Sure did. It all turned on tactics. Same with the P-40 to a large degree. Correct tactics made a huge difference in negating the advantage the Zero had. Japanese aviators took a much longer time to adapt their tactics and it cost them. -- Al
Japanese air tactics were a lot like their infantry tactics, which is to say fairly primitive. In the case of its air groups, some of this was technological in nature. For example, the radios carried in its 1942-era, Zero fighters were single-channel sets that were reception-only. In theory, the units could have been used to direct intercepts of incoming enemies. However, they were heavy and pilots preferred to fly CAP without them! Fighters defending a Japanese task force simply flew high above it and waited. If a ship below them spotted an enemy, it would fire its weapons in the direction of the threat and hope the CAP noticed. Sometimes the magic worked, and sometimes it didn't. The whole thesis behind Parshall and Tully's
Shattered Sword is that the Japanese carriers at Midway were essentially doomed before they set sail. Their well-supported argument is that the
Kido Butai's air defenses were so weak as to be virtually doomed in the face of a competent enemy confronting it in significant numbers. The Japanese were simply overwhelmed.
As to the fighter tactics of its air elements, there really weren't any in the sense of those exhibited by Western air forces. There was no "Vic" or "Finger Four." Success was dependent on the skill and comittment of the individual in single-warrior combat, and to numbers. The idea was simply to swamp and overwhelm the enemy with its very nimble fighters. Formations weren't one iota more sophisticated than the gaggles sent aloft by air forces in WWI. Fighters formed up on their leader, flew to the target and attacked when signalled to do so. From then on out, they were on their own. This worked well enough early in the war. A squadron or two garrisoning an Allied base stood little chance when attacked by a force which outnumbered it 2-1 in fighters alone. The result was usually decimation for the defenders and the appearance of invincibility for the Japanese air groups. However, there were serious cracks in the facade from the beginning. Even in the days of the early conquests, the Japanese experienced significant and unstainable losses to pilots and aircrew, as the Allied pilots were "dishing out" pretty much "as good as they got." By the end of 1942, the losses were so severe as to constitute well over one-hundred-percent of the frontline pilots and aircrew with which Japanese carrier air groups had started the war a year earlier.
Above this post, Al was discussing the Brewster Buffalo and its apparent failure, with a lesser number of Wildcats, to defend Midway effectively. While absolutely valid, it's important to note the losses that the defenders inflicted on the Japanese strike, not only in planes downed, but also those damaged. The outnumbered garrison actually beat the Japanese up pretty well. A key figure, Joichi Tomonaga, the leader of Hiryu's torpedo squadron, survived the attack, but his Kate was damaged. Tomonaga subsequently took off to counterattack the American carriers knowing that he could never make it back in a plane leaking fuel like a sieve. He went aloft anyhow, yet another casualty of Midway's Buffalo fighters. Had the Japanese simply withdrawn after the Midway air-strike, the battle would have fit the pattern of Japanese operations throughout the first year of the war. The air group had gone in, punished the defenders, and accomplished many of its immediate objectives. However, the Buffaloes had really gotten their attention and attacks were still coming at the ships of the carrier group. The Japanese subsequently stuck to their plan and unsuccessfully sought to adapt to unexpected events. They unknowingly elected to fight it out with a determined enemy of roughly equal numbers that was supported by land-based strike and patrol assets. And they got crushed.
-Moe