Britain's Greatest General - National Army Museum (1 Viewer)

[Currahee Chris]

On July 28th, 1932, President Hoover ordered the army to clear out the veterans. MacArthur was in command, and Patton was in charge of the Cavalry. Ike was there, as the liaison with Washington police. Patton was a major then, and saw a chance to make points with MacArthur, then the chief of staff, as well as President Hoover.

The irony of all this is that these two guys are icons in the US Army, ,yet, take General Petraeus, who has more combat experience as a General Officer and people are like "Who??" Go figure. (he has been a general officer in the GWOT for several years now).

Question for the forum- this is something I do not know the answer to- were Axis commanders susceptible to the "ego" bug- in other words, did Rommel, Guderian etc orchestrate operations with questionable personal motives? I know there was dissention with the Japanese attack at Pearl- though I believe the Japanese executed the attack to achieve some strategic aim- not to aid an Admiral in attaining personal glory.

Just curious

Also- I'm adjusting the odds to 5-1 this gets cloed at post 125- if anything I will post some wild, inflammatory comment just to keep my record in check ^&grin^&grin- just kidding- very happy to see the civility.

 

[Louis Badolato]

The irony of all this is that these two guys are icons in the US Army, ,yet, take General Petraeus, who has more combat experience as a General Officer and people are like "Who??" Go figure. (he has been a general officer in the GWOT for several years now).

Question for the forum- this is something I do not know the answer to- were Axis commanders susceptible to the "ego" bug- in other words, did Rommel, Guderian etc orchestrate operations with questionable personal motives? I know there was dissention with the Japanese attack at Pearl- though I believe the Japanese executed the attack to achieve some strategic aim- not to aid an Admiral in attaining personal glory.

Just curious

Also- I'm adjusting the odds to 5-1 this gets cloed at post 125- if anything I will post some wild, inflammatory comment just to keep my record in check ^&grin^&grin- just kidding- very happy to see the civility.

The only Axis general I am aware of disobeying or overstepping orders is Rommel. He consistently disobeyed orders not to attack further and overextend his supply lines in North Africa. His disobedience resulted in some dramatic victories in the short term - which is why he got away with it - but Rommel never seemed capable of understanding logistical limitations, and, as a result, in the end, the Afrika Corps, overextended with supply lines hundreds of miles long at El Alamein, suffered a catastrophic defeat.

 

[Currahee Chris]

Finally, the forces involved. As Howard mentioned, Monty waited for the delivery of 500 brand new Sherman Tanks (something that got his immediate predecessor in command - I forget whether it was Auckinlek or Wavell - sacked by Churchill for dragging his feet), allowing him to have a 5 to 1 advantage in armor, as well as men and artillery. It should be noted that he commanded excellent British, Commonwealth and Anzac forces. The majority of Rommel's men and equipment were Italian. The M13 Tank was a piece of garbage, and the Italian troops were woefully underequipped. The Italian officers were for the most part a disaster.

But should this work to Month's discredit?? If the other guys requested that level of equipment and couldn't get it but Monty was able to then how does this reflect negatively against him?? This entire scenario you describe here is the Powell Principle- which General Powell advocated from lessons learned in Nam- set realistic and clearly defined objectives AND exit strategy and overwhelm the enemy- the world saw how devastatingly effective it worked for the Coalition forces in 1991 with ODS.

Just my two tuppence :tongue:

 

[Louis Badolato]

But should this work to Month's discredit?? If the other guys requested that level of equipment and couldn't get it but Monty was able to then how does this reflect negatively against him?? This entire scenario you describe here is the Powell Principle- which General Powell advocated from lessons learned in Nam- set realistic and clearly defined objectives AND exit strategy and overwhelm the enemy- the world saw how devastatingly effective it worked for the Coalition forces in 1991 with ODS.

Just my two tuppence :tongue:

Chris,

There was certainly a similar, if not greater advantage for the coalition forces during Desert Storm. The difference is that Schwartzkopf was so effective in his handling of the attack that he lost almost no casualties, and scored such a tremedous victory that the enemy forces were totally encircled and forced to immediately surrender.

At El Alamein, the British, due to screw ups during the night attack, suffered many multiples of the casualties suffered by the coalition during the entirety of Desert Storm, and Rommel was permitted to escape with enough of his forces to keep the fight going for almost another year.

The point I was trying to make is that Rob cites the victory at El Alamein as a "great victory" which overcomes all of Monty's other failures to warrant him being the greatest general Britain ever produced. I was merely pointing out that under the circumstances, there was such an advantage, that I simply can't view this victory as warranting any great credit to Monty.

 

[Gazza]

Chris,

There was certainly a similar, if not greater advantage for the coalition forces during Desert Storm. The difference is that Schwartzkopf was so effective in his handling of the attack that he lost almost no casualties, and scored such a tremedous victory that the enemy forces were totally encircled and forced to immediately surrender.

At El Alamein, the British, due to screw ups during the night attack, suffered many multiples of the casualties suffered by the coalition during the entirety of Desert Storm, and Rommel was permitted to escape with enough of his forces to keep the fight going for almost another year.

The point I was trying to make is that Rob cites the victory at El Alamein as a "great victory" which overcomes all of Monty's other failures to warrant him being the greatest general Britain ever produced. I was merely pointing out that under the circumstances, there was such an advantage, that I simply can't view this victory as warranting any great credit to Monty.

I think any comparison with Desert Storm I and low casualties is academic – taking nothing away from Schwartzkopf – but he had massive airpower to attack with AND far more advanced weaponry with regards to tanks and cruise missiles etc. Add to this AWAC’s and satellite imagery. How does this compare to WWII in North Africa? I think we under-estimate how communications have improved and changed the nature of war.

Why is El Alamein such a ‘great victory’? Simple really - up to this point the Wehmarcht was seen as unbeatable. They had previously swept aside France – who possessed the largest army in Europe - and had conquered most of Europe. For many Brits, it marked the beginning of the end and Monty led those forces to victory.

Whether this makes him the Greatest though - I do not know.

I am looking forward to the lectures in April when the top 5 will be debated and a winner announced. Be curious to see which military historians / ex-military present the cases for which of the 5.

Cheers

Gazza

 

[Currahee Chris]

I think any comparison with Desert Storm I and low casualties is academic – taking nothing away from Schwartzkopf – but he had massive airpower to attack with AND far more advanced weaponry with regards to tanks and cruise missiles etc. Add to this AWAC’s and satellite imagery. How does this compare to WWII in North Africa? I think we under-estimate how communications have improved and changed the nature of war.

no no -I think you guys are missing my point- I'm not talking about the toys- I'm talking about the doctrine- Louis infers, if I read correctly, that Monty had a decisive advantage because he had more equipment and better troops than his opposition. I was alluding to the similarities in doctrine between the two conflicts- all things equal. The coalition went into Kuwait with far more equipment and just overwhelmed the Iraqi ground and air forces- which, imo, is brilliant generalship. I felt like what Louis was saying was that this worked to Montys discredit whereas I think it is very much a feather in his cap.

 

[Mitch]

Rommell was not singular in disobeying orders ''Papa'' Hausser (Das Reich et al) disobeyed Hitlers orders in retaking Kharkov and, as punishment his award was deliberately witheld for a while. Others did but, Hausser's springs to mind


ArnhemJim...

Are you saying that all the planning and the crux of the operations around Caen was flawed and down to Monty?? I am wondering what this is based on as it has been said that the tenacity and quality of units the germans fielded was instrumental in stopping and delaying the allied advance.
Mitch

 

[Arnhemjim]

Excellent post though it begs one glaring question on my end....

Exactly how does a career Navy Intel officer become interested in Arnhem?? I don't exactly see the cause/effect of the enormous expertise you have on the subject matter. ^&grin

Oh- btw-

GO ARMY!!

Hi Chris,
Initially I was merely going to cast my vote on the National Army Museum's web page, and let it go at that. However, as this thread extended I reached a point where my Scottish blood got up over some of the comments and assessments made in the forum. You have asked how a "career naval intelligence officer" ever got involved in research on the Battle of Arnhem? My best answer would be that you have to have a life outside your principal field(s) of endeavor (in my case, USSR Submarine Force and ASW), just as a release mechanism. Obviously toy soldiers being another. As you already probably know one of the major lapses in the planning for Market-Garden, was the failure to exploit available intelligence, specifically ULTRA, which was compartmented at a very high level, i.e. 21st Army Group(read Montgomery). Then when I discovered the British Army pamphlet which I referenced in my discussion, I very rapidly began to appreciate a rather consistent and comprehensive pattern or "mentality" that Montgomery had brought into the entire planning process for Operation Market-Garden. I guess you could state it akin to the phrase, "My way or the highway". Based on my research this applied universally to subordinates, peers, and superiors, including Eisenhower on more than one occasion. Again my apologies, the only reason I was so long-winded in my discussion was to try and establish, apart from my work in intelligence, that I had some "depth of keel" on the subject. Enough said.
Best regards,
Jim Gordon

 

[Currahee Chris]

Again my apologies, the only reason I was so long-winded in my discussion was to try and establish, apart from my work in intelligence, that I had some "depth of keel" on the subject. Enough said.
Best regards,
Jim Gordon

Hey Sir-

no apologies neccesary at all- was just curious- sorry if you took it as me trying to bait you. I certainly can appreciate your position- as I have become a fan of the Roman Empire over recent years. I don't think anyone faulted you for being, in your terms, long winded- I think we all appreciated the experience and expertise you bring to the subject matter.

oh and " GO ARMY!!^&grin

Kindest regards
CC

 

[Currahee Chris]

Mitch and Louis-

regarding Axis commanders- Right, I knew a little about Rommel's situation- though has history determined/judged his "insubordination" as ego driven- so much like Monty, Patton and MacArthur, or for some other reasoning. I guess I am trying to figure out why it appears that egoism was so rife in the Allied high command- you know Mitch- I am trying to obtain a better understanding of the nazi mind set/thought process ^&grin^&grin^&grin

 

[uksubs]

just so everyone knows, I am taking this thread to be banned/blocked or otherwise sixed by post 125. I'm giving good odds too ^&grin

Look like you could be right ,think it that time of the month:salute::

 

[Mitch]

Rob...

I knew it!!!

Anyway here is another take on the Caen battles

Operation Neptune
tenacious and aggressive defence and counter attacks by the 21st Panzer Division blunted and halted the 3rd Infantry Division tasked to take Caen on the 6th June.

Operation Perch
9th June a classic pincer movement attack resulted in poor movement because of the bocage and, tenacious and vicious attacks and defence by the Panzer Lehr, 12th SS et al (included is the Villiers Bocage battle) it was also hindered by severe storms in the channel which, severely disrupted supplies.

Le Mesnil-Patry
Canadian armoured division and 46 commando faced fierce resistance at the town and could not move further forward.

Operation Martlett
an attack to support the larger attack Epsom. poor weather and terrain and german defence and counter attacks caused this attack to peter out.

Operation Epsom
an Operation to capture ground around and at Bretville-sur-Laize blunted by powerfull attacks by the Ist SS corps and IInd SS corps. This operation drew in most of the german reserves.

Operation Windsor
An attack to take the airfield at Carpiquet. Here Major Keller was heavily criticised for the failure of this operation. The airfield again was defended with heavy german forces with 75mm 88mm and plenty of 20mm AA guns in heavily fortified concrete bunkers.

Operation Charnwood
The first frontal assault preceded with a dropping of 2000 tons of bombs. The allies took the Northern part of Caen but, due to the devastation the armoured units could not fully take advantage of their gains because of the rubble smoke and german defenders. The big failure was the withdrawal of the 12th SS.

Operation Jupiter
Designed to expand the bridghead take control of Hill 112 and Fontaine and Eterville. After that they were designated to capture Maltot. Again, 9th 10th and 12th SS divisions with heavt tank units artillery and nebelwerfers stopped the attack in its tracks.

Operation Goodwood
I believe was Gen Dempsey's idea and authorised by Monty when he granted permission for Cobra. Massive traffic jams and Dempsey ordering O'Connell to leave all units on their side of the Orne river until all his tanks were across weakened and split his forces. There was also a large minefield placed by the Highlanders to clear as they did not want it to be cleared prior to allow german spotters to see an attack was coming. Not enough clear lanes were made through the minefield and this slowed the advance.
Dempsey failed to co-ordinate his tanks and artillery correctly and this caused great problems
Bombing failed to take out german heavy positions and 88mm guns etc were vitally still in place at Bourguebus ridge with clear lines of fire against the oncoming allies.
He gave too many tasks IMo to 11 armoured Division the lead units which, greatly slowed their advance.
21st, 12th SS and 1st SS Panzer Divisions caused heavy losses in tenacious defence and counter attacks.
Monty then called off the operation but, Caen was by then not as strategically important as it was to both sides on the 6th june.

Its easy to say this was Monty's doing but, lets not forget what the English and Canadians faced probably, arguably, the best german units they fielded in France.
Mitch

 

[Louis Badolato]

Mitch and Rob,

I don't want to pile on or anything, but in Normandy, and during the planning stages leading up to D-Day, wasn't Monty the commander on the ground, with overall responsibility for the planning of the breakout?

Mitch, your last post mentioned certain of the actions failing because the forces were hung up in the Bocage. I know that many British people did and still do vacation in Normandy. Plus there were literally thousands of photo reconaissance shots depicting the bocage. Somebody in the command structure knew about the hedgerows.

Anybody with military experience has to recognize the inherent dangers of attacking these natural fortresses. The infantry that have to take these hedgerows were going to be exposed to a crossfire focused at any entrance or other weak point, then to pre-registered mortar fire as they cross the open field to reach the dug in Nazi positions. When they finally manage to take an individual hedgerow, they will be under fire from the next hedgerow, where the retreating Nazi’s will occupy another pre-prepared defensive position and inflict more casualties. Each armored division only had a couple of the bulldozer tanks necessary to smash through the hedgerows. The Nazi’s needed only watch those tanks to know exactly where the next attack will occur. Absent a hedgecutter, any ordinary tank that rams one of these hedgerows is going to rear up and expose its belly.

How is it possible that the ground commander failed to account for the difficulties of fighting in the hedgerows? Why was it left to Sergeant Curtis Grubb Culin III, a young man from Cranford, New Jersey with no formal education or engineering experience, to come up with the hedgecutter?

Sounds to me like another monumental failure to appreciate intelligence, like the one our friend Captain Gordon pointed out with regard to Operation Market Garden.

 

[DMNamiot]

Hi Guys,

Some very good informative posts here please keep it going. Chris I promise to make it go to at least 152 posts before I drop the axe!%^V

The discussion of Monty and his abilities and victories/losses is interesting. Just remember gents its opinions here. We all know that some of us love the guy and some of us not so much. Like American Generals that some of us really admire and some of us dont. The big thing to try be mindful of is we will not always agree so lets refrain from making references to Jack the Ripper or some other inane illusion. If you dont agree with a stated arguement then please use a fact driven arguement to drive home your point and stay away from the emotions.

Dave

 

[Rob]

Hi Guys,

Some very good informative posts here please keep it going. Chris I promise to make it go to at least 152 posts before I drop the axe!%^V

The discussion of Monty and his abilities and victories/losses is interesting. Just remember gents its opinions here. We all know that some of us love the guy and some of us not so much. Like American Generals that some of us really admire and some of us dont. The big thing to try be mindful of is we will not always agree so lets refrain from making references to Jack the Ripper or some other inane illusion. If you dont agree with a stated arguement then please use a fact driven arguement to drive home your point and stay away from the emotions.

Dave

Hang on a min, where in the forum does it state emotion is not allowed to be shown?. Here is a general who beat the Nazi's greatest General and is a Hero of our country, why do we have to let him be maligned like this all the time with no acknowledgement of his success?. The Jack the Ripper remark maybe inane to you but was a Joke of course, but some armchair generals completely ignore his Victory over Rommel, and believe me some of us are getting sick of it.

Rob

 

[uksubs]

Mitch and Rob,

I don't want to pile on or anything, but in Normandy, and during the planning stages leading up to D-Day, wasn't Monty the commander on the ground, with overall responsibility for the planning of the breakout?

Mitch, your last post mentioned certain of the actions failing because the forces were hung up in the Bocage. I know that many British people did and still do vacation in Normandy. Plus there were literally thousands of photo reconaissance shots depicting the bocage. Somebody in the command structure knew about the hedgerows.

Anybody with military experience has to recognize the inherent dangers of attacking these natural fortresses. The infantry that have to take these hedgerows were going to be exposed to a crossfire focused at any entrance or other weak point, then to pre-registered mortar fire as they cross the open field to reach the dug in Nazi positions. When they finally manage to take an individual hedgerow, they will be under fire from the next hedgerow, where the retreating Nazi’s will occupy another pre-prepared defensive position and inflict more casualties. Each armored division only had a couple of the bulldozer tanks necessary to smash through the hedgerows. The Nazi’s needed only watch those tanks to know exactly where the next attack will occur. Absent a hedgecutter, any ordinary tank that rams one of these hedgerows is going to rear up and expose its belly.

How is it possible that the ground commander failed to account for the difficulties of fighting in the hedgerows? Why was it left to Sergeant Curtis Grubb Culin III, a young man from Cranford, New Jersey with no formal education or engineering experience, to come up with the hedgecutter?

Sounds to me like another monumental failure to appreciate intelligence, like the one our friend Captain Gordon pointed out with regard to Operation Market Garden.

Don't you think the hedgerow worked to the allies advantage as well ,just look what happened on Operation Goodwood when the British & Canadians attacked across open fields they were out gunned by the German 88mm guns but when fighting in the Bocage made easer to attack German armour at closer range & don't forget before this the Allies were only use to fighting in the desert , as for the hedgecutter I don't think it was a battle winner like when the British attacked the German at night & over ran them do you ?

 

[uksubs]

Mitch and Rob,



Anybody with military experience has to recognize the inherent dangers of attacking these natural fortresses.

I think your find The US army had the same problem in 1945 in the Forest of Germany :wink2:

 

[Louis Badolato]

Don't you think the hedgerow worked to the allies advantage as well ,just look what happened on Operation Goodwood when the British & Canadians attacked across open fields they were out gunned by the German 88mm guns but when fighting in the Bocage made easer to attack German armour at closer range & don't forget before this the Allies were only us to fighting in the desert , as for the hedgecutter I don't think it was a battle winner like when the British attacked the German at night & over ran them do you ?

I have never before heard anyone indicate that the hedgerows worked to the Allies advantage. Interesting. I would disagree. The reason the tanks attacking across the open fields was such a disaster was because they were attacking into what they knew to be dug in German 88's and 105's. Because of the hedgerows, they could not bypass or flank these positions, and made a suicidal frontal attack.

Further, the hedgerows provided perfect prefabricated defensive positions for the German defenders. They held the Allies up from June 6th until the breakout in August. Without the hedgrow cutter, the Allies might never have broken out of Normandy.

As far as the Allies only being used to fighting in the desert prior to Normandy, they had previously fought across France and Belguim (in retreat leading up to Dunkirk), fought in Sicily and Italy (mountainous terrain), Crete and Greece, Norway. In any event, regardless of whether they had fought in bocage before, you would think somebody would have recognized the hazard they posed to attacking forces.

And Rob, my friend, I know you dislike when I attack Monty, as he is a British National hero, but Patton is huge American hero, and I attack him as well. And, while Monty, as the ground commander, is most culpable for this intelligence failure, every commander involved in the planning process from Ike on down bears responsibility.

 

[Louis Badolato]

I think your find The US army had the same problem in 1945 in the Forest of Germany :wink2:

They absolutely did, and the idiots responsible for attacking through the Hurtgen Forrest are way further down my list of bad generals than Monty. As a general rule, the American high command was worse than the British, and way worse than the German high command, because many American generals never came within 100 miles of the front, and never examined the ground over which they were ordering their troops to attack. The British commanders usually, and German commanders always, knew the ground over which they expected their men to attack. Because of this, the worst tactical disasters perpetrated by the Allies during the war tended to be caused by American generals like Mark Clark (the whole Italian campaign was an unmitigated disaster) and the geniouses behind the Hurtgen Forest debacle.

Unlike most of the better British and German defenders, Monty ignored intelligence, especially relating to the ground across which he was attacking, leading to several terrible mistakes.

 

[uksubs]

I have never before heard anyone indicate that the hedgerows worked to the Allies advantage. Interesting. I would disagree. The reason the tanks attacking across the open fields was such a disaster was because they were attacking into what they knew to be dug in German 88's and 105's. Because of the hedgerows, they could not bypass or flank these positions, and made a suicidal frontal attack.

Further, the hedgerows provided perfect prefabricated defensive positions for the German defenders. They held the Allies up from June 6th until the breakout in August. Without the hedgrow cutter, the Allies might never have broken out of Normandy.

As far as the Allies only being used to fighting in the desert prior to Normandy, they had previously fought across France and Belguim (in retreat leading up to Dunkirk), fought in Sicily and Italy (mountainous terrain), Crete and Greece, Norway. In any event, regardless of whether they had fought in bocage before, you would think somebody would have recognized the hazard they posed to attacking forces.

Are think your find I was talking about big tank battles ,do you know the number of hedgrow cutter that were made ? It was a great idea but don't think it was the main reason the Allies broke out of Normandy.