flank and pin down the Confederates around Richmond. Even when in the trenches at Petersburg, the Federals continued their flanking maneuvers until they ultimately cut off the Confederate supply line at Five Forks. As soon as Grant had possession of Lee’s life line he ordered the assault that broke the Confederate defenses.

You also delve a little bit into the historiography (the study of how history is portrayed throughout various time periods) on the two men. I find it interesting that you mentioned how Grant’s reputation was tarnished while Lee’s was marbleized as the symbol of the lost cause. I would postulate that during the late 1960’s, 70’s and early 80’s the American and western perception of military operations and the men who directed them took a very negative turn. Because of the American led failure in Vietnam, the western military historian was confronted with validation of defeat from their respective military establishments. Total victory was seen as unachievable and wars of attrition in the style of the Union victory over the Confederacy were unpopular. The historians presented Lee as the noble freedom fighter who despite having the qualitative edge eventually succumbed to superior numbers while fumbling, bumbling Grant merely stumbled upon victory because he possessed all of the quantitative advantages.

When you read books on the war that were written and published in the 1940’s, 50’s, and early 60’s from authors such as Freeman and Catton, you get a much more crisp military analysis. This is clearly a reflection of the positive public attitude towards the military because of their triumph during the Second World War. So, what made for acceptable reading during the World War II era was denigrated in the Vietnam era. In both Freeman and Catton’s analysis of the high command of both countries, the reader is presented with a very balanced and honest account based firmly on conventional military theory. The books that were published during the Vietnam era have a very apologetic tone and seek to justify failure by conjuring up excuses. Publications of this period tend to focus more on the human aspects of military conflict such as topics concerning political, social and daily activity. You are right about contemporary historians getting back to a more objective analysis of how the war unfolded. Today’s historian is charged with combing these two previous styles and attempt to interweave the military as well as human aspects into one seamless narrative.

And as you pointed out, Grant was from Ohio. You might be interested to know that I live less than an hour’s drive from his Boyhood hometown of Georgetown.

Shane

 

[Louis Badolato]

Yes, you are correct that the north possessed superior manpower resources than the Confederates. I am suggesting that a blow destroying a major portion of a federal army would not serve as an end in and of itself, but such an accomplishment would serve as a means to severely disable the will of the northern public to support the Lincoln administration’s prosecution of hostilities. You are suggesting that a certain number of victories would serve to disable the northern will to continue the fight. I believe we are proposing similar ideas about the need for the Confederates to destroy the Northern people’s will. We are merely relating different ways in which this could have been accomplished. It is perfectly feasible that either or any combination of the two might have done the trick. But, the position in my post was not meant to suggest that the south could win a war of attrition, and therefore the advantage in numbers to the north has not been overlooked.

The idea of war is to destroy the enemy’s ability and/or willingness to continue. I think that conventional wisdom assumes that the Confederacy did not possess the capability to destroy the North’s ability, so the Confederate commanders and policy makers were forced to come up with methods for destroying their opponents’ will. The would’ve, could’ve, should’ve surrounding one particular battle or campaign cannot make up for the complete failure of the Confederate government to formulate a proper diplomatic and military strategy and command structure that would have enabled them to succeed.

Lee’s focus was on his army and theatre of responsibility, making him IMHO a lesser general than his eventual conqueror. Grant understood and executed operations on a strategic level. One of the failures of the Confederate system is that they possessed no organized command structure with significant authority above army level. This unfortunate fact left the armies operating independently and competing for resources and talent. A major drawback to the Confederate cause was the incessant hording of talent by Lee for his Army of Northern Virginia and his and President Davis’ continued banishment of undesirables to other theatres.

I agree that Longstreet was one of the more capable strategic thinkers the Confederates had and probably would have experienced more personal and professional success had he remained in federal service with a command under his friend Grant. Had Lee heeded Longstreet’s advice the Pennsylvania campaign would definitely have turned out differently. Another issue at Gettysburg was that Lee failed to adjust his fighting style following the loss of his best offensively minded subordinate. Before Gettysburg the Army of Northern Virginia was divided into two Corps that were under the direction of highly capable and trustworthy subordinates. During the battle of Gettysburg, the army was divided into three corps and the two under Ewell and Hill never experienced the level of leadership commensurate with their fighting abilities. Lee, who continued to command as though Jackson’s abilities were still on hand, experienced significant disappointment on the fields and rolling hills of south central Pennsylvania.

I think we are more or less making the same point, but you are doing so with a better grasp of military terminology than I. Using your better grasp of the terms and ideas (I suspect you have either a military education or experience as an officer, while I am an untrained toy soldier collector, so I appreciate your superior knowledge) an offensive strategy using defensive tactics (i.e. invade the North, force the Union army to react, then choose your ground and make them attack you), causing a disaster that costs Lincoln the election is the method for the Confederacy winning the war I have been trying to express. I believe you are advocating the same basic premise, using better military terminilogy in doing so. In any event, I appreciate the conversation we are having, particularly your and UKReb's inputs. Thanks for the information.

 

[Terp152]

Bob,

When you read books on the war that were written and published in the 1940’s, 50’s, and early 60’s from authors such as Freeman and Catton, you get a much more crisp military analysis. This is clearly a reflection of the positive public attitude towards the military because of their triumph during the Second World War. So, what made for acceptable reading during the World War II era was denigrated in the Vietnam era. In both Freeman and Catton’s analysis of the high command of both countries, the reader is presented with a very balanced and honest account based firmly on conventional military theory. The books that were published during the Vietnam era have a very apologetic tone and seek to justify failure by conjuring up excuses. "

Excellent point Shane. You would make an excellent Military History teacher. Most pre-1970 history narratives do not focus on the socio-economic aspects when discussing the command structure, as you mention. Chris

 

[jazzeum]

As I tend to be more interested in reading about Lincoln, slavery, the EP, the causes that led to the war and so forth, rather than battles, let me add that by late 1864 Lincoln expected to lose the election. One must realize that since the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, the trend in Presidential politics was to have only one term presidents so it was not unnatural to expect that he might be beaten.

In his famous blind memorandum to the cabinet of August 23, 1864 (which can be found in the Collected Works, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/), Lincoln wrote

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probably that this Administration will not be re-elected. Then, it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.
​

The cabinet members were asked to sign the sheet without knowing the contents.

To Lincoln, the Democrats constituted a party that would win the election on a basis that would make it impossible to save the Union. It is possible the rebellious states would have been welcomed back to the fold with slavery intact and the EP retracted.

However, would have that been the end of it? I doubt the Republicans in Congress would have taken that lying down. The Democrats would not have been in power immediately because the inauguration would not have been until March and who can say what would have happened.

It is only fortunate that Lincoln did not lose and the trajectory to abolition completed.

 

[jazzeum]

When you read books on the war that were written and published in the 1940’s, 50’s, and early 60’s from authors such as Freeman and Catton, you get a much more crisp military analysis. This is clearly a reflection of the positive public attitude towards the military because of their triumph during the Second World War. So, what made for acceptable reading during the World War II era was denigrated in the Vietnam era. In both Freeman and Catton’s analysis of the high command of both countries, the reader is presented with a very balanced and honest account based firmly on conventional military theory. The books that were published during the Vietnam era have a very apologetic tone and seek to justify failure by conjuring up excuses. Publications of this period tend to focus more on the human aspects of military conflict such as topics concerning political, social and daily activity. You are right about contemporary historians getting back to a more objective analysis of how the war unfolded. Today’s historian is charged with combing these two previous styles and attempt to interweave the military as well as human aspects into one seamless narrative.

I don't know if you're positing for the way things were or just explaining how things are but wars don't happen in a vaccum and dissecting strategy or re-telling battles can't be neatly separated from what is happening in the social, economic and political spheres, which is why I find an amalgamation of the latter or a focus on the latter to provide a better picture. You can't discuss battles without remembering the strategy of the United States and the rebellious states: one, anti-slavery and the abolition of slavery, and the other, preservation of the system as it existed. Part of the Southern failure to win can't be understood without discussing what was going on in the home front down South and why it was so urgent to "win" as quickly as possible. I read Catton when I was young and I find his style today quaint and Freemen, well, he's just a Lost Causer.

 

[UKReb]

Bob,

This is an excellent post. You touch on many of the big issues that often times get overlooked. The standard Civil War debates on leadership get mired in the Grant vs. Lee argument. I find it difficult to accurately compare the two generals, especially when considering their head to head encounters. Lee was an army commander and Grant was in charge of all Union land forces. Grant at all times had to keep the big picture in his consciousness, while Lee merely had to concentrate on his own section of responsibility. The argument made for Lee during this period is that the majority of the encounters during this phase were tactical victories for the Confederates, yet operationally they were being continuously pushed back on the Richmond defenses by the Army of the Potomac’s flank marches. On the strategic level the whole time Grant is smashing at Lee during the overland campaign, Sherman is carving up the Confederacy in the west. For every soldier used for the defense of Richmond, that was one less soldier being used to defend the Rebel heartland. I think it unfair to compare the two when Lee only had control of his operational theatre and could not directly influence how the other Confederate commanders operated.

I find it interesting that you brought up butcher in your post. Unfortunately Grant gets this unsatisfactory moniker because of the high casualties. In reality the overland campaign of 1864 was very much an operation centered on maneuver. The entire idea was to move by the left flank and pin down the Confederates around Richmond. Even when in the trenches at Petersburg, the Federals continued their flanking maneuvers until they ultimately cut off the Confederate supply line at Five Forks. As soon as Grant had possession of Lee’s life line he ordered the assault that broke the Confederate defenses.

You also delve a little bit into the historiography (the study of how history is portrayed throughout various time periods) on the two men. I find it interesting that you mentioned how Grant’s reputation was tarnished while Lee’s was marbleized as the symbol of the lost cause. I would postulate that during the late 1960’s, 70’s and early 80’s the American and western perception of military operations and the men who directed them took a very negative turn. Because of the American led failure in Vietnam, the western military historian was confronted with validation of defeat from their respective military establishments. Total victory was seen as unachievable and wars of attrition in the style of the Union victory over the Confederacy were unpopular. The historians presented Lee as the noble freedom fighter who despite having the qualitative edge eventually succumbed to superior numbers while fumbling, bumbling Grant merely stumbled upon victory because he possessed all of the quantitative advantages.

When you read books on the war that were written and published in the 1940’s, 50’s, and early 60’s from authors such as Freeman and Catton, you get a much more crisp military analysis. This is clearly a reflection of the positive public attitude towards the military because of their triumph during the Second World War. So, what made for acceptable reading during the World War II era was denigrated in the Vietnam era. In both Freeman and Catton’s analysis of the high command of both countries, the reader is presented with a very balanced and honest account based firmly on conventional military theory. The books that were published during the Vietnam era have a very apologetic tone and seek to justify failure by conjuring up excuses. Publications of this period tend to focus more on the human aspects of military conflict such as topics concerning political, social and daily activity. You are right about contemporary historians getting back to a more objective analysis of how the war unfolded. Today’s historian is charged with combing these two previous styles and attempt to interweave the military as well as human aspects into one seamless narrative.

And as you pointed out, Grant was from Ohio. You might be interested to know that I live less than an hour’s drive from his Boyhood hometown of Georgetown.

Shane

Thanks Shane for your post and I too am thoroughly enjoying inputs from all the guys who have participated in this enthralling (well for us anyway) thread.

Being slightly familiar with the subject I appreciate the rest of the guys comments that they believe that the South was doomed from Fort Sumter onwards. However, I have always found it fascinating to mix it up with like-minded students on their varying views such as contained within this thread. You mention a very key word for this topic "maneuver". Lee was one of the most revered leaders in military history inspiring remarkable devotion from his soldiers whilst embodying the traits of courage and honour. But it would appear to me that Jackson and Longstreet developed a polar opposite to Lee's strategy of frontal assaults. Defend then attack!

An example: Jackson's original plan to strike down Hooker's west flank was only agreed by Lee when he faced a potential disaster at Chancellorsville which proved to be Lee's last major "victory". This classic maneuver employed by Jackson was not be repeated. After Jackson's death there was no-one forceful enough to convince Lee of the necessity to preserve his most precious resource by remaining on the defensive whenever possible and by flanking maneuvers rather than frontally assaulting superior enemy forces. We read that Longstreet believed he had extracted from Lee a promise to undertake such a strategy on their second invasion of the North. But at the very first challenge on July 1st Lee immediately resorted to direct confrontation for three whole days. It is very easy today for us armchair generals to sympathise with the Reb artillery officer Porter Alexander's assessment that

"Never, never, never did General Lee himself bollox a fight as he did at Gettysburg"

And yet as I have previously stated Lee's performance during the Overland Campaign of 1864 still stands today as one of the greatest defensive operations in military history.

Bob

 

[lancer]

In relation to Gettysburg, I don't believe Lee ever had a notion of fighting a defensive invasion of the North. To start with, the two terms are a contradiction and Lee certainly wasn't defensive minded. He knew he had the measure of the Union Army and commander when the invasion plans were set. He wanted to draw the Union Army out and destroy it and the best way was to invade the North and force the Union to do battle where Lee could dictate the offensive terms and he would do this through his usual maneuvering. There are several factors that were working against Lee. He had just fought and won a costly victory at Chancellorsville, had lost Jackson, and had been forced to restructure his command. He was also undertaking an operation that wasn't entirely popular as many people (military and civilian) were against a Southern offensive. Many felt that it was a bad decision to move out of Virginia, almost a violation of the oath to defend their state from the Northen invaders. This last factor, coupled with the inevitable logistical problems presented by an invasion of the North, certainly would make a fast, decisive victory a must. I don't see Lee invading the North and then hunkering down into a defensive position with the hope that the Union commander would launch an attack. How could Lee afford to sit in a defensive position, with supply lines that were stretched out and vulnerable? As I said above, Lee was going to draw the Union into the open and beat them with his classic battle of maneuver, and judging from past performance, he was right in such an assumption. But things changed when Meade was put in command. Meade was a somewhat unknown entity. After finding the Union Army still in defensive positions on the second day at Gettysburg, with no real idea where Stuart was and what info Stuart might have in regards to Union dispositions/intentions, Lee decided to attack the Union Army where it was, with what info he did have. It might not be the best situation, out in the open as he would have preferred, but it was good enough for Lee, with his faith in his own ability and the ability of his army. The enemy was there and he was going to do battle. It was Lee's fate to have all his battle of manuever plans foiled in one way or another at Gettysburg, as will happen in war, but he fought the battle as it presented itself, in the way he preferred. There is no good proof to me that Lee ever intended to establish a defensive position in enemy territory, giving up his manuever warfare, in the hope that the Union Army would dash itself to pieces against his prepared positions. -- Al

 

[Phantom Warrior]

In relation to Gettysburg, I don't believe Lee ever had a notion of fighting a defensive invasion of the North. To start with, the two terms are a contradiction and Lee certainly wasn't defensive minded. He knew he had the measure of the Union Army and commander when the invasion plans were set. He wanted to draw the Union Army out and destroy it and the best way was to invade the North and force the Union to do battle where Lee could dictate the offensive terms and he would do this through his usual maneuvering. There are several factors that were working against Lee. He had just fought and won a costly victory at Chancellorsville, had lost Jackson, and had been forced to restructure his command. He was also undertaking an operation that wasn't entirely popular as many people (military and civilian) were against a Southern offensive. Many felt that it was a bad decision to move out of Virginia, almost a violation of the oath to defend their state from the Northen invaders. This last factor, coupled with the inevitable logistical problems presented by an invasion of the North, certainly would make a fast, decisive victory a must. I don't see Lee invading the North and then hunkering down into a defensive position with the hope that the Union commander would launch an attack. How could Lee afford to sit in a defensive position, with supply lines that were stretched out and vulnerable? As I said above, Lee was going to draw the Union into the open and beat them with his classic battle of maneuver, and judging from past performance, he was right in such an assumption. But things changed when Meade was put in command. Meade was a somewhat unknown entity. After finding the Union Army still in defensive positions on the second day at Gettysburg, with no real idea where Stuart was and what info Stuart might have in regards to Union dispositions/intentions, Lee decided to attack the Union Army where it was, with what info he did have. It might not be the best situation, out in the open as he would have preferred, but it was good enough for Lee, with his faith in his own ability and the ability of his army. The enemy was there and he was going to do battle. It was Lee's fate to have all his battle of manuever plans foiled in one way or another at Gettysburg, as will happen in war, but he fought the battle as it presented itself, in the way he preferred. There is no good proof to me that Lee ever intended to establish a defensive position in enemy territory, giving up his manuever warfare, in the hope that the Union Army would dash itself to pieces against his prepared positions. -- Al

Not establish a defensive position and wait for Meade to attack, but rampage around the north forcing Meade to chase after him and at lee's choice of ground turn to fight Meade. That way Lee could make use of his army's ability to manoeuver.

Terry

 

[Terp152]

In relation to Gettysburg, I don't believe Lee ever had a notion of fighting a defensive invasion of the North. To start with, the two terms are a contradiction and Lee certainly wasn't defensive minded. He knew he had the measure of the Union Army and commander when the invasion plans were set. He wanted to draw the Union Army out and destroy it and the best way was to invade the North and force the Union to do battle where Lee could dictate the offensive terms and he would do this through his usual maneuvering. There are several factors that were working against Lee. He had just fought and won a costly victory at Chancellorsville, had lost Jackson, and had been forced to restructure his command. He was also undertaking an operation that wasn't entirely popular as many people (military and civilian) were against a Southern offensive. Many felt that it was a bad decision to move out of Virginia, almost a violation of the oath to defend their state from the Northen invaders. This last factor, coupled with the inevitable logistical problems presented by an invasion of the North, certainly would make a fast, decisive victory a must. I don't see Lee invading the North and then hunkering down into a defensive position with the hope that the Union commander would launch an attack. How could Lee afford to sit in a defensive position, with supply lines that were stretched out and vulnerable? As I said above, Lee was going to draw the Union into the open and beat them with his classic battle of maneuver, and judging from past performance, he was right in such an assumption. But things changed when Meade was put in command. Meade was a somewhat unknown entity. After finding the Union Army still in defensive positions on the second day at Gettysburg, with no real idea where Stuart was and what info Stuart might have in regards to Union dispositions/intentions, Lee decided to attack the Union Army where it was, with what info he did have. It might not be the best situation, out in the open as he would have preferred, but it was good enough for Lee, with his faith in his own ability and the ability of his army. The enemy was there and he was going to do battle. It was Lee's fate to have all his battle of manuever plans foiled in one way or another at Gettysburg, as will happen in war, but he fought the battle as it presented itself, in the way he preferred. There is no good proof to me that Lee ever intended to establish a defensive position in enemy territory, giving up his manuever warfare, in the hope that the Union Army would dash itself to pieces against his prepared positions. -- Al

Exactlly, no one would place an army of inferior numbers in the middle of hostile territory and then just sit on their backside and wait for an opponent to gather an overwhelming force to strike at the moment of their own choice. It would be the unique commander who would not want to follow up the success of the Army of Northern VA of July 1st to attempt to complete the destruction of the Union Army. Which is why Lee went north in the first place (in addition to avoiding sending sizeable detachments to the west). Chris

 

[lancer]

Exactlly, no one would place an army of inferior numbers in the middle of hostile territory and then just sit on their backside and wait for an opponent to gather an overwhelming force to strike at the moment of their own choice. It would be the unique commander who would not want to follow up the success of the Army of Northern VA of July 1st to attempt to complete the destruction of the Union Army. Which is why Lee went north in the first place (in addition to avoiding sending sizeable detachments to the west). Chris

Chris, it is so obvious to me and you and others but (and I go off course, big time here) all I could think of in relation to the assumption that Lee would establish a defensive position, is to look at a more recent example from history called Dien Bien Phu.{eek3} -- Al

 

[Louis Badolato]

Not establish a defensive position and wait for Meade to attack, but rampage around the north forcing Meade to chase after him and at lee's choice of ground turn to fight Meade. That way Lee could make use of his army's ability to manoeuver.

Terry

Absolutely, Terry. Plus, if you are outnumbered and in enemy territory, it seems counterintuitive to attack your opponent while he has his forces fully assembled and is in a dug in position of his choosing. If you have a superior ability to maneuver, then use it. Move away, towards some valuable or undefended target (preferrably both), and force the enemy to chase you. The either turn around and hit the enemy when it is divided, in an attempt to defeat it in detail, or grab a good piece of ground where you have a viable escape route, and get them to attack you. Its not my idea, Its Jim Longstreet's, so I suspect it was a viable option.